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8 Chapter 1: General Introduction 
Cooperation is now, and always has been, fundamental to social life. The success of 
human evolution is based on effective cooperation within and between groups (e.g., Boyd & 
Richerson, 2009). The ability to cooperate and exchange allowed humans to diversify their 
skills and, as a whole, become collectively more productive. In a globalized world which 
faces many roadblocks to cooperation, it is more crucial than ever to understand how to 
develop cooperative social norms that create cooperative communities.  
Evolutionary biologists see cooperation among kin as promoting the fitness of the 
species by ensuring that one’s genes promulgate into future generations. Humans may be 
unique however, in the capacity to cooperate with complete strangers (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003). For example, global communities have been 
formed through industrialization and globalization where cooperation occurs on a large scale. 
Related to this development, there has been a widespread civilizing process and the rise of 
citizenship in which shared norms have developed around when and how to cooperate. Of 
course, there is also an inherent tension between cooperation and competition – which we see 
in displays of ingroup favouritism, prejudice and inequality which, in the extreme, can lead to 
outbreaks of war and even genocide.   
Recently, there has been increasing importance placed on understanding the evolution 
and maintenance of cooperative societies. This is due to, among other things, the rise of social 
inequalities, polarization of ideologies and extremism, political manipulation through social 
media algorithms, all of which challenge and sometimes threaten to erode existing 
cooperative social structures (for example, Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Putnam, 2001; Woolley 
& Howard, 2018). In the face of all this societal change and in view of  tension within human 
society between cooperative and competitive tendencies, how can cooperation be maintained 
and nurtured? Currently, research addresses the conditions and variables that exist in 
cooperative societies. However, less research has been done to understand how societies form 
that build and sustain cooperative relations over time. Therefore, in this dissertation, we study 
the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in emergent and dynamic, albeit small, 
groups. This approach to studying cooperation allows us to understand how these cooperative 
communities evolve as well as provide insight into how they can be sustained over time.   
In the remainder of this introduction, we will first give an overview of the theoretical 
foundation upon which this thesis is built. As each empirical chapter is written as a standalone 
paper, there are many overlaps in the introductions for each chapter. Therefore, we will keep 
this theoretical background succinct. Next, we briefly address the methodological approach 
used, and finally provide an outline of the chapters that follow.  
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Theoretical Background 
Cooperating in a group can be a risky enterprise: Engaging in an activity or investing 
in a shared resource which serves the group or society as a whole, may not satisfy a person’s 
immediate self-interest. For example, one may be able to accrue greater disposable income if 
one manages to evade the taxation authorities and yet still benefit from government 
expenditures, such as infrastructure. Indeed, early researchers in the field of economics 
foresaw this potential barrier to cooperation and assumed that rationally speaking, under 
conditions in which it is in one’s personal interest not to cooperate, people would free-ride off 
the group or society whenever they were given an opportunity to do so (Edwards, 1962). 
However, in the years since, evidence to the contrary has moved us away from this simplistic 
assumption of humans as rational “homo economicus”; in other words, away from the idea of 
egoist rationality (Ledyard, 1995). The assumption that individuals will act out of pure self-
interest without considering what people around them may do has been replaced by the 
assumption of social rationality (i.e., goal directed behavior that is influenced by social 
conditions). Social rationality argues that people gain adaptive advantages from living in 
groups and are strongly influenced by one another (see for example, Lindenberg, 2015b). 
Therefore, considering what is best for the individual, and thus what their “rational” behavior 
should be in a given circumstance, becomes problematic if one does not consider an 
individual’s place in an interconnected web of human relations. This paradigm shift has 
helped us to advance the understanding of when and how cooperation occurs, for example the 
role that social goals and social norms play in influencing an individual’s choice to cooperate 
or defect (Diekmann & Lindenberg, 2015). Given that cooperation is in many circumstances 
very functional for societies as a whole, it is important for us to identify the factors that 
account for its emergence over time; and how it can be sustained in ever expanding and 
diversifying societies. 
Social Norms for Cooperation  
Why do people cooperate? There are many circumstances where outcomes can be 
maximized when people cooperate and work together. In other words, there are many things 
that people cannot do well alone – from building the pyramids in Egypt to running a 
multinational corporation. The next important question is: When do people cooperate? People 
often come into a situation with a set of expectations for how others might behave and how 
they personally should behave. We broadly refer to these expectations as social norms. 
Bicchieri (2005) argues that social norms can, in part, be distinguished from descriptive 
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norms because following the former often requires that an individual goes against their 
narrow self-interest for the sake of joint gain (for example, one is expected to reciprocate a 
favour or act fairly, even if there is a personal cost to it). In this thesis, we are primarily 
interested in how social norms for cooperation emerge and come into being in the first place.  
One contribution to the social rationality explanation of human behavior is a large 
body of research on social value orientation which suggests that people have set preferences 
to act in particular ways across many circumstances (Messick & McClintock, 1968). Some 
people may be individualistic, competitive and “proself”, while others may be altruistic, 
cooperative and “prosocial”. These individual preferences, or social goals, are mostly seen as 
fairly stable individual differences and thus a potential shortcoming is that these individual 
predispositions do not adequately consider the role of situational and environmental factors 
that may influence one’s behavior in a given circumstance (Diekmann & Lindenberg, 2015).  
In addition to individual preferences, there has also been a fair amount of research 
focus on how generic norms may guide behavior such as cooperation, in group settings. 
Generic norms refer to norms that already exist in society and which people draw upon to 
inform their behavior in a given setting. For example, most societies have generic norms for 
direct reciprocation – where one directly returns a favour to someone, and where not doing so 
may be considered impolite and dishonorable. Further, many societies also have generic 
norms for indirect reciprocation – which occurs in larger systems where reputation gained 
from past interactions informs how third parties treat you. In other words, if one is perceived 
as helpful, one will receive more help in the future – but not necessarily from the people one 
has helped previously. Both direct and indirect reciprocation are normative systems that can 
increase cooperation in society as a whole (for a discussion see Diekmann & Lindenberg, 
2015). 
How does one know which norm to draw on in any given setting? According to goal 
framing theory, whether to cooperate or not in a particular context can be influenced by an 
overarching goal frame that guides an individual (Lindenberg, 2015b). Goal frames are 
activated by environmental cues and the particular goal frame activated informs the social 
heuristics, or rules, that an individual draws upon to guide their behavior in a particular 
situation. According to this theory, the three main goal frames are: hedonic, normative and 
gain goal frames (Lindenberg, 2015b, 2015a). Particular social situations activate certain goal 
frames to a greater extent than others – although multiple goal frames may operate, some in 
the background. This theory helps explain why the social framing of lab-based cooperation 
experiments can have frame-dependent outcomes for cooperative or competitive behavior (see 
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for example Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004; and for meta-analytic results see Van Lange, 
Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). As an illustration, framing an experiment to participants 
in cooperative terms (e.g., as a “Community game”), versus competitive terms (e.g., “Wall 
Street game”), can increase cooperation through the provision of a normative goal frame as 
opposed to a gains goal frame.  
The view that rational behavior needs to be consistent across settings has been 
challenged by this theory. The ability to switch between goal frames depending on the 
situation and then act accordingly shows that one’s behavior is not rational in the traditional 
sense but is highly context-dependent and requires sometimes effortful self-regulation on the 
part of the individual (Lindenberg, 2015a; Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). In particular, self-
regulation is required when there is a conflict of goals: for example, suppressing falling asleep 
– guided by a hedonic goal – while pursuing the normative goal (e.g., writing a chapter for 
your thesis). Self-regulation also allows one to maintain a balance between goals (e.g., to 
avoid thesis-related burnout). Notably, self-regulation here does not simply refer to an 
individual’s stable, innate capacity because institutions, organizations and interpersonal 
relations can all have a large impact on one’s self-regulatory ability (Lindenberg, 2015a).  
A potential shortcoming of both described conceptions of norms – generic norms (e.g., 
reciprocation or ingroup bias) as well as overarching goal frames which activate different 
types of norms – is that both are conceptualized as having a unidirectional influence on 
behavior. Generic norms are seen to “pre-exist” in society and are drawn on as guides for 
behavior; and similarly, goal frames are activated by features of the external environment and 
then an individual adapts their behavior to the particular goal activated. In both conceptions, 
an individual does not co-create the norm or set the goal frame with others through 
interaction. However, norms are by their nature emergent: Individuals play an active role in 
the creation, maintenance and change of social norms (see Reicher & Haslam, 2013). As such, 
social norms cannot simply be seen as manuals for behavior when they are “activated”, but 
rather, are phenomena which are shaped by people through their active engagement with 
others. Therefore, theories regarding the influence of generic norms and/or goal frames on 
cooperation may indeed operate within society once these norms and environments have 
already been formed—but they do not address how society forms in the first place nor how 
humans actively shape it. 
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Social Categorization and Inductive groups 
Why do people show normative behavior in the first place? The presence or absence 
of social identification with a group may help to explain this. For example, there has been a 
lot of evidence to suggest that identifying as a member of a group or social category facilitates 
one’s cooperation with others in that group (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; De Cremer, Van 
Knippenberg, Van Dijk, & Van Leeuwen, 2008; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Simpson, 
2006; Wit & Kerr, 2002). The Social Identity Approach – an integration of social identity 
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1991; Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) – seeks to explain how belonging to a group influences 
one’s cognitive processes and behavior. When the broad social categories to which one 
belongs (e.g., nationality, race, gender etc.) become salient, one comes to see oneself as a 
group member. Under these circumstances, one’s social identity, rather than personal identity, 
tends to guide one’s thoughts and behaviour. Activated social identities influence one to act in 
support of the group, rather than out of self-interest (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; 
Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). These identities also activate particular social norms 
associated with the group (Turner, 1991). Furthermore, norms which are integrated into social 
identities have a greater impact on behavior when social identity is salient; and high 
identifiers tend to experience more positive emotions related to the adherence of group norms 
(Christensen, Rothgerber, Wood, & Matz, 2004). In addition to cooperation, social 
identification with the group has been shown to be associated with a sense of belonging and 
group cohesion (Hogg, 1992; Turner et al., 1987), it promotes collective action (Van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) as well as ingroup favoritism (Tajfel et al., 1971). This 
theory of (inter)group relations also helps to explain how humans form cooperative 
relationships outside of familial ties – rather than one’s sense of self simply extending to 
closely related individuals, through categorization, one’s sense of identity can extend to ever 
broader groups. 
But how do cooperative groups and societies form in the first place? The emergence of 
social identity may explain this process. According to the Interactive Model of Social Identity 
Formation (IMIF; Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005), 
while (pre-existing) social identities can be deduced from broad social categories, social 
identities can also be induced (and thereby developed)  from the bottom up, through 
interpersonal interaction and communication over time. Small, interactive groups can develop 
the same properties as broad abstract categories (such as social identification, belongingness 
etc.), albeit through different pathways. In particular, in inductively formed groups, personal 
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value to the group and heterogeneity of group members is important, rather than the 
homogeneity emphasized by members of a shared social category. Here dynamic processes 
are of central importance to the group: Social norms of the group emerge dynamically through 
interaction over time, rather than being “turned on” by the saliency of a social category. This 
inductive process can explain how individuals come to share a sense of similarity and 
common social identity with one another which, in turn, enables the emergence of social 
norms for cooperation. An individual who sees oneself as a group member – with all the 
interdependencies that this entails – is “socially rational” and is capable of making choices in 
relation to others and cooperating with other group members. 
The effects that the inductive route to social identification has on individual 
perceptions, behavior, and group level outcomes has been explored in areas relating to: 
individual distinctiveness (Jans, Postmes, & Van der Zee, 2012), group solidarity 
(Koudenburg, Postmes, Gordijn, & Van Mourik Broekman, 2015), and solidarity between 
actors and observers (Van Mourik Broekman, Gordijn, Koudenburg, & Postmes, 2018). 
However, currently there is not much research addressing how different forms of 
identification (through social categorization/deductive or inductive processes) are associated 
with cooperation. One aspect of cooperation that this thesis aims to address, is to what extent 
the pathway to social identification affects the trajectory of cooperation within groups. For 
example, can cooperation in inductive groups reach similarly high levels as that of deductive 
groups, given time for interaction to occur and social identities to emerge? Our starting 
assumption, taken from the Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation, is that while 
social categorization will facilitate early and relatively stable levels of cooperation, inductive 
processes will allow groups to develop the same cooperative norms, which become stable 
through interaction over time.  
A Methodological Approach to Studying the Emergence of Cooperative Norms 
In this thesis, we have employed dynamic Public Goods Games (PGGs) in order to 
study the emergence, or lack thereof, of cooperative norms in small interactive groups, while 
also manipulating whether groups of people interact as a deductive or an inductive group. 
PGGs allow people to contribute to a shared resource-pool which generates profit 
proportional to investments, but distributes returns equally to all regardless of individual 
investments (Olson, 1965). Therefore, groups do best when everyone cooperates, but 
individuals maximize profit – at least in the short-term and as long as others cooperate – by 
free-riding (i.e., not cooperating/defecting) (Samuelson, 1954). In the real world, public goods 
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include: public television and radio; material infrastructure (such as roads); intellectual 
property developed in groups etc. (Katz, Lazer, Arrow, & Contractor, 2004; Shankar & Pavitt, 
2002). PGGs are useful because they conceptually reflect how public goods operate in the real 
world but allow us to study cooperation in a controlled environment.  
 We programmed a dynamic PGG in the Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL, see 
viappl.org). VIAPPL is an experimental platform designed to study social interaction and the 
evolution of group processes and norms (see Durrheim, Quayle, Tredoux, Titlestad, & Tooke, 
2016). Participants interact in a controlled environment over a sequence of rounds and their 
interactions are recorded for analyses. Interaction is made up of exchange behavior and the 
sending and receiving of messages. In VIAPPL, the experimenter can design simple dyadic 
exchange games, common pool resource dilemmas and Public Goods Games (PGGs). Since 
VIAPPL was developed as a tool to study group processes, variables such as group size, 
group status, the number of groups, and whether participants can choose their groups or are 
randomly assigned can be manipulated. Questionnaires to measure social psychological 
constructs can be initiated at any point in the experiment. Finally, images can be imported and 
set as the background to the computer-arena; and the avatar images, which represent 
individual players or groups, can also be selected by the experimenter. 
While many traditional social psychological experiments exclude social interaction in 
order to make results more tractable (see Reicher & Haslam, 2013), VIAPPL reintroduces 
social interaction to social psychological experiments in computer-mediated format. The 
inclusion and study of social interaction – while introducing many complexities – more 
closely reflects real world social processes and allows us to study how people make choices in 
relation to others. The aim of this thesis is to study the emergence of cooperative norms and 
examine how groups of different kinds interact over time. As such, VIAPPL provides the 
ideal environment to study these processes.  
In VIAPPL, we simulated small communities in which we could study cooperation in 
small interactive groups. With this set-up, interaction among actors occurred over time (i.e., 
people could contribute the public good over multiple rounds); an individual’s actions could 
be monitored by all group members; and communication between group members was 
enabled. Designing the experiments with these key ingredients allows groups of participants 
to engage in exchange behavior as well as develop social relationships with one another. 
Given that the modern conception of cooperation is based on the idea of social rationality, 
allowing for social processes to occur during exchange can give us insight into how 
 Chapter 1: General introduction 15 
cooperative norms emerge in groups. More details of the experiments can be found in 
Chapters 2-5 of this thesis.   
Overview of the empirical chapters 
In four empirical chapters, we aim to study the emergence of cooperation over time in 
small, interactive groups. We also aim to determine whether interactive groups develop their 
own social norms of cooperation and whether these norms differ between the two social 
identification pathways (i.e., deductive/social categories versus inductive/non-categorized 
groups/interpersonal tie groups). In Chapter 2 through 4 we study the behavioural patterns of 
cooperation in small groups, while in Chapter 5 we qualitatively explore the content of the 
communication that occurred within the groups.  
 
Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, we study the differences in the emergence of cooperation after cueing 
different pathways to social identification (social categorization versus non-categorization). 
We then develop a statistical approach (namely, the multilevel latent class Markov model; see 
Van de Pol & Langeheine, 1990; Vermunt, Tran, & Magidson, 2008) which allows us to 
study the emergence of cooperative norms within interactive groups. Chapter 2 entails one 
large experimental study consisting of 40 groups of 6 participants (240 individuals in total) 
who interact in small groups in a dynamic Public Good Game. In the experiment, participants 
choose to invest in their group over time in a context in which they are given full feedback 
regarding their group members’ investments and are allowed time to communicate between 
investments. Permitting interaction over time enables us to study the dynamic formation of 
social norms of cooperation. 
 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 conceptually replicates the results of Chapter 2 using a richer experimental 
manipulation. While we compared categorization to non-categorization in Chapter 2, in this 
Chapter, we compare the categorization condition to a more strongly inductive-type of social 
identity manipulation. With this in mind, we develop an Interpersonal Ties condition which 
emphasizes social support and interpersonal relations rather than broad social categories (i.e., 
the social categories condition). Besides strengthening the manipulation, a similar 
experimental procedure as Chapter 2 is followed, both in terms of the experiment as well as 
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the method of analysis. In this Chapter, we confirm and build on the results of Chapter 2 and 
go into more detail regarding the emergence of cooperative norms within groups. 
 
Chapter 4 
Due to the fact that in both Chapter 2 and 3 we see high levels of cooperation, in 
which participants often hit the ceiling for cooperation over the course of the game, in this 
chapter we aim to increase the variance in the initial starting values to see whether 
cooperation will still emerge. Therefore, we replicate the experiment in the South African 
context and change the incentive structure such that payoffs are dependent on the outcomes of 
the game. We conduct one large experiment of 300 participants (30 groups of 10) and follow 
an otherwise identical procedure to the study in Chapter 3. In contrast, however, we find 
different results compared to the previous two studies. Here both pathways to social 
identification fail to produce high levels of cooperation and instead, mostly unstable 
communities form in which strongly normative behavior does not arise as frequently. 
 
Chapter 5  
Chapters 3 and 4 followed similar experimental procedures but the cooperation levels 
that groups achieved were different. Since groups in both studies could be divided into those 
who align their behavior on high levels of cooperation (i.e., develop strong cooperative 
norms) and those that do not, here we aim to compare the content of the messages which were 
sent during social interaction in order to gain more insight into the types of communication 
that may facilitate or interfere with the emergence of cooperative norms. In this Chapter, we 
present a mixed-method approach – which includes both qualitative and quantitative analyses 
of the communication – to garner insight into the dynamic conditions under which 
cooperation may emerge more or less easily.  
  
  
Chapter 2: The Dynamic Emergence 
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Abstract 
This paper addresses the formation of social norms of cooperation through interaction in 
repeated Public Goods Games, using novel multilevel techniques. Cooperation has 
traditionally been understood as the interplay of static factors such as shared social identity 
and pre-existing norms. This study investigates the dynamic emergence of cooperative norms 
in the presence or absence of social categorization. A small effect of categorization was 
found: Categorization helps initiate and maintain higher levels of cooperation. However, the 
differences in emergent cooperation between small groups were much stronger than the 
differences between the Categorization and Non-Categorization conditions. Using explorative 
analyses, three distinct classes of groups were found. Within groups, group members follow 
nearly identical rules for their choice of cooperative behavior. We argue that individual 
behavior converged because of the social interactions within these groups. Overall, the 
development of cooperation is best predicted by the process of norm formation that occurs 
when social identities emerge. 
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How does cooperation in small groups emerge? This paper takes a dynamic 
perspective on the formation of social norms for cooperation. We also consider how social 
categorization can influence this norm formation. We seek to understand how cooperation 
arises and is maintained in a social dilemma: drawing on advances both in experimental 
software and in multilevel latent class Markov models, we can analyze decision rules for 
cooperation and the emergence of individual behavioral patterns in conjunction with group 
norms.  
The formation of cooperative norms in a small community, or society at large, has at 
least one fundamental hurdle: When there are collective goods – whether it be collective 
action, public television, farming collective lands, etc. (Katz et al., 2004; Shankar & Pavitt, 
2002) – there may be free riding because collective goods are shared equally, regardless of 
personal contribution (Samuelson, 1954). Therefore, traditional game theory argues that in 
order to maximize one’s (economic) self-interest, it is rational not to cooperate. For example, 
Hardin (1968) argued in the “Tragedy of the Commons” that everyone has an individual 
predisposition to take advantage of a common-pool resource, such as the environment, and 
therefore people are destined to undermine it – for example, through overgrazing or polluting. 
If this were true, all attempts at cooperation are ultimately doomed to fail or falter. 
Such social dilemmas are commonly studied in Public Goods Games (PGG) (Olson, 
1965). A PGG is essentially a simulated society in which participants decide how much to 
contribute to the Public Good – the socially optimal outcome is universal cooperation, the 
best individual outcome is defection while all others cooperate. Contrary to classic rational 
actor expectations, however, research suggests that cooperation in social dilemmas tends to be 
"irrationally" high: in the range of 40-60% of what one can contribute (for example, see 
Ledyard, 1995).   
Why is “rational defection” so rare in these experiments? In his seminal work on the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, Robert Axelrod (1984) found that the most sustainable and profitable 
strategy in repeated interaction is tit-for-tat rather than self-interested defection. Tit-for-tat 
entails that people begin interaction by cooperating and then copy their interactant’s 
subsequent behavior – i.e., conditional cooperation. Tit-for-tat was seen as: a) nice, as it starts 
with cooperation; b) forgiving, as one will cooperate again when the other player stops 
defecting; c) retaliatory, as it punishes non-cooperation; and d) clear, as it is easy to discern 
the interaction pattern. Tit-for-tat was thought to be evolutionary robust and could emerge in 
an environment of egoist players, optimizing each player’s payoff. However, in reality one’s 
20 Chapter 2: The Dynamic Emergence of Cooperative Norms in a Social Dilemma 
payoff is not necessarily instrumental (i.e., maximizing points) but might also have a  
relational value.  
Building on the ideas of game theory, the interdependence perspective (Kelley et al., 
2003; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2008; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) 
provides a framework to look at the effect of between-person processes on collective 
outcomes, where one’s optimal outcome has strong relational considerations. These 
considerations are determined by personal characteristics and situational factors. Whether 
exchanges are seen as rewarding or not, depends not only on instrumental payoff but also on 
one’s individually fixed preferences and expectations. Furthermore, interdependence theory 
assumes that an individual’s behavior will – to greater or lesser extent – be influenced by the 
actions of others, given a particular interdependence structure. Examples of these structures 
include situations in which an individual has unilateral control over another’s outcomes, or 
vice versa; or where both partners’ actions have an effect on outcomes for both. In other 
words, the situation structure influences an individual’s behavior in relation to those to whom 
one’s outcome is tied. If levels of "rational defection" are rare in PGG's, interdependence 
theory suggests this may be because certain individuals value good relations more than profit. 
However, one potential issue for interdependence theory is that most research in this tradition 
focuses on dyads, which is quite far removed from the more complex dynamics of groups. 
Nevertheless, Public Goods research has revealed many static factors that contribute to 
higher levels of cooperation. Of particular interest to social scientists are a shared social 
identity (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Simpson, 2006) and differences in preferences and 
beliefs (e.g., social value orientation, Messick & McClintock, 1968).  
 
Static views on Cooperation and Social Identity 
Much of the traditional research using PGGs examines cooperation in one-shot 
experiments. There is an extensive literature on situational and personal factors that influence 
decisions to cooperate or defect in such settings. We refer to these as “static” factors, in the 
sense that their effects are assumed independent of (or exogenous to) the social interactions or 
exchanges within the PGG. 
For example, cooperation tends to be high in groups that share a social identity. 
Shared social identities can be formed “deductively”, whereby group members infer a joint 
category membership because they exhibit shared characteristics or prototypical traits 
(Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005; Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1985). In other words, group 
identity can form from the top down. Belonging to a shared social category (gender, race, 
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nationality etc.) or even “minimal” groups without meaning (Tajfel et al., 1971) can, for 
example, increase the sense of belonging and group cohesion (Turner et al., 1987) and 
promote ingroup favoritism (Tajfel et al., 1971). 
Higher social identification with one’s group not only alters expectations about the 
behaviors of others: greater cooperation is mediated by one’s sense of self as a group member 
(De Cremer et al., 2008). Having a shared social identity appears to transform the goals of 
selfish individuals so that they cooperate rather than defect (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; 
Turner, 1991). Accordingly, one can increase cooperation by categorizing people at the 
collective, rather than subgroup or individual level (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Wit & Kerr, 
2002; but see Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002, for exceptions). Group members, when 
they identify as a group and hence when shared identity is salient, tend to optimize ingroup 
outcomes and minimize ingroup inequalities (Simpson, 2006), both of which happen when all 
group members contribute maximally to the Public Good.  
A large body of literature shows that levels of cooperation also depend on personal 
preferences. In interdependence theory, a personality difference that has received much 
attention is the distinction between those who are more individualistic, competitive and 
“proself” versus those who are more altruistic, cooperative and “prosocial” (social value 
orientation, SVO, Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, 1999). This explains about 9% 
of the variation in cooperation in social dilemmas (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009). 
Approaches to SVO tend to treat these preferences for cooperation or selfishness as fairly 
stable response styles (Messick, 1999). With respect to exchange decisions, these response 
styles may operate as social heuristics for behaviors that have become automated and intuitive 
because they were rewarding in the past (Jordan, Peysakhovich, & Rand, 2014) and therefore  
may spill over into novel situations (Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016). To our knowledge, how 
these personal response styles play out in dynamic settings, where individuals with different 
social heuristics interact for a prolonged series of exchanges, has not yet been explored.  
Above the individual level, the decision whether or not to cooperate can also be 
influenced by the overarching goal frame salient in a particular context (Lindenberg, 2015a, 
2015b), which also informs the social heuristics drawn on by the individual. Notably, 
Lindenberg (2015a, 2015b) draws a distinction between personal preferences and overarching 
goals, arguing that the latter are determined by the social environment. According to 
Lindenberg (2015a, 2015b), particular social situations activate certain goal frames to a 
greater extent than others (although others may still operate in the background). This explains 
why the social framing of cooperation dilemmas can have different outcomes for cooperative 
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or competitive behavior (see for example Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004; Van Lange, 
Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). For example, framing a social dilemma in cooperative 
terms (“Community game”), versus competitive terms (“Wall Street game”), can increase 
cooperation by providing a normative goal frame (where collective gain is salient) versus a 
gains goal frame (where individual gain is salient). Beyond these situational goal frames, the 
level of within-game cooperation is also likely to be affected by the quality of interactions 
within the game. Here we might see the emergence of norms of an entirely different kind.  
 
Dynamic views on Cooperation and Social Identity 
The emergence of cooperation is increasingly being studied through iterative social 
dilemmas. Naturally, this shift in interest in the field focuses on how relations (or even 
societies) form that are more or less cooperative. This is highly relevant: variability in the 
levels of cooperation between societies tends to be high (e.g., Henrich et al., 2001), so it is 
important to understand what makes a society promote high levels of cooperation. As an 
overall trend, research suggests that cooperation is usually higher when there is a higher 
probability of interacting again in the future (Dal Bó, 2005), possibly due to the role of direct 
and indirect reciprocity where one expects present cooperative behavior to be returned in the 
future (Lindenberg, 2015b; Molm, Schaefer, & Collett, 2007). Factors that enhance the effect 
of reciprocity in cooperative situations include: homogeneity, smallness and stability of the 
group and its membership (Diekmann & Lindenberg, 2015). 
 Most findings from iterative PGGs show that contributions often start at around 50% 
of what one can possibly contribute and, although they tend to decline over time, the average 
contribution remains above zero (Barrera, 2014). Additional research considers factors 
preventing this tendency of decline. For example, studies have found that implementing a 
sanctioning system can mitigate a decline in cooperation (e.g., Barrera, 2014; Van 
Miltenburg, Buskens, Barrera, & Raub, 2014). Sanctioning is a form of negative feedback in 
response to defection, which ideally discourages future defection and encourages cooperation. 
Sanctioning can occur in multiple ways, through material or symbolic means – for example, 
monetary penalties or the communication of social disapproval (Barrera, 2014; Van 
Miltenburg et al., 2014).  
Although cooperation can increase through learning and experience in some infinitely 
repeated games, this is not the case in all games (e.g., Dal Bó, 2005): the exact conditions that 
account for these group differences are not well understood. Therefore, it is valuable to study 
dynamic factors – rather than static factors only – that may increase cooperation. One of these 
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is the effect of communication in cooperation dilemmas. Communication increases 
cooperation (Chen & Komorita, 1994; Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977) presumably 
because it provides the ability to: 1) enhance understanding of the PG situation; 2) coordinate 
actions; 3) create cooperative social norms; 4) form strategic agreements; 5) enhance trust in 
others; and 6) establish a social identity (X. Chen, 1996; Shankar & Pavitt, 2002). 
Communication is thus interactive and can help people to coordinate and support higher levels 
of cooperation within groups.  
Another dynamic component is the in-game formation of either positive or negative 
social ties which depends on the nature of interaction with other players rather than 
exclusively on one’s pre-interaction social value orientation. For example, Van Dijk, 
Sonnemans and van Winden (2002) found direct evidence for social ties (i.e., the extent to 
which two people care about the well-being of one another) forming over time in interaction. 
Once positive social ties are formed, it seems likely that they would have implications for 
future cooperation.  
According to the Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation (Postmes, Haslam, et 
al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005), communication and the formation of social ties both 
play a role in the induction of a shared identity. Research suggests that social interaction, the 
formation of personal relations, and coordinated action can all contribute to the emergence of 
group bonds. In this process, social identity is formed inductively (from the bottom up), rather 
than just deductively (inferred top-down based on predefined social categories). This is 
naturally a more emergent view of social identification, consistent with arguments that the 
agency of an individual in the group can promote identification (Reicher & Haslam, 2013); 
and that interpersonal network interactions foster group belonging and well-being  
(Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2013).  
One study has shown some evidence that cooperation may be higher in groups that 
have formed a shared identity through induction (Jans et al., 2012), but only for 
heterogeneous rather than homogenous groups. The actual process of forming a shared 
identity during social exchange, and how this in turn influences cooperation over time, has not 
been studied as far as we know.  
In sum, while prior research has often explored static factors that influence 
cooperation (e.g. categorization, personal preferences, social heuristics, goal frames), more 
recently attention has turned to dynamic factors accounting for the emergence and 
maintenance of cooperation over time (e.g. induction, communication, social tie formation). 
There are many dynamic factors operating at the group and individual level that all seem to be 
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heavily influenced by the social environment. One approach to further this line of research is 
to determine how these factors operate together and arise simultaneously.  
 
The present research 
How do within-game cooperative norms emerge over time in tandem with dynamic 
factors, such as the induction of a shared identity? We introduce some methodological 
advances – in terms of experimental design and software, as well as statistical techniques – 
that enable us to study the emergence of groups and cooperative norms within groups over 
time. The study presented here is an experimental Public Goods Game where social 
interaction over time was possible and where we manipulated the presence or absence of 
social categorization.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Psychology students (N=240, 164 female, 74 male, two undeclared, Mage= 20.32) 
participated in return for course credit. Groups of six interacted for 1.5 hours. There were 2 
conditions, Categorized versus Non- Categorized, with 20 groups each. For multilevel studies, 
power calculations require approximate knowledge of not only effect sizes but also intraclass 
correlation coefficients and other parameters (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Given the novelty of 
the present research and thus not knowing which parameter values to expect, we had no 
reliable grounds for sample size calculations and decided to use what we expected would be a 
relatively high sample size at the experimental group level. The study was approved by the 




A Public Goods game with communication was created on the experimental platform, 
the Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL, see viappl.org). Participants came to the lab in 
groups of 6. They were connected through the server and all interaction took place over 
VIAPPL, whilst they were physically present in the same room with screens partitioning 
individual computers. The game had four stages: 1) dyadic exchange and group formation; 2) 
Public Goods Game; 3) group reformation and, finally, 4) a second PGG. Before the 
experiment, the general rules of the PGG were explained (via instruction manuals, see 
Supplementary Information A) and a brief demonstration of the software was given.  
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To introduce dynamic interaction and to make the emergence of groups possible, 
participants were given the opportunity to build their own social psychological stimulus 
through interaction in the first stages of the experiment. A settler’s metaphor was used for 
this: participants were asked to imagine that they had arrived on a newly discovered island 
where they would settle and farm the land. They were informed that there are other new 
arrivals on this island with whom they could communicate, interact, and form “farming co-
operatives” in order to build their farms and start cultivating the land.  
In order for participants to form farming co-operatives (or co-
ops), participants could interact with each other beforehand. After the background story was 
presented, participants began a dyadic exchange task where they exchanged building 
materials with other participants to build their farmhouse. Each participant possessed one 
unique building material and there were six in total. They were asked to accumulate three 
additional materials during the task. Participants could message one another in order to 
coordinate their exchanges1. 
The outcome of dyadic exchange was symbolic as the ‘houses’ built had no carry-over 
into the following phases of the game. However, this task did provide participants with a 
history of interaction that could be a basis for forming co-ops. The feedback at the end of the 
task was identical for all participants – “Well done! You built your farm as best you could. 
Now organize - through discussion - which co-op you want to join!”. The message appeared 
regardless of how many materials the participant ended up with.  
At this stage participants were given the opportunity to join one 
of three co-ops after communicating via instant messaging for 3 minutes2. The choice of three 
co-ops instead of two, reflects the idea that groups often exist in complex formations, not 
purely in dichotomous terms (P. Kerr, Durrheim, & Dixon, 2017). Furthermore, we felt that 
two groups would make the choice for the Categorized condition too obvious so we allowed 
room for participants to make alternate groups, not simply recreate the assigned 
                                               
 
1 Since communication itself could not bind players to their choices, strategic patterns of behaviors had 
the potential to emerge – for example a player could promise to exchange with another player in order 
to get the second player’s resource but then not follow through in the action round. We are interested 
not in these strategic patterns themselves (and therefore do not analyze them here), but rather how 
participants could use this information in their interactions in order to form the co-ops in the following 
phase of the game. 
2 Due to a limitation in the software at the time, participants had to indicate their choice twice. The 
second time they did so, the co-ops were set for the PGG. This was necessary to give participants who 
discovered they had not coordinated their selections well the opportunity to change their choices.  
 
Dyadic Exchange.  
Group Formation.   
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categories/groups (although they could form two groups and leave the third co-op empty). 
The only rule was that each co-op could have a maximum of 4 members; the 5th person who 
tried to join would be asked to make a different selection.  
 Two Public Goods Games were played. The first followed 
directly after group formation and lasted 12 rounds.3 The second game (10 rounds) was 
played after participants were allowed to reform co-ops (this time without making exchanges 
beforehand). Following general rules of PGGs (Olson, 1965), participants received an 
endowment of 10 tokens at the beginning of each round of the game. They then 
communicated for a short period of time (40 seconds) before individually deciding whether to 
contribute anything from 0 to 10 tokens to their co-op (they could not contribute to other co-
ops). Unallocated tokens were automatically added to one's ‘personal account’. At the end of 
each round, participants were paid out from their co-op; whereby the total funds in the co-op 
were multiplied by 1.2 and divided equally among the co-op members, regardless of how 
many tokens they had personally contributed. At the end of each round, each participant 
received an updated token balance: a 2 token increase per round + tokens not contributed to 
their co-op + their share of the co-op profit. The tokens had a symbolic value and did not 
relate to any payment at the end of the experiment but we encouraged participants to “Try to 
collect 45 tokens or more!”. 
This set up presents a classic social dilemma where the socially optimal outcome – 
where all co-op members benefit equally and the total is maximal – is obtained if all members 
invest their entire endowment in their co-op at every round. However, individuals could 
potentially earn more tokens if the others in their co-op made high contributions and they 
would defect by investing less or nothing. Participants were provided with payoff examples in 
the instruction manual (see Figure 1). 
                                               
 
3 To avoid end-game effects we did not inform the participants how many rounds there were in each 
PGG but rather told them that the computer would randomly determine the number. 
 Public Goods Games.  
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Participants were able to see how many tokens each other participant contributed to 
their co-op in the previous round. This was presented through a visual summary image at the 
end of each round (see Figure 2). In addition, all other participants' token balances were 





You are in a co-op with 3 people. You start with 10 tokens. You decide to invest 8 in 
your co-op. The other co-op members invest 8 and 8 respectively. 
The share that everyone gets would be: ((8 + 8 + 8) x 1.2)/3 = 9.6 
It’s pay-out time! You get: 
2 + 2 + 9.6 = 13.6 (14) and so do the others 
 
Example 2: 
You are in a co-op with 4 people. You start with 10 tokens. You decide to invest 5 in 
your co-op. The other co-op members invest 2, 5 and 8 respectively. 
The share that everyone gets would be: ((5+2+ 5+8) x 1.2)/4 = 6 
It’s pay-out time! You get: 
2 + 5 + 6 = 13 
The others get 16, 13 and 10 respectively. 
 
Figure 1. Examples of payoff calculations given to participants 
Figure 2. Visual Summary Image taken from one Experimental group in the 
Categorized Condition. 
Note: The avatar with the darker outline around it represented the individual 
player onscreen. 
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This was administered after completion of the 
second PGG. The questions referred to the second co-op that a participant had joined. We did 
not ask questions about the first co-ops to avoid priming effects in the second PGG. 
There were two experimental conditions: Categorized 
and Non-Categorized. In the Categorized condition, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two groups – the Purple or Green group – at the beginning of the experiment. Each 
group was asked to imagine that they had arrived on the island as a group, on the same ship. 
The metaphor of common ships was meant to provide an abstract and minimal social category 
from which participants could deduce who should be in their co-ops. Group homogeneity was 
made salient by coloring the avatars, representing participants onscreen, purple or green. In 
minimal group studies such categorizations promote in-group bias (Tajfel et al., 1971). We 
expected categorization to influence the choice of co-op as well as subsequent cooperative 
behavior. In line with the Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation (Postmes, Haslam, et 
al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005), this is a process in which group identity is deduced 
from a shared “history” of the group, group homogeneity and/or the presence of a distinct 
outgroup. 
In the Non-Categorized condition, participants imagined that each had individually 
arrived on a different ship from a unique land. Individual heterogeneity was made salient by 
using uniquely colored avatars. By not providing a pre-assigned category, we reasoned that 
any groups that formed could only be “induced”– that is, formed only based on 
communication in the dyadic exchange stage. We assumed that the Non-Categorized 
condition offered more scope for an inductive group formation process in which personal 
value to the group may be acknowledged (here, through individual heterogeneity) and the co-
ops are formed through interpersonal interaction. In addition, there is no distinct outgroup 
from the beginning of the manipulation, unlike in the Categorized condition. 
In both conditions, participants were free to choose to form any co-ops they wished.  
 
 
 This DV was measured by an individual’s choice of co-
op membership, before the first and second PGG respectively. With it we could test 1) whether 
individuals in the Categorized condition were more likely to form a co-op with their categorical 
group (Green or Purple) and 2) the degree of change in co-op membership between PGGs (for 
both conditions).  
Post-Experimental Questionnaire.  
Experimental manipulation.   
Dependent measures.  
Co-op formation and change.  
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 The behavioral data from both 
PGGs represented the degree of cooperation with one’s co-op. This was operationalized by the 
number of tokens contributed to the co-op at each round (an integer from 0 to 10).  
 To better understand why participants cooperated or 
not, we included several variables which are of theoretical interest and which could be linked 
to the behavioral data. Items were measured on a 7 point Likert scale from 1 = “strongly 
disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”. The primary constructs we measured were: social 
identification (e.g., “During the game, I identified with other members of my co-operative”; 
adapted from Leach et al., 2008; 6 items, a=0.82); belongingness (e.g., “During the game I 
felt connected with one or more members in my co-operative”; Van Beest & Williams, 2006; 
4 items, a=0.86) and the entitativity of the co-op (e.g., "This co-operative acted as a unit"; 
Brooke, Postmes, Jetten, & Dyson, 2009; Jans, Postmes, & Van der Zee, 2011; 4 items; 
a=0.89). We also measured perceived trust (e.g., “I trusted that other members of my co-
operative would follow through on what they said in their messages”; 2 items, a=0.75) and 
satisfaction with the co-op (e.g., “I wanted to exit my co-operative”, reverse scored; 4 items, 
a=0.85). To avoid interrupting the game or priming participants, these were all measured after 
the second PGG and thus referred to the second co-op only.  
In addition, identification with (4 items, a=0.84) and perceived entitativity of (4 items, 
a=0.90) the entire group of participants was measured because a game-like experience could 
bond all participants, regardless of co-op membership. By including these measures we could 
distinguish ‘game feelings’ from feelings toward the co-op, which we were interested in. 
Items for game social identification include, for example: “I identified with all the other 
participants in the game”; and for game entitativity: “All the participants of this game were in 
agreement on how to behave”. Social identification with, and perceived entitativity of the co-
op were only slightly correlated with the game experience (r = 0.30 and 0.36 respectively). 
This weak correlation rules out the possibility that bonding within the game as a whole could 
account for effects within co-ops. Game identification and entitativity are not used in further 
analysis.  
Finally to tap into inductive identity we measured personal value to the group (e.g., 
“My co-op could not have functioned without me”; adapted from Koudenburg et al., 2015); 
however, the scale had low reliability (3 items, a=0.55) and was not used in the analysis. We 
also measured ingroup bias towards the other co-ops in the game but the low reliability (3 
Cooperation/amount contributed to the Public Good.  
 Social psychological measures.  
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items, a=0.57) also excluded this measure from further analysis. The descriptive statistics for 
each measure can be found in Table A1 in Supplementary Information A. 
 In this paper, we do not analyze the content of the messages as it 
is beyond the scope of this article and will be the subject of future work. However, we would 
like to provide some relevant descriptive information. Messages were no longer than 100 
characters, although an unlimited number of messages could be sent between contribution 
rounds. Across the two PGGs, 224 out of 240 participants sent at least one message to their 
co-op. Across the 224, the mean number of messages sent was 15.3 and 12.3 in the first and 
second PGG, respectively. The mean number of characters per message was 21 and 24, with a 
maximum of 48 and 37 messages sent per PGG. There were no differences in the quantity of 
communication between conditions.  
 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. For the Categorized condition, participants on the same “ship” 
(representing a social category) have a higher probability of being in the same co-op, 
compared to random selection. Since no one in the Non-Categorized condition shared a ship, 
this condition is not a suitable comparison and so we test this hypothesis through simulations 
for the Categorized condition. Of course, if this hypothesis is supported, this logically implies 
differences between experimental conditions. 
 Hypothesis 2.  At the end of the cooperation, co-ops in the Categorized and Non-
Categorized condition will have similar levels of social identification, entitativity, 
belongingness etc. This expectation is based on the theory that shared identities and solidarity 
emerge through cooperative interactions, even in the absence of a priori social categorizations 
(Jans et al., 2012; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005). Note that this research hypothesis of “no 
difference” is a statistical null hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3. On average, contributions to the co-op will be higher in the Categorized 
compared to the Non-Categorized condition. Differences between conditions will be stronger 
in earlier phases of the game. Cooperation within co-ops in the Non-Categorized condition is 
expected to emerge over time, in line with Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation 
(Postmes, Haslam, et al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005) (see Figure 3). 
Discussion content.  
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Analysis Approach and Results 
Co-op formation and change: Hypothesis 1  
 Were participants in the Categorized condition more likely to form co-ops 
with their category (Green or Purple group)? We tested independence between pre-assigned 
categories and co-ops in this condition to find out.  
We calculated the Jaccard similarity coefficient4 between the adjacency matrices for 
belonging to the same category and belonging to the same co-op (Batagelj & Bren, 1995; 
Jaccard, 1900). A coefficient of 1 indicates complete overlap (i.e., social categories are identical 
to co-ops), while 0 indicates that every pair in the same social category is in different co-ops. 
The null hypothesis was tested by a permutation test, comparing the observed Jaccard 
coefficient with the distribution of Jaccard coefficients between the observed co-ops and 
randomly chosen, equally sized groups5. If the observed Jaccard value is significantly high in 
this comparison, this is a sign that individuals were more likely to join a co-op with their own 
category members rather than with other category members.  
Stability of the co-ops (in both conditions) over the course of the experiment was also 
tested. Participants selected co-ops before the first PGG and before the second PGG, therefore 
co-op membership could change. Stability was likewise measured by Jaccard’s similarity index 
                                               
 
4 This coefficient is defined as the proportion of the pairs that are linked in both categories and co-ops, 
among the pairs that are linked in at least one of these. 









Figure 3. Expected Levels of Cooperation over time 
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and a permutation test, described above. Higher Jaccard indices for co-op change over time 
indicate that co-op members tended to stick together, while indices of 0 mean that co-ops 
changed completely.  
 First, we tested whether in the Categorized condition, participants in the 
same pre-assigned categorical group are more likely to be in the same co-op. The results from 
the permutation test showed that participants were more likely to form co-ops with their 
categorical group members compared to random choice, in both Co-op Formation phases (p < 
0.001 for both, see Table 1). Therefore Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
 
As an illustration: if, for example, in the Categorized condition the first co-op is 
formed by all members of one category and one member of the other category, and the second 
co-op by the remaining two members of the second category, then J=4/9=0.44. Note that the 
proportions of games in which categories were exactly the same as co-ops were 0.10 and 0.15, 
for the first and second PGG respectively. 
Next, we tested the degree of change in co-ops between PGGs for both conditions. As 
shown in Table 2, the observed mean Jaccard coefficients were around 0.5 for both conditions 








Jaccard (with s.e.) 
Observed mean 
Jaccard 
First PGG 0.27 (0.04) 0.53  




Co-op change between PGGs: Both conditions 
 
Condition Random mean Jaccard (with s.e.) Observed mean 
Jaccard 
Categorized 0.28 (0.04) 0.56  
Non-
Categorized 
0.25 (0.04) 0.54  
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for both conditions were significant (p<0.001), indicating significant similarity in co-op 
membership between the two PGGs. 
 
Social Psychological Effects: Hypothesis 2.  
 To test for differences between the Categorized and Non-Categorized 
condition in the measured social psychological variables, we ran a multilevel, multivariate 
model (Snijders & Bosker, 2012) using runMlwin in R (Version 2.36) (Leckie & Charlton, 
2013; Rasbash, Charlton, Browne, Healy, & Cameron, 2009). We examined the effect of 
experimental condition (Categorized vs. Non-Categorized) on several dependent variables: 
social identification, belonging, entitativity, trust and satisfaction with the co-op. Correlations 
are reported in Table A2 of Supplementary Information A. 
This model takes into account the dependencies between measured variables (i.e. 
responses, Level 1), as well as possible similarities among participants (Level 2) in the same 
co-op (Level 3). Co-ops from the second PGG define the nesting level at Level 3. Adding a 
fourth level (i.e., experimental group) caused convergence issues and was dropped from the 
final model.  
 We had not expected notable differences between conditions and the results 
largely support this expectation (Hypothesis 2). Comparing the null model to the model with 
the experimental condition, showed the multivariate test was significant (c2(5) = 13.9, 
p=0.02), therefore the univariate results are considered. However, there were no significant 
univariate differences at all. There were no significant differences between conditions for 
social identification (b= -0.250, SD= 0.197, z = -1.27, 95% CI (-0.637, 0.136), p=0.20), 
entitativity (b= -0.133, SD= 0.219, z = -0.60, 95% CI (-0.564, 0.299), p=0.55), trust (b= -
0.217, SD= 0.191, z = -1.14, 95% CI (-0.592, 0.157), p=0.25), satisfaction with the co-op (b= 
0.002, SD= 0.222, z = 0.01, 95% CI (-0.432, 0.0437), p=0.99) or sense of belonging to the co-
op (b= -0.323, SD= 0.181, z = -1.79, 95% CI (-0.7677, 0.031), p=0.07). The null findings 
make the multivariate significance difficult to interpret.   
 
The Effect of Categorization versus Non-Categorization on Cooperation: 
Hypothesis 3.  
 Changes in the level of cooperation – as inferred from the amount 
contributed to the co-op at each round – was analyzed by two different methods. First, we 
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latent class model. The former method is more traditional and easier to grasp, giving 
important descriptive insights. However, it also revealed that model assumptions of 
heteroscedasticity were not met; therefore, it cannot conclusively test hypotheses. We do 
present model-based standard errors here to give readers an indication of the uncertainty in 
the estimates. The second analysis gives more fine-grained results. 
First, we tested a longitudinal, polynomial multilevel model (Snijders & Bosker, 2012) 
in which rounds/time (Level 1) is nested in participants (Level 2), in co-ops (Level 3), in 
experimental groups (Level 4). Splines – i.e., functions that allows for the pattern of growth to 
change direction or speed at specified points – improved model fit (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 
Analyses were conducted using the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) 
in R (R Core Team, 2016). Data from the first and second PGG were modelled separately 
since co-op membership (and therefore the nesting structure) could change from the first to 
the second PGG.  We base our reported model on model-building criteria and did not use 
hypothesis testing. The assumption of homoscedasticity of the residual variance is not tenable 
for this dataset as many people repeated their behavior from round to round. Nevertheless, 
this model gives good descriptive insights.  
 
 
 We investigated the difference in cooperation over 
time between the two conditions. The intra-class correlation showed that 37% of the 
unexplained variation in cooperation lies at the co-op level; 59% at the round level; only 4% 
lies at the experimental group level and 0% at the individual level. The best fitting model was 
a quadratic model with a spline function6 and random slopes for round at the co-op level. 
Details can be found in Table A3 in Supplementary Information A. 
Results suggest a negative effect of condition on cooperation (b = -0.77, SE = 0.42) 
with slightly higher cooperation in the Categorized compared to the Non-Categorized 
condition. There was also a negative interaction between round and condition (b = -0.10, SE = 
0.06). The corresponding curves of model predictions for both conditions over time are shown 
in Figure 4: Cooperation increases over time in both conditions until round 4, after which 
cooperation in the Categorized condition continues to increase slightly whereas cooperation in 
                                               
 
6 The spline has a node at round 4. This means that the function is quadratic for rounds up to 4, as well 
as quadratic from round 4 onward, and smooth, but the coefficient for the squared term changes value 
at round 4. 
Results.  
Cooperation in the First PGG.  
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the Non-Categorized condition declines slightly. Higher overall cooperation in the 
Categorized condition is in line with Hypothesis 3, however the time pattern is not (cf. Figure 
3) since cooperation in the Non-Categorized condition declined after round 4. As seen in 
Figure 5, most of the variation occurred between individual co-ops, much more so than 
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Figure 4. Average cooperation over time 
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Figure 5. Co-op Cooperation over time 
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  For the interested reader, and to avoid too much 
repetition, full results for the second PGG can be found in Supplementary Information A. The 
overall pattern of results was similar: overall cooperation was slightly higher in the 
Categorized compared to the Non-Categorized condition, although in both conditions 
cooperation started higher and dipped slightly toward the end.   
In summary, overall cooperation was rather high in both conditions, and the condition 
did not have a strong effect on cooperation. Descriptively, there were higher levels of 
cooperation in the Categorized compared to the Non-Categorized condition, in both PGGs. 
This is in line with Hypothesis 3. However, the variance components and the plots suggest 
much variability between co-ops in the degree to which cooperation emerged. This variability 
is further investigated after the interim discussion. 
Interim Discussion: The Role of Categorization on Cooperation  
The discussion of this paper is in two parts. In this section, co-op formation and the 
role of categorization on overall cooperation are discussed. In the next section, we elaborate 
on the results from the second half of our analyses and make concluding remarks.   
First, in reference to the co-ops formed in the Categorized condition, we found that 
participants mostly self-selected their co-ops along category lines. While nothing in the 
experimental set-up forbade participants from forming any co-op they liked, perhaps with 
minimal information in a novel setting, they did what they thought was expected by the 
experimenter. However, the dyadic exchange rounds with communication before the PGG did 
provide interaction with all other participants (not just categorical group members). In 
addition, participants could join one of three co-ops, instead of two – designed to reduce the 
perceived demand that participants should form co-ops along category lines (20% of the time, 
three co-ops were formed). Although some co-ops formed exactly according to their pre-
assigned categories (12.5% of the time), most did not. Therefore, the formation of groups was 
likely a considered choice on the part of participants, although not purely cued by 
categorization. Nevertheless, since categorization did significantly impact co-op selection, 
this implies a logical difference between experimental conditions, although perhaps not very 
strong.  
 Following group formation, cooperation in the first PGG was high in both conditions 
– even higher than the usual 40-60% of cooperation found in most public goods research 
(Ledyard, 1995). High levels of cooperation were probably due to the framing of the 
experiment – as building a community of farmers, after arriving on a deserted island –, 
Cooperation in the Second PGG.
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repeated interaction, and the ability to communicate (allowing organisation, pledging, 
sanctioning, etc.).  
In the Categorized condition, we see that overall, there are slightly higher levels of 
cooperation that increase over time. Deductive groups, formed in a top-down manner by 
emphasizing category similarity (here via shared avatar color and background story), may 
have an easier time cooperating at higher levels from the beginning of interaction, thus 
cooperation has a stronger basis for growing over time, with little indication of decline. We 
initially expected that cooperation in categorized groups, starting at a higher level, would 
eventually decline as time went on (see Figure 3) but found that categorization seems to 
prevent decline, in the first PGG at least. This suggests that for sustainable cooperation, 
having a group categorization could be beneficial. 
In the Non-Categorized condition, although cooperation is still relatively high, and 
increases for a time, the trend toward the end of the interaction in the first PGG is downward. 
We expected that once non-categorized groups were given time to interact, cooperation would 
increase steadily rather than decrease. Previous research has shown that inductively formed 
groups – in which heterogeneity is salient and personal value highlighted – show equally high 
levels of social identification and solidarity as deductive groups, even though the pathway to 
identification and solidarity may be different (Jans et al., 2012; Koudenburg et al., 2015; 
Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005). However, by looking closely at the between-group variation of 
cooperation at the co-op level, we see that while some co-ops in the Non-Categorized 
condition did continuously increase in cooperation over time, there was a set of others that did 
not, and there appears to be more variation between co-ops in this condition compared to the 
Categorized condition. Thus cooperation appears to depend more strongly on within-group 
processes in the Non-Categorized than in the Categorized condition. Perhaps inductive groups 
have a harder time maintaining cooperation compared to groups with a shared social category, 
but this largely depends on how the inductive group processes unfold.  
 Finally, in both conditions, there was little change in co-op membership between the 
first and second PGG – which makes sense considering the high levels of cooperation. 
Evidently, there is no need to leave a co-op that is collaborating well together. Furthermore, 
the slight decrease in cooperation in the Non-Categorized condition, toward the end of the 
first PGG, was not stark enough for participants to change co-ops more compared to the 
Categorized condition, suggesting that cooperation can still reach high levels in inductive 
groups. Related to this finding, there were no ultimate differences in one’s sense of 
identification, group belonging and entitativity between experimental conditions at the end of 
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interaction (i.e., end of the second PGG). This supports the Interactive Model of Social 
Identity Formation (Postmes, Haslam, et al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005) which posits 
that inductively formed groups can develop the same social psychological outcomes as 
deductively formed groups, although the pathway may be different.  
The multilevel growth model, reported above and discussed here, provides a good 
description of how cooperation develops in the Categorized and Non-Categorized conditions. 
But for the purpose of testing hypotheses, it is not reliable because our data violated the 
assumption of homoscedasticity. Specifically, a sizeable proportion of individuals gave the 
same contribution round after round (i.e., repetition) while others hit the ceiling of 
cooperation; and this tended to be a shared behavior in some co-ops. These “zero variance” 
behaviors are a meaningful feature of the kinds of cooperative behaviors we are seeking to 
describe; but having a high proportion of them is extremely unlikely under the assumptions of 
the multilevel model. Therefore, the standard errors of these results cannot be trusted entirely. 
More importantly, our analysis revealed a considerable amount of between-co-op variability 
in cooperation within conditions that could not be well represented by a standard longitudinal 
multilevel model. To address these issues, we present the results of a more statistically 
complex model below. This model allows us to classify similar kinds of decision rules; 
individuals; and co-ops, regardless of the experimental conditions and comprises a more fine-
grained exploratory approach to analyzing these data. 
 
Classifying Cooperative behavior, types of individuals, and types of co-ops 
Method 
The second analysis of amount contributed to the Pubic Good over time regards these 
amounts as resulting from a process of decisions made by participants. Technically, we use 
multilevel latent class Markov models (Lukočiene, Varriale, & Vermunt, 2010; Paas, 
Vermunt, & Bijmolt, 2007; Van de Pol & Langeheine, 1990; Vermunt, Tran, & Magidson, 
2008) implemented in Latent Gold (Version 5.1) (Vermunt & Magidson, 2016).  
In the model specified, decisions about the contributions are represented as regression 
models, operating round by round, where the amount contributed is the dependent variable 
and the explanatory variables are the participant’s own contribution in the previous round and 
the mean contribution of the participant’s co-op in the previous round. It is assumed that 
participants’ decision rules can be classified in a few types (“latent classes”), and each type 
embodies one decision rule, defined by the regression coefficients and the residual variance in 
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the regression model. The type of decision rule followed by any given participant may change 
over time. Because of the experimental design, the model has three levels of latent classes, as 
follows. 
1. The first level is round, with a regression model for the amount contributed. The 
explanatory variables are the lagged contributions of self and co-op, and a dummy for 
the first round, necessary because then there are no lagged contributions. The 
parameters of this regression model embody the decision rule about cooperative 
behavior and are selected from K1 latent classes. These classes are dynamic, meaning 
that they can change from round to round. 
2. The second level is the individual, which is also in a latent class selected from K2 
latent classes of individuals. These are constant over time. The latent class of the 
individual probabilistically determines the latent classes at the round level. 
3. The third level is the co-op, in a latent class selected from K3 latent classes of co-ops, 
likewise constant over time. The latent class of the co-op probabilistically determines 
the latent classes of the individual. 
To specify the dynamic classes at Level 1, we need initial probabilities and the transition 
probability matrix specifying the probabilities phk that in round t+1 the class is k, given that in 
round t it was h. These initial probabilities and transition matrices depend on the latent class 
of the individual and are estimated from the data. 
The numbers of latent classes K1, K2, and K3 at the three levels are determined by a 
combination of goodness of fit and interpretability. Results of the estimation then include the 
set of decision rules employed (latent classes of regression models), the estimated class of 
each individual (determining the decision rules they generally employ), and the estimated 
class of the co-ops (determining their composition of classes of individuals). For a more 
technical treatment of the method, the interested reader is referred to Supplementary 
Information A where we provide more detailed background to the latent class Markov model, 
provide model specifications, further discuss our predictors and covariates for the model, as 
well as outline the process of model development.  
 
Results 
Separate models were applied to the first PGG and the second PGG data as the nesting 
factor (i.e., co-op) could be different between games. We selected labels to describe the classes 
at each level, to aid with interpretation.   
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 The estimated model (see Supplementary 
Information A, Table A7, for model building details) specified 4 classes of decision rules 
(Level 1) that participants drew on to decide how much to cooperate in a given round. 
Furthermore, individual participants could be classified into three classes (Level 2) which 
overlapped almost perfectly with three classes of co-ops (Level 3).  
We labelled the four decision rules as: 
Maximum Cooperation (the ceiling of cooperation), Nearly-There (close to Maximum 
Cooperation), Repetition (repeating one’s behavior from the previous round) and Reaction 
(responding to the contributions of the co-op), named in accordance with the interpretation 
below. Table 3 presents for each decision rule the overall relative frequency with which it is 
applied, the mean amount that resulted from its application, and the parameters of its linear 
regression model. The history of the game was found to be an important predictor in the 
decision regarding how much to cooperate with one’s co-op. Both own lagged amount and the 
lagged amount of the co-op can significantly distinguish among decision rules (own lag: c2 
(3) = 88820.06, p < 0.001; co-op lag: c2 (3) = 126.11, p <0.001). The four decision rules are 
significantly different from one another for the first round of the game, predicting different 
levels of cooperation from the outset (c2 (3) = 16.02, p = 0.001). The four transition 
probability matrices are also significantly different (c2 (12) = 153.28, p < 0.001). The 
transition probabilities themselves are given in Table 4. We now discuss the four decision 
rules. 
The first decision rule, Maximum Cooperation, was the most common, guiding 
participant decisions on how much to cooperate 56% of the time. If someone applied this 
decision rule they would contribute the full endowment of 10 tokens to the PG. Due to this 
ceiling effect, the amount to contribute when using this decision rule could not be predicted 
by the history of the game (b = 0, for both own lag and co-op lag, Table 3) and the residual 
variation is almost nil (s2 = 0.001), meaning that the rule – when used – was almost 
deterministic. In terms of stability, Maximum Cooperation was likely to remain the 
participant’s decision rule in the following round, with an 86% probability (see Table 4). 
 
  
Cooperation in the First PGG.  
Level 1: Decision rules for cooperation.  
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The second most common decision rule, occurring 26% of the time, was Reaction 
(Mamount = 4.95). To give some insight into the coefficients, the regression model can be 
roughly approximated, for rounds 2 and further, by (1/3)*7 + (1/3)*self-lagged + 
(1/3)*(2*(co-op-lagged – self-lagged)). Interpreting this, the value of 7 and the own previous 
contribution may be regarded as providing reference values, and the third contribution is a 
reward for the co-op or a punishment – as the case may be – for the deviation between the 
contributions of co-op and self. If, in the previous round, the co-op average was higher than 
own contribution, it is a reward – the new amount contributed is higher than the reference 
value. If the co-op average was lower, then punishment follows – the new amount contributed 
is less than the reference value. In this decision rule the residual variation was highest (s2 = 
4.91, Table 3). Reaction was more likely to remain the decision rule in the following round 
(58%) rather than transitioning to other decision rules, although it was less stable than 
Maximum Cooperation (see Table 4).  
 
Table 3 









56% 8% 11% 26% 
Mean Amount 10 8.23 6.89 4.95 
Intercept 10 6.740 0 3.093 
First Round 0 0.224 0 -0.791 
Lagged amount (own) 0 0.017 1 -0.364 
Lagged amount (co-op) 0 0.185 0 0.631 
Residual variance 0.001 0.239 0.007 4.914 
Note: The numbers reported in rows 3-6 are regression coefficients 
First Round is the dummy for time was a binary variable 1 at the first round and 0 for all 
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Although not part of the definition of this decision rule, it is interesting to see 
descriptively in which situations it was applied. The frequency of applying Reaction was a 
decreasing function of the previous average contribution by the co-op, decreasing from about 
64% for low contributions (0-5 tokens) to 3% for very high contributions (10 tokens). 
Participants were more likely to be reactive to contributions by fellow co-op members, and 
base their behavior on a comparison between own and others’ contributions, in stages where 
the contributions by others were relatively low.  
Repetition (Mamount=6.89) occurred 11% of the time. This decision rule consisted of 
repeating what one did in the previous round7 (own lagged amount: b = 1.00, Table 3). 
Residual variance in this rule was low (s2 = 0.007). From the transition probabilities in Table 
4, it appears that Repetition was the most unstable decision rule, with no clear pattern for 
transitioning to one of the other rules. 
                                               
 
























0.86 0.05 0.00 0.09 
Nearly there 0.59 0.07 0.22 0.12 
Repetition 0.19 0.18 0.28 0.35 
Reaction 0.19 0.08 0.15 0.58 
Note: The numbers presented in the table are the probabilities of each decision rule 
transitioning into each of the other decision rules in the following round. Row sums 
are 1.000, because these are the total probabilities of the previous decision rule 
transitioning into anything. 
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The least frequent decision rule was Nearly-There (Mamount = 8.23), occurring 8% of 
the time. The contribution was quite high on average, with some variation explained mostly 
by the average co-op contribution in the previous round (b = 0.185, Table 3) and very slightly 
by one’s own previous contribution (b = 0.017). Residual variance was still rather low (s2 = 
0.24). The label was chosen in view of the high probability of an individual switching to 
Maximum Cooperation in the next round (60% of the time, Table 4).  
Figure 6 visualizes the tendency for Maximum Cooperation to increase over time, 
while Reaction decreases.  
 
 Based on the four decision rules of behavior, the model 
distinguished among three classes of participants, which we labelled: Committed Cooperators 
(Mamount=9.19, 47% of participants), Responsive Players (Mamount=8.05, 36%) and Reactive 
Players (Mamount=5.99; 17%). It will become clear below that we interpret these classes as 
mainly emerging from group processes: we can rule out that a priori individual differences are 
involved.  
The strongest difference among the three classes are in the probability matrices of 
transitioning from one to another decision rule (c2 (24) = 184.89, p < 0.001). There were less 
strong differences guiding the decision rule at the start of the game (c2 (6) = 13.51, p = 0.04). 
The probability matrices for initial decision rules and transition probabilities per individual 
class are found in Table 5 and the findings of interest will be discussed further. 























Nearly−There Reaction Repetition Maximum Cooperation
Figure 6. Proportion of individuals using each decision rule at each round: First PGG 
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Throughout the game, Committed Cooperators were much more likely to choose 
Maximum Cooperation over other decision rules, with a 79% probability. However, in the 
first round of the game (Table 5), they had a relatively low chance of using it (25%). This 
suggests that Committed Cooperators did not necessarily start off by contributing the highest 
amount, rather their cooperation developed over time. Furthermore, once they chose 
Maximum Cooperation, these players had a 97% chance of continuing with it in the 
subsequent round.  
Responsive Players drew on all decision rules but were most likely to be guided by 
Maximum Cooperation (49%) and Reaction (27%) during the game. In the first round, they 
had a 16% and 26% chance of choosing Maximum Cooperation and Reaction respectively 
(see Table 5). In comparison to Committed Cooperators, Responsive Players had a lower 
probability of sticking to Maximum Cooperation once they begun to use it (69% compared to 
97%). 
Finally, Reactive Players were most likely to choose Reaction (66%) and Repetition 
(21%) throughout the game, and they were the least likely class to select Maximum 
Cooperation (6%).  In addition, they tended to begin the game with the lowest amount of 
cooperation – with a 63% chance of choosing Reaction8 and zero probability of choosing 
Maximum Cooperation. In the unlikely case that Reactive Players chose Maximum 
Cooperation in one round, they only had a 6% chance of continuing to use it in the following 
round. 
 A total of 86 co-ops formed in the first PGG, across the 
experimental groups. The model categorized these co-ops into three classes. Strikingly, the 
three co-op classes strongly overlap with the three individual classes (99.3 -99.6%). This 
means that the probabilities of the decision rules for cooperative behavior were: 1) consistent 
among all individuals within co-ops and 2) different between co-ops. This high 
correspondence of co-op and individual classes is best explained by the formation of within-
co-op social norms, which we will come back to in the discussion.  
The three co-op classes were labelled: Committed Co-ops (Mamount=9.19), 
Responsive Co-ops (Mamount=8.04) and Reactive Co-ops (Mamount=6.01); see Figure 7 for their 
trajectories of Amounts contributed over time.  
                                               
 
8 Of course, in the first round, participants are not reacting to anything. However Reaction is labelled 
as such according to its general pattern.  
Level 3: Co-op classes.  
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In a final model, the experimental condition (Categorized versus Non-Categorized) 
was included as a covariate at the co-op level to determine whether it affected the type of co-
op formed in the PGG. However, the overall main effect of condition was only marginally 
significant (c2 (2) = 4.88, p = 0.09). For interest, exploration of the paired comparisons 
suggests that categorization can perhaps, to a small extent, predict the difference between the 
presence of Committed and Reactive Co-ops between conditions (c2 (1) = 4.22, p = 0.04). 
There were more Committed Co-ops in the Categorized condition (55% versus 32%) and 































Figure 7. The average amount contributed to the co-op over time: First PGG 





Transition probabilities for Individual Classes in First PGG 
   
Starting Decision rule 
 
Individual Class Maximum Cooperation Nearly-There Repetition Reaction 
 
Committed 0.26 0.13 0.29 0.32 
 
Responsive 0.16 0.19 0.38 0.26 
 
Reactive 0.00 0.07 0.29 0.64 
 
     
  
Present Decision rule 







Maximum Cooperation 0.97 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Nearly-There 0.68 0.04 0.25 0.03 
Repetition 0.31 0.21 0.06 0.42 







Maximum Cooperation 0.69 0.09 0.00 0.21 
Nearly-There 0.62 0.01 0.21 0.15 
Repetition 0.26 0.19 0.33 0.22 






Maximum Cooperation 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.94 
Nearly-There 0.14 0.39 0.18 0.29 
Repetition 0.02 0.14 0.36 0.48 
Reaction 0.09 0.00 0.18 0.73 
 
 Chapter 2: The Dynamic Emergence of Cooperative Norms in a Social Dilemma 47 
 The results from the second PGG were very 
similar to the first. We found the same four decision rules, three individual classes and three 
co-op classes, as well as the same overlap between individual and co-op classes. To avoid 
repetition, full results are in Supplementary Information A. To summarize these findings: The 
same classifications were found in the second PGG, but the overall level of cooperation was 
higher. Specifically: 1) the mean amounts contributed, predicted by the decision rules, were 
higher; 2) there was a higher proportion of individuals using Maximum Cooperation in each 
individual class; 3) more individuals could now be classified as Committed Cooperators and 
4) more co-ops could be classified as Committed Co-ops. Therefore, these findings suggest 
that cooperation is learned and transferred from the first PGG into the second. Cooperative 
behavior seems to spill over from one stage of the experiment to the next and interestingly, 
the type of cooperator one is classified as at one time, can change – since there was a higher 
proportion of Committed Cooperators (13% more) in the second PGG, even though the 
participants were the same.  
Discussion: Cooperative norms develop within groups 
In this paper, we aimed to study the emergence of cooperative norms over time, following 
group formation. Furthermore, we aimed to compare the processes of group formation and 
cooperation in categorized and non-categorized groups. In the first discussion section, we 
elaborated on the findings from the more traditional approach to data analysis. In the present 
section we focus on findings from the dynamic latent class model, with some additional 
discussion on the experimental method and overall study limitations.  
While our first analysis provided a good description about how cooperation generally 
emerges over time for categorized and non-categorized groups; our second approach, using 
dynamic latent class models, allowed us to study the emergence of particular classes of 
individuals and co-ops, and the types of decision rules that they apply. This second method 
lends itself for modelling inductive processes: we did not explicitly predict or test for 
particular classes of co-ops or individuals but were able to explore the emergence of these 
within the context of this game.  
We found that co-op members, in a given round, were likely to employ one of four 
decision rules – Maximum Cooperation, Nearly-There, Repetition and Reaction – which 
determined the amount contributed to the Public Good. The emergence of some of the 
decision rules used by participants in this study is in line with previous research. For example, 
Repetition, in which players simply repeat what they did the previous round, predicted an 
Cooperation in the Second PGG.  
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average contribution within the range of the 40 – 60% contribution often found in one-shot 
PGGs (Ledyard, 1995). This decision rule seems to be a “safe” and common strategy and is 
thus repeated.  
In addition, the decision rule of Reaction closely mimics what one finds with conditional 
cooperation – i.e., one cooperates when the group does and defects when the group does 
(Axelrod, 1984; Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001). All four decision rules were consistent 
across both PGGs. The decision rule itself used (a) the particular amount one personally 
contributed to the PG in the previous round and (b) the average level of cooperation shown by 
one’s co-op members. The probability of choosing a given decision rule depended on (c) the 
decision rule one had previously chosen, and (d) the type of individual one could be classified 
as – Committed Cooperator, Responsive Cooperator or Reactive Player.  
These decision rules and the classes of individuals that emerged through interaction in the 
PGG, help to explain the findings from the first set of analyses – cooperation emerges over 
time through interaction with others. As an illustration, Committed Cooperators mostly did 
not start off by hitting the ceiling for cooperation. Their commitment level and high 
contributions developed over time as they established Committed Co-ops together. These 
findings indicate that further progress in understanding how to support cooperation can be 
made by studying the reasons why maximum cooperation emerges, as well as the contexts 
(i.e., the particular types of groups) in which it flourishes.  
One possible key to maximizing cooperation is how a group establishes its shared identity 
and normative patterns of behavior. We found almost perfect overlap between the individual 
and co-op classes, meaning that co-ops consisted of people of the same individual class. We 
interpret this to mean that cooperation depends highly on one’s group and that learning occurs 
within the group. We believe that we can rule out the alternative explanation for this finding 
because it is too improbable that across all 86 co-ops, people with the same preferences for 
cooperation happened to find one another after very limited interaction. Therefore, our finding 
suggests the formation of group norms, which, in turn, influences the kind of cooperator one 
‘becomes’. As additional support for this interpretation, there was also a change in the overall 
relative frequency of individual classes from the first to the second PGG (although the 
participants remained the same), meaning that some participants changed the type of person 
they were classified as. For example, more people were classified as Committed Cooperators 
in the second PGG. Therefore it would seem that people can learn to become more 
cooperative when exposed to cooperative groups and also, that cooperative groups emerge in 
the process of interaction. 
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This finding is quite different to traditional research findings in the interdependence 
literature, in which people are usually assumed to have fixed personal preferences for 
cooperation or selfishness (e.g., Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, 1999). In this 
study, we find strong evidence that the type of cooperation that is prevalent in the group as a 
whole determines the type of cooperator one becomes (see also Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016). 
 
Studying Emergent Social Phenomena 
This study shows that individual classes, group norms, and stable co-ops (perhaps with a 
shared social identification) form in tandem, through interaction. We found that within a short 
period of interaction, group members aligned their decision making behavior regarding 
cooperation and, even under the same experimental conditions of the PGG, different types of 
groups emerged. The key question of this study about the emergence of cooperation could not 
be answered without our methodological approach: To study the emergent nature of any 
social behavior (including, but not exclusively, cooperation) it is important to account for 
complex social interdependencies, beyond dyads. In this study, we used the experimental 
platform VIAPPL through which we could monitor interaction over time to follow the 
emergence of cooperation and address issues of causality. While this approach may limit 
external validity, it has the strong advantage of allowing us to study complex emergent 
phenomena in a carefully controlled environment.  
A potential challenge for research such as this, is the interdependent nature of the data – 
which needs to be accounted for in the statistical analysis. With multilevel latent class Markov 
models, we were able to learn from these interdependencies – distilling patterns of behaviors, 
classes of individuals and classes of co-ops. Without this approach, we would not have seen 
that individual preferences appear emergent through interaction with the group and are 
collectively established in a short period of interaction. We imagine many cases in which this 
type of group analysis could be used to study emergent phenomena and will be useful to those 
interested in group processes research. 
 
Implications 
In this paper, we were able to clearly distinguish three types of cooperators: Committed, 
Responsive and Reactive. These “cooperators” emerged together in interaction and 
collectively established social norms regarding decision making on cooperation. Recent 
research has also uncovered the existence of Consistent Contributors (Weber & Murnighan, 
2008) and Resilient Cooperators (Mao, Dworkin, Suri, & Watts, 2017), albeit in lower 
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numbers than this study, and only making up a minority of their group. Nevertheless, even a 
single Consistent Contributor can change the social norms of cooperation, leading to higher 
contributions by group members (Weber & Murnighan, 2008); and a small minority of 
Resilient Cooperators are able to stabilize unravelling (i.e., prevent progressively earlier 
defection), thus sustaining high levels of cooperation for longer, at personal cost (Mao et al., 
2017).  
Similarly, we imagine that Maximum Cooperators, could influence Responsive Players 
especially, but Reactive Players too. Future research could determine the optimal ratio of 
these types of cooperators to players who defect regularly, for maximal cooperation to 
emerge. Perhaps introducing clusters of these cooperators can be effective (see Axelrod, 
1984). A challenge here may be that the cooperators in this study emerged together in a short 
period of interaction but we do not know how, as individuals, they might influence a pre-
existing non-cooperative group over time.  
Under what conditions do these cooperators emerge? Maximum Cooperators were slightly 
more common when social categories were salient, suggesting that if social identification is 
activated early on – rather than later, through induction – more of these cooperator types can 
emerge.  
Further, cooperation-friendly environments (e.g., experiments with a higher marginal per 
capita return) seem to result in the emergence of Consistent Contributors (Weber & 
Murnighan, 2008). Likewise, the cooperation-friendly framing of this experiment (as a 
community game) possibly activated a normative goal frame (Lindenberg, 2015a, 2015b) thus 
supporting the emergence of many Maximum Cooperators. On the other hand, Reactive 
Players, or “rational actors”, may emerge in greater numbers than we found when 
competitiveness is more salient.  
Future research could further explore conditions under which different types of 
cooperators may emerge; what motivates these types of players under what conditions; and 
how many of them are required to influence others in the group, thus shaping norms of 
cooperative or uncooperative behavior. 
 
Limitations 
According to the Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation (Postmes, Haslam, et 
al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005), social identification with a group is often an interplay 
between deductive and inductive processes. In many natural groups, these processes are quite 
difficult to completely tease apart. In our study, as with natural groups, it was also difficult to 
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completely separate these processes in a way that still maintained experimental equivalence 
between conditions. While our pre-assigned categorized groups were signaled through group 
homogeneity (visually, through color) and a history of the group was presented to participants 
(with the story of having arrived from the same country together, an attempt to mimic 
nationality as a categorical identity), there was no actual history and the groups were minimal 
and small. Furthermore, categorized individuals could interact with their entire group and 
choose their own co-ops, which were not always perfectly aligned with their pre-assigned 
categorical groups.  
On the other hand, participants in co-ops in the Non-Categorized condition –  co-ops 
which were indeed small, interactive and heterogeneous – were still faced with the task of 
choosing their co-ops early on in the game, limiting the organic emergence of these groups. In 
addition, the other one or two co-ops could be seen on screen by participants during the game. 
These other groups could have served as comparison outgroups. Therefore, one may argue 
that non-categorized, inductive groups here function as social categories as soon as 
participants select their co-ops. Perhaps this could explain why there was not a large 
difference between conditions in terms of cooperation. However, some differences did still 
emerge (although often marginally significant). For example, the pattern of decline in 
cooperation in the first PGG for non-categorized groups, and the fact that more Reactive co-
ops were likely to form in the Non-Categorized condition and more Committed Co-ops in the 
Categorized condition. So, the manipulation appears to have been effective in tapping into 
different processes. Nevertheless, the small differences between conditions were less 
impressive than the variability between co-ops within conditions. This variability to us seems 
more important in understanding cooperation within groups. In other words, any prior 
categorization effect was overshadowed by the emergent social norms within groups. 
Therefore, the dynamic process of emergent social norms appears more influential than the 
static framing of the group, at least in this experiment.  
Another potential limitation is that we did not incentivize participants according to the 
outcome of the experiment. While this is common practice in psychological experiments, it is 
not the standard economic approach. This may lead to the question whether participants were 
sufficiently motivated to engage in a meaningful way in the experiment: We believe that 
indeed they were motivated. Descriptions of the number of messages sent suggest that 
participants were engaged with one another – allowing for communication over time likely 
made the relational value of interaction more important than self-interest (i.e., maximizing 
tokens). Furthermore, not all co-ops reached the highest levels of cooperation therefore, not 
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incentivizing clearly did not have a uniform (positive) effect on the groups. However, it 
would be interesting for future research to study how incentives might change the number of 
Committed Co-ops that form under different goal frames.   
From this study, we know that interaction over time is important in the development 
of cooperative people and groups; however we have not yet examined what it is about the 
quality of the interaction itself that promotes the emergence of maximally cooperative groups 
rather than reactive groups. Categorization appears to be only a part of the story in fostering 
cooperative groups. Our results seem to suggest that people can change and adapt depending 
on the social context of interaction, and become more cooperative together if they can develop 
the right learning environment as a group. Some groups, however, are more successful than 
others at forming cooperative norms. 
 
Conclusion 
The results from this study show that collaboration is not a static given, but rather 
cooperation within groups is emergent over time through social interaction. There are large 
differences among groups to the extent in which they can achieve maximum cooperation, and 
while some of this appears to be accounted for by shared category membership, most of it 
emerges through interaction. In that process of emergence, individual types and co-op types 
arise in tandem, shaping (and being shaped by) emergent group norms. The emergent 
properties of the “personality” of the individual cannot be seen independently of the emergent 
properties of group as a whole (in fact there is almost perfect overlap between the two). At the 
end of the day, this means that at least some of the static factors discussed at the start of this 
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Abstract 
Research in the social identity literature has shown that belonging to a shared social category 
can increase one’s cooperation with members of that category. Our previous research has 
shown that emergent group norms for cooperative behavior – in terms of which decision rules 
to use when cooperating in a repeated Public Goods Game – are very important in 
determining whether high levels of cooperation are reached: both in groups with a prior social 
category label and in groups without them, cooperation emerges over time through 
interaction. The present paper is a conceptual replication of our previous study, but uses a 
stronger manipulation, comparing groups with a primed social category to primed 
interpersonal ties. Results replicate those found before: 1) high levels of cooperation can 
emerge in both bottom-up (social categories) and top-down groups (interpersonal ties); 2) 
group norms for cooperative behavior are created in which individuals align their behavior 
within their group; and 3) this norm emergence occurs regardless of the social identity 
pathway primed. Novel findings include that: 4) primed social categories appear to prompt 
initially higher levels of cooperation, but 5) bottom-up groups reach these same levels over 
time and finally, 6) in groups in which the average level of cooperation is high, group 
members are more highly identified at the end of the interaction. Thus, in addition to 
replicating earlier findings, this study suggests that emergent social identification and 
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In this paper, we look at the emergence of cooperation over time in a Public Goods 
Game (Olson, 1965) in which participants interact with one another over time in small groups 
on the experimental platform, VIAPPL (see viappl.org). While we know that ingroup 
identification plays an important role in the emergence and maintenance of cooperation within 
groups (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; De Cremer et al., 2008; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; 
Simpson, 2006), we know less about how social identity emerges, hand in hand with group 
norms that sustain cooperation among ingroup members. In this study, we compare the 
emergence of cooperation within social categories as well as in groups emphasizing 
interpersonal ties, where we expect the processes to be somewhat different in each 
configuration of the group. Nevertheless, based on past research (see Chapter 2 of this thesis), 
we expect that the variability of cooperation within conditions will be greater than between 
conditions: our key prediction is that different types of groups form in the process of 
interaction with different patterns of cooperation, and that these groups account for 
cooperation more so than the somewhat static experimental manipulation.  
 This paper will be structured in the following way: First, we will look at cooperation 
as a social dilemma and introduce the paradigm that this study will employ (i.e., dynamic 
Public Goods Games), as well as the factors that affect cooperation (relevant to this study). 
We will also provide the theoretical framework guiding our experimental cues for social 
identification by exploring the similarities and differences between conceptualizations of the 
group as social categories and interpersonal ties. Furthermore, following our prior research, 
we shall explain that processes of norm formation take place when cooperation emerges in 
groups over the course of a game. Finally, we will lay out our aim for this study.  
 
Cooperation as a Public Goods Game 
Cooperation is fundamental to group life – it runs through all social interactions 
whether it be in terms of friendships and family relations (imbuing both symbolic and 
instrumental value); teamwork within organizations; or markets and economic trade on a 
national level. Understanding the factors that facilitate and maintain cooperation over time is 
therefore an important research area in many fields, including sociology, behavioral 
economics and social psychology. One of the ways in which cooperation can and has been 
studied, is through social dilemma games where there is a personal cost to cooperating – this 
cost reflects the cost of real life cooperation. Public Goods Games (PGGs) (Olson, 1965) are 
an example of one such social dilemma game.  
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A Public Good (PG) is defined as a resource or service which is formed though 
individual contributions and shared among individuals, regardless of how much they have 
personally contributed (for example see Samuelson, 1954). Public television and radio; 
material infrastructure (such as parks, bridges etc.); intellectual property developed in small 
groups; and collective action are all examples of public goods (Katz et al., 2004; Shankar & 
Pavitt, 2002). In a Public Goods Game, participants choose how much to invest in the PG. 
After investments are made, the total sum of the contributions is multiplied by a pre-defined 
number greater than 1 (usually doubled) and everyone in the game receives an equal share of 
the profit, regardless of their personal contribution. Therefore, while maximum cooperation is 
the socially optimal outcome, defection can maximize the instrumental self-interest of the 
individual (in the short term and as long as others continue to cooperate). In iterative PGG’s, 
participants interact with one another over time, investing in the PG over multiple rounds – 
this allows one to study the process of the emergence of cooperation. Since there is continued 
interaction over time, “the shadow of the future” (Fearon, 1998) is in operation – enabling 
factors such as sanctioning, reciprocity and normative action to come into play –thus often 
leading to an increase in cooperation, compared to one-shot games (Dal Bó, 2005).  In 
addition to expectations of the future, experiences of the past (i.e., learning) can also occur in 
iterative games. Indeed, some argue that trust – an important component in facilitating 
cooperation – is a consequence of the interdependency between “the shadow of the future” 
(i.e., positive expectations generate trust) and “the shadow of the past” (i.e., past experience 
mediates trust building indirectly) (for example, see Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008). 
 
Social Norms in Public Goods Games 
The role of social norms in cooperation has long been acknowledged as a pivotal 
characteristic of the social contexts in which cooperation occurs, both within and between 
groups. For example, framing a social dilemma in cooperative or competitive terms, thereby 
pre-constructing norms in social dilemmas, has been shown to affect the level of cooperation 
(see for example Liberman et al., 2004; Lindenberg, 2015a; Van Lange et al., 2013), as does 
the payoff structure of the public goods game (PGG) – whereby payment based on the 
outcome of the experiment appears to provide a competitive frame to the dilemma, thus 
reducing cooperation (Jordan et al., 2014; Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). 
In addition to social frames, a generic norm of direct and indirect reciprocity may also 
play a role in fostering cooperation (Molm et al., 2007). The likelihood of reciprocity 
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occurring increases in groups that are more homogenous;  are small enough for detecting and 
sanctioning defection; and have stable group membership (Diekmann & Lindenberg, 2015). 
There is some evidence that reciprocity may be an even stronger predictor of cooperation than 
merely conforming to experimentally manipulated group norms of cooperation or defection 
(for example see Romano & Balliet, 2017). Further research shows that norms fostered in 
social environments outside the lab become social heuristics that spillover into novel lab 
environments (Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016) and since reciprocity is considered to be a 
generic norm in itself (Gouldner, 1960), perhaps certain norms – such as the norm of 
reciprocity – are stronger than norms which are experimentally manipulated inside of the lab.  
In many experimental studies, the effect of social norms on cooperation has been 
explored in a somewhat static way (for example, by providing normative or competitive 
frames to participants). However, we also know that in natural settings, social norms can only 
emerge over time and come to affect cooperation in a more dynamic way, presumably 
through social interaction.  There has been previous research which suggests that the dynamic 
emergence of social norms is indeed an important aspect to cooperation. For example, the 
studies by Peysakhovich and Rand (2016) manipulated social norms of cooperation by 
exposing participants to externally imposed interaction rules designed to either foster norms 
of cooperation or defection, during experience in a repeated game (Stage A). They then 
measured the effect of this manipulated norm through one-shot cooperation games (Stage B). 
Importantly, the authors found evidence for the spillover of social norms from Stage A to 
Stage B. An extension of this work would be to look at the emergence of these norms 
(without direct manipulation) through interaction in small groups. Indeed, in a review of 
conditional cooperation as a social norm operating within cooperation games, Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004) argue that although it is clear that the socio-economic environment shapes 
the benefits and costs of cooperation (and punishment for non-cooperation), not much is 
known about the process of norm formation within particular environments, either empirically 
and theoretically.  
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we found that there appears to be strong social norm 
formation which occurs within small interactive groups in a dynamic and interactive public 
goods game (PGG). In the experiment participants could self-form groups before the 
beginning of the PGG (after being provided with a categorization cue or not), and during 
multiple rounds of contributing to the Public Good, they were able to communicate with one 
another and receive full feedback regarding one another’s contributions. We found that three 
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distinct kinds of groups emerged which utilized different sets of decision rules for 
cooperation. These decision rules affected their level of cooperation. Also, group members 
strongly conformed within groups. The groups were labelled: Committed Co-ops (i.e., groups 
that gave maximally over time), Responsive Co-ops (i.e., groups whose decision rules were 
dependent on group average contributions in the previous round) and Reactive groups (i.e., 
groups in which individuals responded to low average contributions by giving even less the 
next round).  Importantly, group norm emergence was largely independent of pre-
experimentally manipulated social identity cues of social categorization versus non-
categorization.  
These results showed that cooperation is not a static given (i.e., a deterministic 
function of categorization), instead it emerges over time through social interaction and, while 
some groups can reach maximum cooperation better than others, this can only be partially 
explained by shared category membership. However, this represents a single study of its kind 
and therefore more research in this area is needed to further understand how emergent norms 
(rather than manipulated and somewhat “static” norms alone) can have an impact on the level 
of cooperation that a particular group shows.  
In the present study, we aim to extend our previous research to further test the way in 
which social norms emerge together with the formation of a shared social identity. Indeed, 
research has shown that the emergence of social identity content (including group norms), 
often goes hand in hand with the emergence of a shared sense of social identity (as it applies 
to politicization, see Turner-Zwinkels, van Zomeren, & Postmes, 2015). Therefore, in the 
present study we aim to conceptually replicate the results of our first study by strengthening 
the social categorization cue and comparing this ‘social categories’ condition to a condition in 
which interpersonal ties are primed, rather than not providing any cue to group membership at 
all (which was the case in the previous Chapter).  
 In the next section, we discuss the nature of group membership further by comparing 
social categories to interpersonal networks. 
 
Cooperation in Social Categories 
Why do people show normative behaviour? One reason is that when people identify as 
members of their group, the group goal becomes their personal goal and they are more likely 
to act in normative ways, signaling that they are prototypical members of their group; and will 
place the group’s interests above their self-interest (Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1991; Turner 
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et al., 1987). While simply being a member of a group (or social category) does not 
necessarily imply that one will have strong psychological connection to the group; social 
categorization is considered a pre-condition to social identification and is usually associated 
with strong ingroup cooperation, even in meaningless, experimentally manipulated groups 
(Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1991). Social identification, therefore, is the degree to which one 
incorporates the identity of one’s group membership into one’s personal identity, which 
comes to influence behavior in particular ways.  
Indeed, direct experimental evidence shows that the extent to which one identifies 
with one’s social category increases cooperation within groups in many Public Goods studies 
(Brewer & Kramer, 1986; De Cremer et al., 2008; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Simpson, 
2006; Wit & Kerr, 2002); this is likely because it maximizes ingroup outcomes and reduces 
ingroup inequalities (Simpson, 2006) and because it predisposes group members towards 
expectations of reciprocity (Tanis & Postmes, 2005). Traditionally, this theoretical approach 
to the impact of social identification on cooperation could imply that social categorization is a 
somewhat static factor that will normally predict a stable level of cooperation within the 
category/group. However, there is some initial evidence to suggest that cooperation emerges 
over time through interaction both in groups that are formed from a social category and those 
that are not (Chapter 2 of this thesis), although the pathways to cooperation are somewhat 
different.  To explain such emergence, further research should study the additional factors that 
result in the emergence of cooperation over the course of social interaction – this is one of the 
goals of the present research. 
 
Differences between Social Categorization and Interpersonal Networks 
As we argued above, from existing research we expect cooperation to be high in social 
categories, through processes of social identification. However, in many respects social 
categories are very different to other conceptualizations of the group – such as small interactive 
groups and interpersonal networks. Certain characteristics of social categories (such as social 
identification, belonging etc.) can develop in small groups and in networks too (Postmes, 
Haslam, et al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005), but this is a very different type of process 
to that of shared category membership. 
According to the traditional social identity perspective, groups are often conceptualized 
as social categories – broad, abstract groups based on homogenous traits (e.g., gender, 
nationality, race etc.). Postmes et al. (2005) refer to social identification with these categories 
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as deductive social identities, which form from the top down, based on shared characteristics. 
According to self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985, 1991), contexts that make one’s 
categorization as a member of a particular group salient, activate associated norms and 
expectations that come along with being a member of the group. Category salience, in turn, 
increases social influence among group members and adherence to shared group norms (Turner, 
1991). In sum, social identification through categorization results in individuals acting as 
members of a group by following relevant group norms and placing group goals ahead of self-
interested goals that do not favor the group. 
More recently, research has focused on the ways in which some of the properties of social 
categories (such as social identification, perceived entitativity but also shared norms; Postmes, 
Spears, et al., 2005) can emerge within small groups and social networks too. The formation of 
inductive social identities (Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation, Postmes et al., 2005) 
provides one such route through which some of the properties of social categories come into 
play in interactive groups. In contrast to deductive social identities, inductive identities form 
from the bottom up, through interaction and communication amongst group members over time 
(Postmes, Haslam, et al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005).  
Similarly, groups have also been formulated as interpersonal networks (Deaux & Martin, 
2003; Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2013), in which members of the network have close, personal 
bonds with some, but not all, other members and these bonds are created through interaction. 
Interpersonal networks are usually bounded by the possibilities for face-to-face or other direct 
means of communication, implying that their size will be smaller than that of social categories. 
The number of bonds of any one network member will be limited by constraints posed by the 
possibilities for interaction. For example, Dunbar (2008) mentions 5 network members as 
typical for ‘support cliques’ and 15 for ‘sympathy groups’.  
Despite some obvious differences between social categories and inductive groups or 
social networks, research has found that being a member of either of these types of groups can 
lead to similarly high levels of social identification, belongingness, and entitativity (Postmes, 
Spears, et al., 2005), suggesting that some properties of large and abstract social categories can 
also emerge in networks. However, the pathways through which these similar properties may 
emerge, are different. As an illustration: Although categories and networks both imbue 
individuals with a sense of belonging, the belongingness felt in interpersonal networks is 
mediated by the quality of the interpersonal bonds, in which the nature of the real social 
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interaction is crucial; whereas belonging in social categories is mediated by perceived 
intragroup similarity (Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2013).  
Moreover, research has also shown that in groups formed on the basis of interaction and 
iterative cooperation (i.e., inductive groups), the emergence of a sense of shared identity is 
mediated by individual distinctiveness and by the perceived value of the personal contributions 
of self and others, to the group (Jans et al., 2012; Koudenburg et al., 2015; Van Mourik 
Broekman et al., 2018; Van Mourik Broekman, Koudenburg, Gordijn, Krans, & Postmes, 
2019). By contrast, until now the assumption has been that the individual plays no central role 
in the formation of groups based on category membership. So, while the outcomes between 
categorical groups and smaller networks (such as social identification, belongingness and 
cooperation) may be similar, the pathways will likely be different. For example, cooperation 
may initially be higher in deductive groups compared to inductive groups, but over time, 
cooperation can also emerge in the latter types of groups.  
 
The Interplay between Social Categorization and Interpersonal Networks 
Rather than focus on the differences between categories and networks, one can also 
focus on the ways in which categories and networks are enmeshed, interact and mutually 
reinforce each other. Ultimately, in nearly every group, processes that stem from shared social 
categorization (top-down) co-occur with processes that stem from intra-group communication 
and interaction in smaller groups (bottom up) (Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005). For one thing, 
categorization affords opportunities and constraints regarding with whom to link in everyday 
interaction (Deaux & Martin, 2003). In other words, categories influence which networks we 
choose to belong to. For example, a common feature of social networks is the presence of 
homophily – whereby people form networks with similar others (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). 
As an illustration: in the study of the effect of immigration on friendship formation, 
homophily is found to be common in school-based friendship networks (i.e., interpersonal 
networks). Here, the choice of friends (or interaction partners) is often based on ethnicity – 
which is a shared social category (for example, Smith, Van Tubergen, Maas, & McFarland, 
2016). More intricately, whether an immigrant can gain access to a friendship network, can 
depend on how they identify at a categorical level, and not just on the presence of an obvious, 
externally shared feature such as nationality. For example, native peers of immigrants are 
more likely to include immigrant friends in their networks if they have a strong host-country, 
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rather than ethnic, identification (see for example Leszczensky, 2013; Leszczensky, Stark, 
Flache, & Munniksma, 2016) and further, minority students may reject from their friendship 
network, fellow minorities who do not show strong minority identification (Boda & Néray, 
2015). Studies such as these provide support for the idea that social identification based on 
social categories can influence the types of smaller interpersonal networks (such as friendship 
networks) that form. 
As we can see from social identification research, social categories and smaller, 
inductively formed networks have been theoretically distinguished from one another. 
However, in many respects, they share similarities and are usually enmeshed.  While there has 
been much research showing that social categories facilitate cooperation, and deter defection 
– through goal salience shifts (from individual to group goals) and normative behavior, for 
example – not much is known if, or how, these processes may occur in interpersonal tie 
groups9. Therefore, this paper takes a closer look the interplay between social categories and 
interpersonal ties to better understand how cooperation can emerge and be sustained over 
time.  
 
The present research 
In this paper, we seek to compare the emergence of cooperation in social categories 
and interpersonal tie groups – by zooming in on their similarities and differences – and thus 
further understand the interplay of these two group processes on cooperation. We expect to 
replicate results of our previous research, which showed that strong social norms evolve 
among individuals both in small groups which are formed from social categories, and groups 
which are not (Chapter 2 of this thesis). As a conceptual replication, the present study also 
builds on our previous research in that we manipulate the trajectories to social identity 
formation by maximizing the differences between the experimental conditions. Our previous 
study compared a categorization to a non-categorization condition, while in the present study, 
we compare social categories to interpersonal tie groups (described below) in order to study 
their effect on cooperation.  
  
                                               
 
9 While our research was inspired by the distinction between social categories and interpersonal 
networks, in this study we refer to these interpersonal networks as “interpersonal tie groups” or 
“interpersonal ties” to avoid confusion with social network analysis. In our study, ties were not dyadic, 
nor could we analyze network structure. 
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Method 
Participants and Design  
In total, the study consisted of 240 participants who participated in groups of six, 
resulting in a total of 40 groups (180 female, 56 male, 4 undeclared, Mage= 21.5(3)). We had 
two experimental conditions (Interpersonal Ties versus Social Categories) – each replicated 
20 times. Participants were incentivized either by course credit or a fixed payment according 
to the length of the experiment (approx. 1 hour). The study was conducted at the University of 
Groningen in the Netherlands and was approved by the departmental Ethics Committee. 
 
Procedure  
Six participants were invited into the lab at one time. They were seated at computers 
where they played a Public Goods game using the Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL, 
see viappl.org). Before the start of the game, participants read an instruction manual with the 
back story to, and instructions of, the game. They were told that they were about to start 
farming on a virtual island and to do so they would join one of two farming groups (or 
farming co-operatives). Following the group formation phase, they would begin investing in 
their co-op over 11 rounds of the game.  
After logging on to the game, participants joined the farming co-operative that they 
were instructed to join (after random assignment by the software application) and engaged in 
a five-minute chat conversation with their co-op on a pre-assigned topic (see experimental 
manipulation below). Once the conversation time was up, participants played 8 rounds of the 
game where, at each round, they could choose to invest in their co-op (0 to 10 tokens). The 
amounts contributed by each member of the co-op were added together, multiplied by 1.2 and 
thereafter divided equally among all members of the co-op; regardless of how much they 
themselves invested. Participants’ token balances were updated at the beginning of each new 
round. This calculation was based on a constant increase of two tokens per round, plus the 
amount they did not contribute (i.e., their remaining personal token balance) and the amount 
they received from the co-op profit, which was an equal share. Before each round, 
participants could briefly message each other for a period of 40 seconds and following each 
round, participants were shown an image of what everyone else had contributed the previous 
round. In addition, they could also see the investments of the other co-op in the previous 
round.  
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Before the last two rounds of the game, to emphasize the end game, there was a mid-
experimental questionnaire to complete. After the last two rounds, a post-experimental 
questionnaire was administered. Participants left the lab once this final questionnaire was 
completed.  
 
 Each game was assigned to one of the two 
experimental conditions which were designed to manipulate the type of social identification 
processes that we are interested in. For each condition, the description of what a farming co-
op is, was different (see Supplementary Information B for more details on the instruction 
manuals). In the Interpersonal Ties condition (see Figure 8), based on a manipulation of 
inductive identity used in previous research (Jans et al., 2012; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005 
and Chapter 2 of this thesis), participants were each assigned a unique farm animal 
representing their type of farm on the island. Participants were either placed on the east or 
west side of the island and were instructed to join a farming co-operative with all of the 
members from their side of the island. Therefore, there were two co-ops, each consisted of 
three members, where every individual was afforded a unique identity (symbolized by their 
farm animal) as well as a common co-op identity, based on the geography of the island.  
To further strengthen this manipulation, the topic of conversation for the first phase 
of the experiment was: 
“As you know, people generally rely on their neighbours and friends for social 
support. Please discuss in your group:  What are the five most important benefits that 
personal relations would provide to a farmer on a newly discovered island?” 
In the Social Categories condition (see  Figure 9), participants were either assigned to 
farm cattle or corn and were instructed to join the co-op with all similar farmers (i.e., join the 
Cattle or Corn Co-op, depending on their assigned avatar). Therefore their unique identity, 
relative to the Interpersonal Ties condition, was downplayed and their common co-op 
category identity made more salient. In contrast to the former condition, the topic of 
conversation for the Social Categories condition was:  
“As you know, farmers generally rely on their farming co-operatives to support 
agriculture. Please discuss in your group:  What are the five most important benefits that 
farming co-operatives would provide to the members of the co-operative as a whole?” 
Experimental Manipulation.  
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By referring to the co-op as a whole, the aim was to make the salience of the social category 
stronger, rather than interpersonal relations (for similar manipulations see for example 
Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999). 
 
   
 
Figure 8. Interpersonal Ties Condition in VIAPPL 
Figure 9. Social Categories Condition in VIAPPL 
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In contrast to Chapter 2 of this thesis, participants in this study were not allowed to 
self-form groups after the experimental manipulation. While in real life, self-selection into 
groups can be an important aspect to inductive group formation, this is much less common in 
existing social categories. Although not impossible, it rarely happens that people change race, 
gender etc. – at least not regularly, compared to the change in interpersonal networks such as 
work groups and friendship circles. By allowing both conditions to self-select their groups in 
Chapter 2, the differences between the conditions was not necessarily strong enough to see 
how the trajectories to cooperation may be different. In this study, we alter the manipulation 
to see if the difference between categories and interpersonal groups are stronger than the 
previous Chapter suggested.  
 
Dependent variables 
 Cooperation was 
operationalized as the amount contributed to the co-op per round. The minimum amount per 
round was 0 tokens, while the maximum amount was 10, and participants could contribute 
any number in between and including these values. 
 We measured social psychological constructs just 
before the last two rounds of the game and again post-experimentally. All items were 
measured on a 7 point Likert scale, unless otherwise specified. We were primarily interested 
in identification with the co-op ( e.g., “During the game, I identified with other members of 
my co-operative”, adapted from Leach et al., 2008; 6 items; a=0.87, GLB = 0.90), perceived 
entitativity ( e.g., “This co-operative acted as a unit”; Brooke, Postmes, Jetten, & Dyson, 
2009; 4 items, a=0.88, GLB = 0.91) and a sense of belonging with the co-op ( e.g., “During 
the game I felt connected with one or more members in my co-operative”; Van Beest & 
Williams, 2006; 4 items, a=0.79, GLB = 0.83).  
Furthermore, we measured the degree to which participants see the goal of 
contributing to the PG as a group/interdependent goal (e.g., “I see myself and the other 
members of my co-op as a group with common goals”; 6 items, a=0.88, GLB = 0.94) or an 
individual/independent goal (e.g., “I think each member of my co-op has his or her own 
interests”; 4 items, a=0.75, GLB = 0.77). These questions were adapted from a deductive 
identity manipulation from Swaab, Postmes and Spears (2008). We also evaluated the 
perceived closeness to one’s own co-op and to the other co-op through an image selection 
task (see Schubert & Otten, 2002). These items assessed the perceived overlap between 1) self 
Cooperation/Amount Contributed to the Public Good.  
Social Psychological Measures.  
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and own co-op and 2) self and other co-op (for the images used, see Figure B1 and Figure B2 
in Supplementary Information B). The closeness items were significantly and negatively 
correlated (r (237) = -0.20, p = 0.001) and were used separately in the analyses. All of the 
above items were measured before the last two rounds of the game.  
Post-experimentally, we measured social identification again (6 items, a= 0.92, GLB 
= 0.94), as well as perceived trust in the co-op (e.g., “I trusted that other members of my co-
operative would follow through on what they said in their messages”; 3 items, a=0.78, GLB = 
0.79) and satisfaction with the co-op (e.g., “I wanted to exit my co-operative”, reverse scored; 
4 items, a=0.93, GLB = 0.93). Finally, through two items, created for the purpose of this 
study, we also measured the expected reward for contributions (“I believed that people in my 
co-op would reward me for my contributions”) and the expected punishment for lack of 
contributions (“I believed that people in my co-op would punish me if I didn’t contribute 
fairly”).  
 
Hypotheses and Expectations 
Below we list our hypotheses (i.e., testable propositions) and expectations (i.e., 
propositions that depend on particular in-game behaviors that might or might not be 
displayed).  
Expectation 1. We expect there to be higher levels of ingroup identification 
belongingness, perceived entitativity, perceived trustworthiness and satisfaction in co-ops 
which show higher levels of cooperation.  
Hypothesis 2. We do not expect a significant difference in the strength of ingroup 
identification between the Social Categories and Interpersonal Ties conditions. This 
expectation also applies to belongingness, perceived entitativity, perceived trustworthiness 
and satisfaction with the co-op, expected reward and expected punishment between the 
conditions. This null statistical hypothesis is based on research which shows that shared 
identities and solidarity can also arise through interaction without the need of explicit social 
categories (Jans et al., 2012; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005, and Chapter 2 of this thesis). 
Hypothesis 3. The perceived goal behavior of group members will be more 
interdependent (group-based) in the Social Categories than the Interpersonal Ties condition. 
Conversely, the perceived goal behavior of group members will be more independent 
(individualist) in the Interpersonal Ties condition, in which heterogeneity is more salient, 
compared to the Social Categories condition.   
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Hypothesis 4. There will be a greater sense of closeness to one’s own co-op in the 
Interpersonal Ties condition, where personal relations and interpersonal ties are made more 
salient, compared to the Social Categories condition.  
Hypothesis 5. Overall, there will be more cooperation in the Social Categories versus 
the Interpersonal Ties condition. 
Expectation 6. In the Social Categories condition, higher and more stable patterns of 
cooperation will occur in earlier rounds and decrease slightly over time. However, in the 
Interpersonal Ties condition, a similar level of cooperation will be reached in later rounds and 
increase over time. Thus we expect similar levels of cooperation to be met in both conditions 
toward the end of the interaction. We do not have specific predictions for different end-game 
effects, as this is a more explorative aspect of the design.  
Expectation 7. There will be variability in cooperation norms between groups, even 
within the same condition. We will be able to classify different “types” of farming co-
operatives independently of the experimental condition, based on shared cooperative behavior 
during the iterative PGG (see Chapter 2 of this thesis). 
Analysis Approach and Results 
The method and results of the analyses are reported in two sections. First, we present 
the method and results together for the social psychological measures. Second, we report the 
method and results for cooperation over time, which includes three subsections: 1) the 
analysis of the differences between experimental conditions (used descriptively, as not all the 
assumptions of the multilevel longitudinal model are met); 2) the classification of co-ops 
according to similar decision rules; and 3) the description of homogeneity of cooperative 
behavior across all co-ops.  
 
Social Psychological Effects  
 To test differences in the measured constructs between the Interpersonal 
Ties and Social Categories conditions and amongst co-ops, a multilevel, multivariate model is 
applied using runMlwin in R (Version 2.36) (Leckie & Charlton, 2013; Rasbash et al., 2009). 
Our nesting structure is: response (Level 1) nested in participant (Level 2), nested in co-op 
(Level 3), nested in game (Level 4). The explanatory variables tested are: the experimental 
Method.  
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condition (Social Categories vs Interpersonal Ties)10; the average amount contributed by the 
co-op in the second half of the game – to allow for possible convergence of behavior –; and 
the individual’s mean deviance from the average co-op contribution. The co-op contributions 
are split up into two variables, the average for the co-op and the individual deviation, because 
this yields the distinction between individual-level and co-op-level effects on the dependent 
variables (cf. Snijders & Bosker, 2012). The dependent variables are the social psychological 
measures: social identification, belonging, entitativity, trust of co-op, satisfaction with co-op, 
expected reward and expected punishment. Correlations among constructs can be found in 
Table B1 in Supplementary Information B.  
 The intra-class correlations (see Table B3 in Supplementary Information B) 
show that for all the dependent variables, very little of the unexplained variance lies at the 
experimental group level (3%, averaged across variables), a fair amount lies at the co-op level 
(31%), and most resides at the individual level (66%).  
Iteratively, we established that, of the models tested, the best fitting model was the 
model with only the average contributions of the co-op as the explanatory variable, excluding 
the effect of the experimental condition and individual deviations from the co-op’s average 
contributions (see Table B4 in Supplementary Information B for model comparison). A Chi-
Square test was conducted on the deviance statistics for the null model and the final model 
reported here. The result was significant (c2(11) = 47.6, p < 0.001), therefore univariate 
results are interpreted. 
The findings show that there were indeed significant effects of the average 
contributions from the co-op (in the second half of the experiment) on many of the social 
psychological variables. In particular, in co-ops with higher levels of cooperation, people 
shared a greater sense of social identification; entitativity; belonging; satisfaction with, and 
trust of, the co-op; closeness to their own co-op and the perception that co-op members shared 
interdependent group goals (see Table 6). These findings are in line with Expectation 1.  
The non-significant effect of condition on the social psychological variables support 
Hypothesis 2, that there should be no differences between conditions on measures of: social 
identification, belongingness, perceived entitativity, perceived trustworthiness and 
satisfaction with the co-op, expected reward and expected punishment between the 
conditions. However, our prediction that there would be a difference between conditions on 
                                               
 
10 For the table of the descriptives per condition, see Table B2 in Supplementary Information B.  
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the perception of interdependent group goals and independent/individualist goals (Hypothesis 
3), was not met. Furthermore, we had predicted that there may be greater perceptions of 
closeness to one’s own co-op when interpersonal ties are made salient (Hypothesis 4), which 
also was not the case since there was no multivariate effect of condition. Finally, how one 
feels psychologically about the co-op at the end of the PGG can be explained more by group-
level than individual-level variables, since the effect of the individual deviance from the co-
op’s average contribution is non-significant while the group-level average contribution is 
significant.   
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Table 6 
Multivariate MLM: Fixed part of the model 
 Coef. Std. Err. Z-score P-value 95% Conf. Interval 
Intercept_Social Identification 2.36 0.53 4.46 0.000 1.32 3.39 
Intercept_Entitativity 1.55 0.68 2.27 0.023 0.21 2.89 
Intercept_Belonging 3.26 0.50 6.52 0.000 2.28 4.24 
Intercept_Satisfaction with co-op 3.41 0.62 5.46 0.000 2.19 4.64 
Intercept_Trust 2.87 0.66 4.34 0.000 1.58 4.17 
Intercept_Interdependent goals 2.65 0.49 5.32 0.000 1.68 3.63 
Intercept_Independent goals 5.37 0.53 10.14 0.000 4.33 6.41 
Intercept_Closeness to own co-op 2.32 0.63 3.67 0.000 1.08 3.55 
Intercept_Closeness to other co-op 2.03 0.59 3.43 0.000 0.87 3.19 
Intercept_Expected reward 4.67 0.71 6.56 0.000 3.28 6.07 
Intercept_Expected punishment 4.75 0.69 6.91 0.000 3.41 6.10 
Level of cooperation_Social Identification 0.32 0.06 5.24 0.000 0.19 0.43 
Level of cooperation_Entitativity 0.48 0.08 6.14 0.000 0.32 0.63 
Level of cooperation_Belonging 0.26 0.06 4.53 0.000 0.15 0.37 
Level of cooperation_Satisfaction with co-op 0.26 0.07 3.68 0.000 0.12 0.40 
Level of cooperation_Trust 0.30 0.08 4.00 0.000 0.15 0.45 
Level of cooperation_Interdependent goals 0.33 0.06 5.90 0.000 0.22 0.45 
Level of cooperation_Independent goals -0.12 0.06 -1.91 0.056 -0.23 0.00 
Level of cooperation_Closeness to own co-op 0.33 0.07 4.56 0.000 0.19 0.47 
Level of cooperation_Closeness to other co-op 0.02 0.07 0.27 0.787 -0.11 0.15 
Level of cooperation_Expected reward -0.15 0.08 -1.82 0.069 -0.31 0.01 
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The Effect of Social Categorization and Interpersonal Ties on Cooperation 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, a similar experiment was analyzed. We found that some co-
ops had virtually constant contributions over time, whereas others showed strong fluctuations. 
Such a data pattern violates the assumption of residual homoscedasticity made in multilevel 
models (MLM) for longitudinal data, and invalidates the standard errors obtained from such 
models. The same pattern was found in the data analyzed here. Therefore, here we report the 
MLM analysis for descriptive purposes without emphasizing the associated p-values or model 
fit. We also conduct a longitudinal latent class analysis that more closely represents the 
choices made by participants of how much to cooperate on a round-by-round basis. The two 
different types of models will be presented sequentially.  
  To test the overall effect of the experimental condition on cooperation over 
time, we first conducted a longitudinal, polynomial multilevel model (Snijders & Bosker, 
2012). Analyses are conducted using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) in the R 
environment (R Core Team, 2016). Our data structure was: round/time (Level 1), nested in 
participant (Level 2), in co-op (Level 3), in experimental group (Level 4). Model selection 
was based on Chi-Square tests of model fit where our final model included a spline function – 
which allows one to model the change in the direction or speed of growth at specified points 
(for a treatment of splines, see Snijders & Bosker, 2012).  
According to the intra-class correlation, 25% of the unexplained variance 
lies at the co-op level and 75% at the round level (and none at the experimental group or 
individual level). Through model testing, we found the best model was a quadratic conditional 
growth model with a spline11, and random slopes for round in co-op. Table B5 in 
Supplementary Information B provides more details for model selection.  
The selected model included an interaction for the quadratic term for round with 
condition (b = 0.05, SE = 0.026) as well as the interaction of the spline (node at round 6) and 
condition (b = -0.15, SE = 0.049). For the full table of results (Table B6), see Supplementary 
Information B. By plotting the predicted values for cooperation over time for each condition 
(see Figure 10), we can see that there is higher cooperation in the Social Categories condition 
compared to the Interpersonal Ties condition, especially in the early stages of interaction. 
While cooperation slightly decreases toward the end of the game in the Social Categories 
                                               
 
11 The spline was such that the function was quadratic for the rounds up to round 6, as well as 
quadratic for round 6 to 11, but the coefficient for the squared term changes after round 6. 
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condition, it appears to stabilize for the Interpersonal Ties condition, perhaps suggesting 
different end-game effects for each condition. The overall results of the analysis are in line 
with Hypothesis 5 and there is also some support for Expectation 6, although we did not have 


















Figure 10. Cooperation over time 
Interpersonal Ties Social Categories




















Note: This is a plot of the fitted values of the co-ops where each colored line represents 
one of the 80 co-ops. 
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We can see from Figure 11, which plots the random slopes for every co-op in the 
study, that there was a lot of variability in cooperation among the different co-ops in both 
conditions: some co-ops show the emergence of cooperation over time, others do not show 
such emergence and others still, show the extinguishing of early high cooperation. We explore 
the differences between co-ops in the next two subsections: First, we formally classify co-ops 
using a latent class model and then we provide descriptive patterns for the homogeneity of 
behavior within all 80 co-ops over time. 
  
Classifying cooperative behavior, types of individuals and types of co-ops 
 Analyses for the amount contributed to the public good were conducted 
using a multilevel latent class Markov model (Vermunt, Tran, & Magidson, 2008) 
implemented in Latent Gold (Version 5.1) (Vermunt & Magidson, 2016).  
Our analysis procedure was the same as in Chapter 2 of this thesis which the reader 
can refer to, to avoid repetition. In brief: amount contributed (i.e., cooperation) is modelled as 
a linear regression, with, as predictors, the amount contributed by the individual and the 
average amount contributed by the co-op, both as recorded in the previous round. These 
regression models represent the decision rules employed by the individuals to determine the 
amount of cooperation. Reflecting the multilevel structure, there are latent classes for 
individuals (Level 2) as well as for co-ops (Level 3). The latent class of the individual 
determines probabilistically the initial choice of the decision rule and also the possible 
changes in decision rules from round to round. The individual level classes depend 
probabilistically on the latent class of the co-op. In this model, one’s individual class and the 
co-op class cannot change from round to round, unlike decision rules which are the dynamic 
component of the model. The experimental condition is modelled as a covariate at the highest 
level (co-op level) since it is shared by participants within co-ops.  
 The final model (see Supplementary Information B for model selection 
details, Table B7) contained four unique decision rules (Level 1), two individual classes 
(Level 2) and two co-op classes (Level 3). The individual and co-op classes overlapped 
almost perfectly (99%). 
 The four decision rules were labelled: 
Maximum Cooperation (the ceiling for cooperation), Nearly-There (very close to Maximum 
Cooperation both in terms of the level of cooperation and the likelihood of transitioning to 
Maximum Cooperation), Reaction (rewarding or punishing the co-op) and Defection (failure 
Method.  
Results.  
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 Chapter 3: Social Categories and Interpersonal Ties  75 
to cooperate). These labels were selected to fit the defining characteristics of these decision 
rules which are reported in more detail below.  
Regression results for Amount contributed (i.e. cooperation) were not significant for 
own lagged amount meaning that one’s personal history of cooperation did not play a role in 
any of the four decision rules (c2 (4) = 0.7, p = 0.95). However, the average lagged amount of 
the co-op was significant (c2 (4) = 36.8, p < 0.001), indicating that the decision rules 
depended on the average amount contributed in the previous round by all co-op members. The 
regression results for each decision rule are presented in Table 7 and discussed further below. 
Furthermore, the decision rules were significantly different from one another from the 
very first round of the experiment, predicting different levels of cooperation from the outset of 
the interaction (c2 (3) = 9.8, p < 0.05). Additionally, the four decision rules were significantly 
different in terms of their transition probabilities (i.e., a participant’s likelihood of switching 
decision rules in the following round, given their decision rule in the current round) (c2 (12) = 












Table 7.  











Overall relative frequency 60% 6% 24% 9% 
Mean Amount 10 8 7 2 
Intercept 10.000 9. 000 4.347 1.551 
Time Dummy1 0. 000 -4. 000 1.204 1.095 
Lagged amount (own) 0. 000 0. 000 -0.023 -0.033 
Lagged amount (co-op) 0. 000 0. 000 0.326 -0.004 
Residual variance 0.001 0.011 1.969 1.404 
Note: Except for the first two rows, the numbers in the table are regression 
coefficients 
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Maximum Cooperation was the most prevalent decision rule, occurring 60% of the 
time. Guided by this decision rule, an individual would contribute the maximum number of 
tokens to the co-op (Mamount =10). There was an 83% chance that this decision rule would 
remain stable in the following round, meaning that an individual would not be very likely to 
choose another decision rule. There was hardly any residual variance (s2 = 0.001) due to the 
ceiling effect and high conformity on the amount to contribute when using this decision rule.  
The second most common decision rule, Reaction (Mamount = 7), guided participants’ 
actions 24% of the time. Under this decision rule, the amount contributed was partly predicted 
by the average amount one’s co-op had contributed in the previous round (b=0.33). Although 
not a part of the regression model, there was a 43% chance that one would be guided by 
Reaction if, in the preceding round, the average amount contributed by the other co-op 
members was between 0-7.6 tokens. In contrast, there was only a 4% chance that one would 
be guided by Reaction if the co-op contributed the maximum amount of 10 in the previous 
round. Furthermore, the transition probabilities suggest that one had a 47% likelihood of 
continuing to use this decision rule in the following rounds but there was also a 38% chance 
of switching to Maximum Cooperation.  
Taken together, these results for Reaction (both model predictions and the descriptive 
for this rule) suggest that one is reactive especially to low contributions from one’s co-op, 
such that one will respond negatively to the co-op for low average contributions but also, that 
one is likely to react positively to higher contributions by the co-op and therefore can switch 
to Maximum Cooperation in response to the co-op. In support of this interpretation, the 
posterior probabilities further show that there is a 90% chance of Maximum Cooperation for 
Table 8.  














  Maximum 
Cooperation 
Nearly- 
There Reaction Defection 
Maximum 
Cooperation 0.83 0.04 0.09 0.05 
Nearly- 
There 0.42 0.17 0.36 0.05 
Reaction 0.38 0.08 0.47 0.07 
Defection 0.23 0.02 0.41 0.34 
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those individuals whose co-ops gave an average of 10 in the previous round. This decision 
rule had the highest residual variance (s2 = 1.969), meaning that the amount that one 
contributed while being guided by this decision rule was highly variable. 
Defection (Mamount = 2), in which one failed to cooperate with the co-op, occurred with 
only a 9% probability. This decision rule did not at all use the amount contributed by the co-
op in the previous round (b = 0.000). In addition, Defection was a rather unstable decision 
rule: While there was a 33% probability that Defection would continue to be used in the 
following round, there was a 41% chance that a person would switch to Reaction (where 
participants respond usually to low amounts contributed by the co-op) and a 23% chance a 
person would use Maximum Cooperation. The fact that about a quarter of the time Defection 
transitions into Maximum Cooperation suggests that Defection can be somewhat rectified 
through interaction. The residual variance was relatively high for Defection (s2 = 1.414) 
Finally, the least occurring decision rule was Nearly-There (Mamount =8) which guided 
behavior 6% of the time. Unlike Reaction, Nearly-There did not at all use the lagged amount 
of the co-op (b = 0.00). Also in comparison to Reaction, this decision rule was more unstable. 
One had a higher probability of transitioning into Maximum Cooperation (41%) in the next 
round or switching to Reaction (36%), rather than continuing to be guided by Nearly-There 
(17%). Residual variance was low (s2 = 0.011) compared to some of the other decision rules, 
meaning it predicted a relatively small margin of cooperation (i.e. amount contributed to the 
public good). 
As one can see from Figure 12 the strategy of Maximum Cooperation increases over 
time while Reaction somewhat decreases. While Defection is reduced at the mid-game, it 
increases in the last round, indicating some end-game effects. Figure 13 shows that the 
decision rule Maximum Cooperation, predicts a stable amount of 10 per round while after the 
first few rounds, Nearly-There predicts a stable amount, as does Defection. However, 
Reaction predicts an amount that is more prone to fluctuation over rounds, which makes 
theoretical sense since this decision rule is based on a response (positive or negative) to the 
average amount given by the co-op in the previous round.  
 
















































Figure 12. Proportion of individuals using each decision rule per round 
Figure 13. Mean amount predicted by each decision rule per round 
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 The model classified two individual level classes: 
Responsive Players which consisted of 55% of participants (MAmount=8) and Committed 
Cooperators who made up the remaining 45% (MAmount=9). The two individual classes 
differed significantly from one another in terms of which decision rule they were likely to use 
in the beginning of the interaction (c2 (6) = 32.7 p < 0.001); as well as in their probability of 
transitioning into one of the other three decision rules, given their current decision rule (c2 
(12) = 162.3, p < 0.01).  For the full transition probabilities see Table 9. 
 
Throughout the public goods game (PGG), Committed Cooperators had an 83% 
probability of selecting Maximum Cooperation as their decision rule and only a 9% chance of 
choosing Reaction (with a 4% chance each of choosing Defection and Nearly-There).  At the 
start of the PGG (round 1), half of all Committed Cooperators selected Maximum 
Cooperation, while only 5% began with Defection. In addition, a Committed Cooperator who 
was guided by Maximum Cooperation in the previous round, had a 92% chance of remaining 
with this pattern of behavior in the following round.  
Level 2: Individual classes.  
Table 9.  
Transition probabilities for Individual Classes 
  Starting Decision rule  
 Individual Class Maximum Cooperation Nearly-There Reaction Defection 
 Committed 0.50 0.14 0.31 0.05 
 Responsive 0.09 0.23 0.31 0.37 
      
  Present Decision rule  
Individual 
Class Previous State 
Maximum 







Cooperation 0.92 0.01 0.03 0.04 
Nearly-There 0.56 0.13 0.21 0.11 
Reaction 0.55 0.14 0.31 0.00 







Cooperation 0.66 0.08 0.18 0.07 
Nearly-There 0.36 0.18 0.43 0.03 
Reaction 0.34 0.07 0.51 0.08 
Defection 0.13 0.00 0.48 0.39 
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Overall, Responsive Players had a 42% probability of utilizing Maximum 
Cooperation; a 35% chance of Reaction and 14% chance of Defection. They were only guided 
by Nearly-There 9% of the time. In contrast to Committed Cooperators, at the start of the 
PGG, Responsive Players only had a 9% chance of selecting Maximum Cooperation. Instead, 
they more likely begun with Defection (37% of the time). In terms of transitioning in and out 
of decision rules: Responsive Players had a comparatively lower probability of sticking with 
Maximum Cooperation if they selected it in the previous round (66%), while they had an 18% 
chance of transitioning from Maximum Cooperation to Reaction. 
Notably, with regards to the probability of transitioning out of Defection, a Committed 
Cooperator was 52% more likely to switch to Maximum Cooperation from Defection, 
compared to a Responsive Player. 
 The model classified two co-op classes and they overlap 
almost perfectly (99%) with the individual level classes (i.e., Committed Co-ops consisted 
mostly of Committed Cooperators and Responsive Co-ops mostly of Responsive Players). 
The difference between the two co-op classes was indeed significant (c2 (1) = 16.7, p < 
0.001). 
Responsive Co-ops made up 55% of the co-ops (Mamount=7.55) while Committed Co-
ops (Mamount=9.27) made up the remaining 45%. Given the strong overlap between individual 
and co-op classes, behavior was consistent within co-ops and different between co-ops. This 
finding suggests that individuals quickly learn norms of cooperation over time and their 
behavior becomes aligned with that of their group. A similar result for group norm formation 
was found in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
The experimental condition (Interpersonal Ties versus Social Categories) was a 
marginally significant predictor of the co-op classes (c2 (1) = 3.7, p = 0.05). The Interpersonal 
Ties condition was made up of 33% Committed Co-ops and 67% Responsive Co-ops; while 
the Social Categories condition consisted of 56% Committed Co-ops and 44% Responsive 
Co-ops. Therefore, there were more Committed Co-ops in the Social Categories condition 
where broad social categories, rather than interpersonal ties, were made salient.  
 
Level 3: Co-op classes.  
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Figure 14 shows that cooperation improves over time for both classes of co-ops. While 
Committed Co-ops overall start with higher levels, Responsive Co-ops increase their 
cooperation over time.  
These findings are in line with Expectation 7, as we find different co-ops forming with 
their own norms for cooperation and furthermore, these types of groups are meaningfully 
different even for the same experimental condition.  
We also included the social psychological measures as 
inactive covariates in the model, which simply shows how these covariates relate to the 
classes. They are “inactive” as no estimation and no statistical tests are performed (Vermunt 
& Magidson, 2016).  This step allows us to determine whether the type of player one was 
classified as may have an influence on social psychological states. The patterns reported here 
are descriptive since we were not testing whether any of these has a significant effect on 
cooperation or the type of individual classified.   
Table 10 reports the full pattern of results but overall, we see that Committed 
Cooperators score above average on entitativity, belongingness, social identification, trust and 
satisfaction with the co-op, perception of interdependent goals and closeness to own co-op. 
Responsive players, on the other hand, tend to score average or below average on these 
measures. Moreover, Committed Cooperators also score above average on closeness to the 




















Figure 14. Mean amount contributed to the co-op over time 
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other co-op, below average on expected reward, and average on expected punishment from 
their co-op for their actions. Taken together, these results suggest that Committed Cooperators 































Table 10  
Breakdown of the probabilities for each social psychological correlate by Individual Class 
 
 Level on Scale Responsive Players Committed Cooperators 
Entitativity High  44% 56% 
Mean (5.7) 69% 31% 
Low 80% 20% 
Belongingness High  41% 59% 
Mean (5.5) 63% 37% 
Low 62% 38% 
Social Identification High  43% 57% 
Mean (5.1) 60% 40% 
Low 67% 33% 
Trust  High  44% 56% 
Mean (5.5) 70% 30% 
Low 61% 39% 
Satisfaction with co-op High  48% 52% 
Mean (5.7) 63% 37% 
Low 72% 28% 
Interdependent goals High  32% 68% 
Mean (5.5) 57% 43% 
Low 67% 33% 
Independent goals High  58% 42% 
Mean (4.4) 61% 39% 
Low 51% 49% 
Closeness to own co-op High  44% 56% 
Mean (5.1) 64% 36% 
Low 65% 35% 
Closeness to other co-op High  44% 56% 
Mean (2.1) 57% 43% 
Low 60% 40% 
Expected  
Reward 
High  61% 39% 
Mean (3.4) 52% 48% 
Low 34% 66% 
Expected Punishment High  57% 43% 
Mean (4.1) 50% 50% 
Low 51% 49% 
Note: Rows sum to 100%. Each cell percentage indicates the probability that the given type of 
player would score in a certain range on the given measure. To simplify the presentation of the 
results we collapsed the probability above and below the mean of the given measure (which is 
recorded in brackets).  
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Descriptive Emergence of Cooperative Norms 
The latent class analysis provides strong evidence that co-op members come to align 
their behavior over the course of interaction and social norms regarding which decision rules 
to use arise within co-ops. How do these behavioral norms emerge in co-ops over time? There 
are various ways of describing the developments over time and one is simply to look at the 
emergence of behavioral consistency (e.g., co-ops whose members display the same behavior 
from round to round). For example, low variance in cooperative behavior may be an 
indication of behavioral norms and agreement; and these patterns of agreement over time can 
help us to understand if, and when, the emergence of cooperation occurs and for which co-
ops. The following section provides us with a description of these patterns for all co-ops in 
the present study.  
Figure 15 visualizes the co-ops when individual members contributed the exact same 
amount to the Public Good in a particular round (i.e., there was no variance in a co-op’s 
contributions in that round). The white spaces indicate that there was no such alignment, 
while the color code shows the exact amount that was converged on. As we can see from the 
figure, the exact convergence mostly happened at maximum cooperation, while there are a 
very few occasions where some co-ops managed to align on something other than 10.   
Furthermore, only 5% of co-ops gave the exact same amount consecutively from the 
first round through to the last round of the public goods game (PGG). On the other hand, 15% 
of co-ops contributed the same amount in the first two rounds. Additionally, 48% of co-ops 
managed to align their behavior in two consecutive rounds from round 4 onwards (i.e., from 
rounds 4-5, 5-6 etc.), while only an average of 19% of co-ops did this in consecutive rounds 
from 1 - 3. Since cooperation within co-ops in the present study is very high overall, this 
descriptive evidence provides additional support for our argument that cooperation, and 
agreement on the amount to contribute within the group, emerges over time rather than being 
present from the beginning. Additionally, there is also evidence that cooperation can break 
down in some groups over time (see the bottom rows in Figure 15), which provides us with 
some case studies in which cooperation is not always stable. These case studies suggest that 
cooperation needs to be actively maintained.  
Additional descriptive analysis showed that in 72% of the rounds, contributions of all 
participants within a co-op differed by not more than 2 tokens. Therefore, in Figure 16 we 
visualize, for each co-op in every round, the alignment (or not) of their cooperative behavior 
within two tokens of the group mean, color-coded by the mean amount that the group 
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converged on. The figure shows that even when behavioral alignment is considered less 
strictly (i.e., not the exact same amount, but within two tokens of one another), then most 
alignment still occurs at the higher end of what one could maximally contribute. Overall, co-
ops are less likely to align their behavior in early rounds. However, later they can reach high 
levels of cooperation. Furthermore, there are some cases where alignment rarely occurs while 
in contrast, in some co-ops alignment can occur right from the beginning of interaction. Both 
figures also show a few instances of end-game effects whereby in the last round of interaction 
(note, participants knew it would be the final round), alignment of cooperative action broke 
down. These end-game effects were also suggested by the multilevel regression but, by and 
large, cooperation was more sustainable than not.  
In sum: the pattern of these descriptive findings show that emergence of cooperation 
within groups over time is an important element in the PGG experiment and that a more stable 
pattern of behavior is maximum cooperation.  
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Figure 15. Heatmap of cooperative emergence (or not) per co-op: 
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Mean Amount Contributed:
Figure 16. Null Variance Heatmap of cooperative emergence (or not) 
per co-op: Variance of 2 tokens 
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Discussion  
 In this paper, we aimed to study the role that social categories and interpersonal ties play 
in the emergence of cooperation over time. We provided participants with experimental cues 
(Social Categories versus Interpersonal Ties) which we expected would lead to different 
trajectories of cooperation. As a follow-up to previous research in Chapter 2 of this thesis, we 
wanted to zoom in on the emergence of social norms guiding cooperation levels within both 
kinds of groups (Social Categories and Interpersonal Ties), as cooperation emerges over time 
through social interaction. We expected these emergent norms to be stronger in determining 
the development of cooperation than the differences that could be accounted for by the 
experimental condition. Our main findings from this study will be discussed as follows: 1) 
group norms develop in early rounds of interaction whereby individuals align their decision-
making rules for cooperation; and the effect of these norms are stronger than the primed social 
identity pathway; 2) overall, cooperation emerges over time and while social categories may 
prompt initially higher levels of cooperation, bottom-up groups can reach the same high levels 
of cooperation; 3) group members are more highly identified in groups where cooperation is 
higher and 4) following 2 and 3, social identification and cooperation may be mutually 
reinforcing processes. 
 
The Emergence of Committed and Responsive Co-ops  
In this study, as in our previous research (Chapter 2) we found evidence suggesting that 
strong norm formation in cooperative decision making took place across conditions and was 
in fact stronger than the effect of the experimental manipulation. First, we find strong support 
for this claim from the 99% overlap between the two individual and two co-op classes given 
by the dynamic latent class model: Committed Co-ops consisted almost entirely of Committed 
Cooperators and Responsive Co-ops, of Responsive Players. Cooperative behavior was 
completely consistent within co-ops and different between the two types of co-ops. Since 
individuals were randomly allocated to conditions, we can confidently rule out that the 
consistency in cooperative decision rules between the individual and their group is due to 
their personality which determines their individual behavior: it must be that the emergent 
properties of the group (which of course may be influenced by players’ initial personal 
preferences) comes to completely dominate the personal preferences of players later in the 
game. We also find additional support for our claim of norm emergence in our descriptive 
analysis where we found that many co-ops aligned their cooperative behavior around the 
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maximum amount they could contribute to the Public Good, and much of this alignment 
occurred in the first few rounds of play. 
Also replicating the findings from our previous study, Committed Cooperators had a 
much higher chance of being guided by Maximum Cooperation as the decision rule in the first 
round of interaction, compared to Responsive Players. Given that there is a very strong 
overlap between individual and co-op classes, this finding suggests that if enough group 
members start off the interaction by placing trust in their group through contributing the 
maximum amount, this sets a basis for the emergence of cooperative group norms. This 
appears to be the general pattern, although the descriptive analysis given by Figure 10 
suggests that this is not always the case, as there are a few case studies where cooperation 
started off reasonably well but deteriorated over time. 
In further support of Chapter 2, members of Committed Co-ops are more likely to stick to 
Maximum Cooperation once they begin using it to guide their decisions during the public 
goods game (PGG), while Responsive Co-ops have a greater chance of changing their pattern 
of behavior, evidently as they react to member contributions over time. Committed Co-ops 
also appear to be more resilient to defection in that they have a far greater chance, compared 
to Responsive Co-ops in which group members defect, of switching to more cooperative 
behavior in the next round. Perhaps the few instances of defection by Committed Co-ops 
serve to sanction (or at least show social disapproval for) non-cooperative behavior; but the 
willingness to switch back to Maximum Cooperation in the following round also signals to 
fellow group members that they are willing to restore cooperation – this resembles the tit-for-
tat strategy in which one’s cooperation is conditional on the cooperation of others (Axelrod, 
1984; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).  In addition, even though Responsive Co-ops are more 
likely to start off with defection, they too can reach high levels of cooperation, which suggests 
that cooperation emerges over time through interaction and can emerge even when interaction 
starts off with a level of uncertainty.  
The finding that about a quarter of the time someone who uses defection as a decision rule 
will transition into using Maximum Cooperation, which is arguably quite a drastic flip in 
behavior, suggests that failure to cooperate can be rectified through interaction. Although we 
still find very mild end-game effects where defection increases slightly, the proportion of 
people choosing Maximum Cooperation remained much higher than the proportion who 
chose defection at the end of the game. That Maximum Cooperation remains high right to the 
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end, suggests that there is a more general trend for stable cooperation to emerge in one of two 
forms: Committed Co-ops and Responsive Co-ops.   
If the evolution of committed groups in interaction is crucial to developing optimal levels 
of cooperation, it is also important to try understand what it is about the social situation and 
the people involved, that can lead to committed cooperators and groups forming. Committed 
Cooperators in the present study showed greater solidarity with their groups compared to 
Responsive Players. This result is perhaps not surprising since they were nested within co-ops 
which showed similarly high levels of cooperation as themselves. However, since we could 
not measure these social psychological variables beforehand (when co-ops did not yet exist), 
we are unable to draw any firm causal lines. It could be that high levels of cooperation 
fostered a sense of solidarity; or that those who have a greater tendency to feel solidarity with 
groups to which they belong, will naturally cooperate more. However, since Committed 
Cooperators together created Committed Co-ops through interaction, it might at least suggest 
a causal pathway whereby cooperation actually results in higher solidarity rather than the 
reverse.  
Furthermore, slightly more Committed Co-ops formed when broad social categories, 
rather than interpersonal ties, were made salient – this mild effect was also found in our 
previous study. Given that social categorization seems to help initiate the formation of 
cooperative groups somewhat more than inductive group formation, it may be that social 
identity can kick-start the emergence of cooperative norms.  
 
Social Categories versus Interpersonal Ties 
 This study also supports the results of the previous Chapter by providing further evidence 
for the fact that when social categories are made salient, group members appear to have a 
basis to cooperate (i.e., possibly through shared social groups and group heterogeneity), and 
cooperate at higher levels from the beginning of social interaction. In other words, at the start 
of the collaboration there appears to be greater trust and expected reciprocity (see Tanis & 
Postmes, 2005) which results in higher levels of cooperation among those who have a pre-
defined social category, compared to those who have been primed with the importance of 
interpersonal relationships. This can be seen from the different starting points for cooperation 
between conditions in Figure 10 of the results. Although cooperation in this study tended to 
slightly decline toward the very end of the interaction for categorized individuals, cooperation 
still remained well above starting levels. The results also show that when interpersonal ties are 
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made salient, cooperation is established later on in interaction, compared to social categories, 
but strengthens over time, in line with our expectations.  
In terms of the particular patterns of cooperation over time, while our previous research 
suggested that categorized individuals show less of a tendency to decrease their level of 
cooperation over time (compared to non-categorized individuals); categorized individuals in 
the present study did show a slight decrease in cooperation (compared to when interpersonal 
ties were made salient) at the end-game. Here it seems that interpersonal ties, above broad 
social categories, that may act as a buffer against cooperative decline. This finding appears to 
be somewhat consistent with findings from Van Mourik Broekman et al., (2018) who 
compared groups that were formed through interactive cooperation (similar to our 
interpersonal ties condition) with groups formed through uniform cooperation (similar to our 
social category condition) and control groups with no interaction. The groups that were 
formed interactively showed greater commitment during a follow-up task (suggested by 
sustained activity levels during a physical exercise) compared to both uniform and control 
groups, which showed declining levels of activity.  
We had expected that social categories and interpersonal ties would achieve similar levels 
of social identification, in accordance with the Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation 
(Postmes, Haslam, et al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005). We find some support for this 
expectation due to the null effect of condition on any of the social psychological variables 
measured. However, the results of the analysis of the social psychological measures did show 
that the average contribution of one’s co-op, in the second half of the game, had a noticeable 
impact on one’s psychological feeling about the group, regardless of the experimental 
condition. In particular, participants who were members of co-ops that contributed a higher 
mean amount to the public good showed, at the end of the experiment, higher levels of social 
identification, entitativity, belonging, satisfaction with and trust of their co-op, greater 
closeness to their co-op as well as shared the perception that their co-op acted based on 
interdependent group goals. Furthermore, one’s individual deviation from the group’s average 
level of cooperation did not influence one’s feeling about the group, suggesting that one’s 
identification with, and perception of, the group was entirely dependent on what happened at 
the group level, rather than one’s individual decisions within the group.  
 Although the effect of the experimental condition could, to some extent, explain the 
pattern of cooperation over time, there was also large variability among co-ops, regardless of 
condition. Furthermore, the impact of a particular co-op’s cooperation level on one’s 
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psychological state also appeared to be more important than the just the effect of the 
experimental manipulation. Therefore, while the pathway to group formation may result in a 
slightly different overall trajectory for cooperation, it is what happens within the groups 
themselves, above the static experimental condition, that ultimately leads to some groups 
showing stronger emergence of cooperation compared to others.    
 
Conclusion 
In this study, we show that cooperation is an emergent process that unfolds over time 
through interaction and that this emergence occurs both in social categories and interpersonal 
ties (which represent two social identity pathways). Both pathways to social identification 
with one’s group can result in high levels of cooperation, albeit through different routes: For 
example, social categories appear to start off with higher levels of cooperation but 
interpersonal tie groups can reach the same (high) level of cooperation over time. 
Furthermore, social norms for appropriate behavior (i.e., which decision rules to use and 
when) arise through interaction, resulting in different types of groups (in this study, named the 
Committed and Responsive Co-ops). Finally, beyond our previous research, we show that 
high identifiers most commonly belong to groups in which cooperation is highest and 
moreover, there are slightly more high identifiers in the social categories condition (in the 
sense that there are more Committed Co-ops in this condition). Taken together, this suggests 
that social identification and cooperation arise in tandem and are likely mutually reinforcing 
but also that a social category is not necessary for this to happen. The key findings in this 
paper replicate what we found in our previous study but also add to it. By changing the 
experimental manipulation in order to compare a richer social categories condition to an 
interpersonal ties condition (rather than a non-categorization condition), we can conclude that 
dynamic and emergent group norms are much stronger at predicting cooperation than static 
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Abstract 
Past research has shown that both social categorization and interpersonal ties foster 
cooperation in small groups interacting in a Public Goods Dilemma. In these studies, groups 
come to align their behavior through normative patterns of cooperative decision-making and 
different kinds of groups emerge – all with fairly high levels of cooperation. In this paper, we 
attempted to replicate this effect with some changes. Unexpectedly, we see that neither 
primed social identification pathway (through social categorization or interpersonal ties) 
guarantees the emergence of cooperation. Instead, we find only partial replication: one out of 
three types of groups align their decision-making behavior and reach fair levels of 
cooperation. The other two types of groups, containing even a few Defectors, are much less 
stable – cooperation starts low and devolves over rounds of interaction, without strong 
normative patterns emerging.  Nevertheless, some cooperative individuals still exist in these 
groups, despite it being against their narrow self-interest. While dynamic within-group factors 
appear foremost in the emergence and maintenance of cooperation; given that this study was 
conducted in a different societal context –macro-level factors may kick start, or indeed 
hamper, the emergence of cooperative group norms.  
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In previous research using Public Goods Games, we have shown that stable systems of 
cooperation emerge whereby members of a group come to align their decision rules for 
cooperation and become homogenous in their overall cooperation levels (see Chapter 2 and 3 
of this thesis). Three different kinds of groups, with their own normative patterns, tended to 
emerge: Committed Co-ops (groups which hit the ceiling for cooperation and are the most 
stable); Responsive Co-ops (groups in which cooperation remains high but people base their 
decisions primarily on what their group has done in the previous interaction, thus increasing 
or decreasing their contributions based on the group) and Reactive Co-ops (groups in which 
people react to low contributions by giving even less in the following interaction). We believe 
that within-group social interaction is crucial for the emergence of these cooperative norms. 
However, in our previous research, overall cooperation started rather high and tended 
to increase in most groups. In the current study one key aim was to increase the variance in 
the initial levels of cooperation to study whether cooperation could still reach the same high 
levels found in prior studies. Indeed, our changes to the experiment led individuals to make 
much lower initial contributions, as we had desired. However, as we will show, we only saw 
the emergence of moderate levels of cooperation in one of three types of groups. In the others, 
we witnessed a breakdown of cooperation and the formation of less stable groups.  
The introduction of this paper will be structured as follows: First, we broadly 
introduce our research in reference to our prior studies, discuss the change in experimental 
setting, and introduce the experimental paradigm (a dynamic Public Goods Game). Next, we 
discuss particular macro-level and group-level factors that may influence cooperation – the 
literature included in these sections helps provide structure to the unexpected findings of the 
present study.  
The aim of this paper, and the broader program of research which it is a part of, is to 
study the emergence (or in this case, the breakdown) of cooperation in small, interactive 
groups. We compare two experimental conditions designed to reflect two potential 
foundations for the emergence of cooperation: Social Categorization and Interpersonal Ties. 
Participants interacted with one another over time, playing a Public Goods Game (PGG) with 
communication, through the computer-mediated interaction platform, VIAPPL (the Virtual 
Interaction Application, see viappl.org). As mentioned above, this study saw a greater 
breakdown of cooperation than in previous Chapters. Therefore, we discuss possible reasons 
for this lack of cooperation and argue that more research should be conducted into how 
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macro-level factors may interact with group-level factors to affect cooperation in different 
contexts, especially in non-WEIRD societies (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). 
Cooperation as a Social Dilemma 
Social dilemmas are regularly used to study the emergence and maintenance of 
cooperation. In experimental paradigms such as Public Goods Games (PGG), participants are 
given the choice to cooperate with others, or defect. While the socially optimal outcome is for 
all players to cooperate and subsequently share in the material benefits generated from the act 
of cooperation, the temptation for free-riding still exists (Olson, 1965; Samuelson, 1954). Due 
to the nature of public goods – they are equally accessible and equally divisible – an 
individual may get away with not contributing to the existence of the public good (PG) while 
still having equal access to it. On the other hand, for the PG to exist a certain number of 
people need to cooperate and contribute to its’ existence, or it fails to exist for everyone.  
Cooperation may be risky for an individual when there is no guarantee that everyone 
else will cooperate. In fact, in many social dilemma situations it was traditionally considered 
rational for players to defect out of self-interest, rather than cooperate (Edwards, 1962). 
Despite this, cooperation levels are usually well above what is predicted by the rational choice 
model for cooperation in social dilemmas (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Barrera, 2014; 
Ledyard, 1995) and these levels of cooperation also differ among societies (Henrich & Boyd, 
2005). For example, cooperation is usually higher in collectivist cultures which value 
collective-interest over self-interest (e.g., C. C. Chen & Chen, 1998). However, in some cases 
(as we shall see in the present study) we find that cooperation starts low and declines over 
time. In this paper, we discuss what possible factors, beyond a traditional rational choice 
explanation, could potentially contribute to these low levels of cooperation – we begin by 
considering factors at the societal level given the change in setting from the Netherlands to 
South Africa.  
 
Marco-level influences on Cooperation  
While previous studies that found high levels of cooperation (see Chapter 2 and 3) were 
conducted in the Netherlands, we extended the setting of the present experiment to South 
Africa. As such, we begin by discussing macro-level factors found to influence cooperation, 
before looking at group-level factors that may explain lower levels of cooperation found in 
this paper. 
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 While self-interest may be a predominant barrier to 
cooperation in individualistic societies, this may not be an adequate explanation for the same 
problem in collectivistic societies, since individuals within the latter are usually motivated by 
collective-interest. Indeed, certain societies appear to be more cooperative and trusting than 
others (Henrich et al., 2001; Jordan, Peysakhovich, & Rand, 2014). There are possible 
influences at the societal level that may affect cooperation levels in social dilemmas. First, 
societies may have particular norms for cooperative behavior. Indeed, even the setting of an 
experiment can greatly influence whether cooperation emerges or not. Therefore, we start by 
looking at goal framing theory (Lindenberg, Fetchenhauer, Flache, & Buunk, 2006) in order 
to explain influences on behavior that are external to group interaction itself. Next and 
relatedly, we discuss cultural patterns, the role of societal institutions and the role of trust and 
punishment in different societies. 
 Group interaction takes place in particular environmental contexts which may activate self-
interest or collective-interest to varying degrees and further, normative patterns usually differ 
at a societal level as well as at a local level. The fact that context is important has been 
illustrated, for example, through research which has manipulated the framing of a social 
dilemma (to appear more cooperative or competitive) in order to study its effect on 
cooperation (see for example Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004; Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, 
& Van Dijk, 2013). As a more concrete illustration, research has shown that a normative goal-
frame can be activated through presenting a public goods game as a “Community Game”, 
resulting in higher levels of cooperation; while presenting the same game as a “Wall Street 
Game”, one can activate a gains goal-frame which increases competition and defection 
(Liberman et al., 2004; Lindenberg, 2015).  
Besides activating cooperation or defection by experimentally manipulating goal-
frames through the description of an experiment, whether or not an individual’s material 
outcome is dependent on the public goods game (PGG), or not, can also have an influence. In 
other words, paying participants based on their ‘performance’ in the PGG can increase 
defection as explicit monetary incentives may overshadow their intrinsic motivation to 
cooperate and increase the likelihood of expected utility decision making, or making the 
“rational choice” (Jordan et al., 2014; Weber et al., 2004). Seeing social relations and group 
interaction as a kind of marketplace exchange would have a very different effect on one’s 
behavior, in comparison to seeing group interaction as having symbolic benefits that are not 
directly related to explicit monetary reward – and these perceptions of group relations may 
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differ across societies and cultures. It is also quite probable that normative and gains goal 
frames may be more or less prominent depending on, for example, whether a society is more 
or less collectivist or individualist in nature. Therefore, culture at a societal level may 
generate expectations around how to behave under particular circumstances, and these 
expectations may spill over into interpersonal interaction. 
 Cultural values, which differ both within and between 
countries, appear to play some role in whether or not cooperation emerges. Traditionally, 
cultural research has focused on the distinction between individualist and collectivist societies 
(Hofstede, 1980). The starker the contrast between two countries on the individualist-
collectivist (I-C) dimensions, the greater the difference in cooperation; such that collectivist 
societies cooperate more while individualist societies engage more in competition and free-
riding in social dilemmas ( e.g., Cox, Lobel, & Mcleod, 1991; Parks & Vu, 1994). However, 
one could also argue that individuals in societies focused on building and maintaining strong 
family ties (i.e., collectivist cultures) lack norms of cooperation with strangers. It has been 
suggested, for example, that collectivistic people will respond negatively to punishment for 
not cooperating with strangers because cooperating with strangers is not culturally normative 
(see Balliet & Van Lange, 2013). 
Although culture itself is not necessarily seen as static and there are likely to be cultural 
shifts over time, within the context of a single experiment one’s cultural preference is usually 
treated as fixed: collectivists may be more cooperative, while individualists are more likely to 
show narrow self-interest. Therefore, how cultural preferences interact with emergent group 
processes is an important extension of cultural studies on cooperation. 
Furthermore, the individualism-collectivism dichotomy may be too simplistic.  And 
indeed, this distinction has now been extended – it is further qualified by preferred power 
differentials: vertical and horizontal. Cultural patterns can thus be divided into four types: 
horizontal collectivism (H-C), vertical collectivism (V-C), horizontal individualism (V-I) and 
vertical individualism (V-C) (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Sivadas, Bruvold, 
& Nelson, 2008). Drawing these further distinctions between I-C also helps to explain the 
presence of different within-country cultural values, especially in diverse societies such as 
South Africa.  
While both collectivistic patterns see the self-concept as being interdependent with group 
identity, the primary difference between the sub-types is that H-C individuals prefer equal 
relationships, while V-Cs’ accept and expect status differences. On the other hand, both 
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individualistic patterns are defined by an autonomous self-concept but, while H-Is’ see all 
individuals as equal, V-Is’ expect inequality and support competition12  (see Probst, 
Carnevale, & Triandis, 1999). 
Probst et al. (1999) directly tested the effect of these four cultural patterns on cooperation 
in a social dilemma. They found that the most noticeable difference existed between vertical 
individualists and vertical collectivists such that the former were more likely to defect while 
the latter would cooperate, in a single-player prisoner’s dilemma. Furthermore, in attitudinal 
measures, V-Is’ reported goal was to maximize individual interests and V-Cs’ goal, to 
maximize group interests. However, this study did not allow interaction among participants, 
therefore we do not know how strong the effect of cultural patterns on cooperation is in 
interactional settings.  
From the I-C social dilemma literature, it appears that the traditional rational choice model 
(i.e., a person will likely defect as it is in one’s self interest, especially in one-shot 
interactions) might work, at least in part, to predict behavior for pro-selfs in cultures where 
individualism is higher but may not provide a good explanation for the behavior of those with 
collectivist values. Chen & Chen (1998) argue that the mechanisms that have been seen to 
increase cooperation – such as: superordinate goals, group identity, trust, accountability, 
communication and reward structure – may operate differently in collectivist and individualist 
societies. For example, these authors propose that when considering cooperation in newly 
formed groups, a new group identity that enhances personal identities may increase 
cooperation in individualist cultures; while a new group identity that complements existing 
group identities will increase cooperation in collectivist societies.  
 While cultural differences may explain 
between-society differences in cooperation, the quality of societal institutions may also play a 
role. While experiences of trustworthy institutions (such as government structures) may 
                                               
 
12 These four cultural patterns have some association with social value orientation (SVO, Messick & 
McClintock, 1968), which is a person’s’ fairly stable preference for cooperation or defection. SVO and the four 
cultural patterns seem to share some of the same variance, and the cultural patterns, rather than SVO may predict 
cooperation better (e.g., Probst et al., 1999).These patterns also correspond with Fiske’s social relations model 
(e.g., Rai & Fiske, 2011) which defines four preferences for how societies distribute resources. The overlap has 
been suggested by Probst et al., (1999) whereby both collectivisms encompass communal sharing (i.e., resources 
shared on needs basis), while H-C also includes equality matching (i.e., equal distribution) and V-C includes 
authority ranking (i.e., higher status results in more resources). While both individualisms include market pricing 
(i.e., merit-based sharing), H-I includes equality matching and V-I, authority ranking.  
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increase generalized trust in society, distrust may arise when institutions are seen as 
exploitative and corrupt13.  
Indeed, while norms of direct and indirect reciprocity appear to be fairly universal 
(Diekmann & Lindenberg, 2015; Gouldner, 1960; Jordan et al., 2014), the quality of the 
societal institutions can vary drastically among different societies. In some environments it 
may be safe to trust strangers, reciprocate and cooperate with them; however in others it may 
be safer to assume non-cooperation and thus defect oneself (Jordan et al., 2014).  
There is evidence to show that cooperation learned in one context – for example, through 
experience with, or perceptions of, societal institutions – can spill-over into other contexts, 
such as experimental lab settings (e.g., Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016) or small group settings. 
Taking this spill-over effect into account, the quality of societal institutions is important in 
fostering sustainable cooperation at all levels. ‘Quality’ may not be straightforward though: 
the quality of institutions is not only determined by what is enshrined in the constitution of a 
particular country (i.e., how democratic the institutions are), but also the extent to which 
constitutional guidelines are enforced and coordination between oversight authorities can 
occur (for example, see Pillay, 2004).  
In South Africa for example, corruption in public institutions is prolific despite having an 
impressive democratic constitution with many oversight authorities (Pillay, 2004). High 
profile corruption has been exposed in the previous administration (for example, Public 
Protector South Africa, 2014), having also existed historically in the oppressive apartheid 
government (for example, see Hyslop, 2005). Long-term exposure to unfair and untrustworthy 
institutions could trickle down into smaller scale interactions among members of the general 
public, whereby is safer to try to maximize one’s own self-interest rather than trust a possibly 
untrustworthy collective to which one has no close, direct ties. This may be exacerbated if 
one’s society is more collectivist in nature and cooperating with close family members and 
friends, rather than strangers, is the norm.   
While macro-level societal factors such as normative frames, cultural values, societal 
institutions and trust, all play a role in the emergence of cooperation within smaller groups, 
we also need to consider the dynamic interpersonal factors which relate to how new groups 
are formed. As an illustration, factors seen to enhance cooperation in one culture may not 
                                               
 
13 Since measures of trust are usually correlated with national wealth, wealth inequality and market 
competitiveness, one possible explanation for low generalized trust at the societal level is also the 
economic development of a country (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013). 
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work identically in another culture (C. C. Chen & Chen, 1998). In particular, with regards to 
social identity, identities that enhance individuality may help cooperation in individualist 
settings while identities that support existing close-knit identities in collectivist cultures, may 
increase cooperation in those settings. We discuss the effect of social identity on cooperation 
in the following section, as this will also provide the groundwork for the experimental 
manipulations that we use in the present study (also see Chapter 2 of this thesis).   
 
Group level influences: Social Identity Pathways to Cooperation 
One factor that can increase cooperation and ameliorate defection is group membership. 
For example, ingroup favouritism has shown to reliably result in within-group cooperation 
across different experimental paradigms (for a review see Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014) and 
ingroup cooperation is seen as accounting for most real-world cooperation (e.g., Parks, 
Joireman, & Van Lange, 2013). It has been proposed that social identification with one’s 
group is one possible driving force behind cooperation within groups, also during Public 
Goods Games (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; De Cremer et al., 2008; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 
1999; Turner, 1991; Wit & Kerr, 2002). Therefore, while there are apparent societal level 
factors influencing cooperation in smaller groups, there are also important group level factors 
which become salient during group interaction.  
The role of social identification on ingroup cooperation has predominantly been studied 
from a categorization perspective, in which broad social categories – based on similarities 
among group members – are in the foreground of one’s social identity and the presence of an 
outgroup is salient (Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005; Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1985). However, 
a more dynamic view of social identification are so-called inductive identities: these form 
from the bottom-up through interaction and are based on one’s personal value to the group 
(i.e., intragroup differences which are complementary and contribute to the success of the 
group). The existence of dynamically formed social identities has been suggested by the 
Interactive Model of Social Identify Formation (Postmes, Haslam, et al., 2005; Postmes, 
Spears, et al., 2005) as well as a network approach to social identity in which direct 
interpersonal ties between group members are seen as primary to the group’s existence and 
identity (for example, see Deaux & Martin, 2003; Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2015; 
Leszczensky, 2013). For shared identities to be induced, the salience of an outgroup is not 
necessary. While it has been proposed that both processes of identity formation (bottom-up 
and top-down) can result in equally high levels of social identification and belongingness, the 
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pathways to these outcomes may be different (e.g., Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2013; 
Koudenburg et al., 2015). 
In previous research, we have directly compared the levels of cooperation over time 
between experimentally manipulated social categories and inductive-type groups (Chapter 2 
and 3 of this thesis). Overall, cooperation is slightly higher when social categories are made 
salient (in both Chapter 2 and 3), however, inductive-type groups (for example, where 
interpersonal ties are made more salient, Chapter 3) can result in more sustained cooperation 
over time, even when the end-game is made explicit. Therefore, from previous research, it 
appears that both types of social groupings can enhance cooperation, albeit possibly through 
different trajectories. In sum, group membership and social identification may increase 
cooperation under many circumstances and especially so when a normative goal frame is 
activated (Lindenberg, 2015b). However, there may be other factors which could overshadow 
any positive effect of social identification and normative goal framing on cooperation. These 
factors may include: a competing gains norm that is activated by explicit monetary incentives, 
spill-over from societal institutions, and differing cultural values – even within the same 
country.  
 
Aim of the research 
Given the high levels of cooperation and similar findings in Chapter 2 and 3 of this 
thesis, we aimed to extend the study of Chapter 3 in particular, by: (1) sampling in a different 
social context, (2) changing the payoff structure such that people are paid based on the 
outcome of the public goods game (PGG), and (3) by increasing the group size. We hoped 
these changes in setting and design would give more variance in the initial contributions in 
the PGG, rather than having people hit the ceiling for cooperation early on in interaction. We 
expected that cooperation would still emerge, although the trajectory would be somewhat 
different from the previous studies. Given the change in the societal context, we also wanted 
to see whether one’s within-country cultural values made any difference to the experience of 
the group, or to overall cooperation levels.  
The fact that there were three main changes between Chapter 3 and the present study 
complicates drawing direct comparisons. Taking this into consideration, the present research 
can only directly answer questions relating to the difference in cooperation between the 
experimental conditions (i.e., the two social identification pathways: Social Categories versus 
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Interpersonal Ties) and whether one’s cultural values have any effect on one’s experience of, 
or behavior in, the PGG.  
Method 
Participants and design 
Student volunteers (N= 300, 167 males, 130 females, 3 undeclared, Mage =21.7 (7.7)) 
from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, participated the PGG experiment in 
groups of ten. Participants were incentivized according to a payment scale14 based on how 
many tokens they ended up with at the end of the experiment (an average of 30 ZAR). 30 
experiments were conducted in total, with 15 replications in each of the two conditions 
(Interpersonal Ties versus Social Categories condition). Ethical clearance was granted by the 
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, UKZN. 
 
Procedure 
Groups of ten participants were invited to participate in an experiment at one time. 
After signing informed consent sheets, participants were given a few minutes to read an 
instruction manual (see Supplementary Information C) with the explanation and instructions 
for the game.  
Thereafter the experimenter guided participants through a brief practice round where 
they would learn how to use the software platform on which the experiment was run – the 
Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL, see viappl.org). Following this, participants 
answered a pre-experimental questionnaire. After the first questionnaire, the game began.  
In the first stage, participants would enter the game arena – which appeared onscreen 
as an island– and each participant would be able to see the avatars (icons) which represented 
the type of farm each individual was assigned to in the game. These avatars were randomly 
assigned to the participant by the VIAPPL software when participants logged onto the game. 
Instructions appeared onscreen that informed participants which ‘farming co-operative’ – or 
group – they would join, according to the experimental condition. There were five participants 
in each co-op.  
Following co-op formation, there was a five-minute period in which participants were 
asked to discuss, via instant messaging, the topic provided to them (described below). 
                                               
 
14 Participants were aware of the payment scale prior to the PGG.  
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Directly after the conversation was finished, participants began investing in their co-op 
according to the rules of a Public Goods Game (PGG). For 11 rounds, participants could 
choose to invest 0 - 10 tokens per round. The total amount invested in the co-op was summed, 
multiplied by 1.2 and divided equally among all co-op members, regardless of how much they 
had personally invested. At the end of each round, the participants’ token balance was 
updated by the following rules: 2 additional tokens per round + the amount participants 
retained from the previous round (i.e., what they had not invested) + their share of the co-op 
profit.  
Before each round of investment in the Public Good (PG), participants had 40 seconds 
to message one other regarding any topic; and following each round, a visual summary image 
was shown to participants – providing feedback regarding everyone else’s contributions. After 
the ninth round, a ‘mid-experimental’ questionnaire was given, before the final two rounds of 
play. This questionnaire was used to get a sense of the feelings towards the co-op before the 
PG end-game – as having the end of interaction in sight has been demonstrated to result in 
increasing in defection (Ledyard, 1995). After the final two rounds of the game – which were 
emphasized via a brief message informing participants that the game would soon end – 
participants were presented with a post-experimental questionnaire.  
After completion of the final questionnaire, participants were paid according to the 
number of tokens they had accumulated by the end of the experiment and they could leave the 
lab.  
As with our previous study, in Chapter 3 of this thesis, we had two experimental 
conditions – the Interpersonal Ties and Social Categories condition. In the Interpersonal Ties 
condition participants were randomly assigned to one side of the game island (east or west). 
They each had one of ten unique animals that they would ‘farm’ in the game, therefore their 
individuality was emphasized (see Figure 17). By contrast, in the Social Categories condition, 
participants were assigned to either be cattle or corn farmers, highlighting group homogeneity 
(see Figure 18).  
To further manipulate the differences that we were interested in studying, participants 
in each condition had a different topic of conversation that they would engage in with their 
co-op members prior to the start of the PG game. The topic in the Interpersonal Ties condition 
was:  
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“As you probably know, people generally rely on their neighbours and friends for 
social support. Please discuss in your group:  What are the five most important benefits that 
personal relations would provide to a farmer on a newly discovered island?” 
While the topic in the Social Categories condition was:  
“As you probably know, farmers generally rely on their farming co-operatives to 
support agriculture. Please discuss in your group:  What are the five most important benefits 
that farming co-operatives would provide to the members of the co-operative as a whole?” 
In the Interpersonal Ties condition, farmers on the east side of the island were 
instructed to join one co-op together, while those on the west joined another. In the Social 
Categories condition, all the cattle farmers would form one co-op while all the corn farmers 
would form the other. For both conditions, participants were not given a choice as to which 
co-op to join in order to strengthen the manipulation. 
The procedure for the present experiment was nearly identical to Chapter 3 of this 
thesis. Differences were that: participants interacted in groups of 10 instead of 6; the context 
of the study differed (South Africa versus the Netherlands) and the instruction manual made 
more salient an example of how an individual could earn more if they defected while their co-
op still contributed highly – we did this to try to increase the variance, especially in starting 
levels of cooperation, as participants in the previous studies seemed to ‘max out’ quite 
quickly. Finally, participants were paid according to the number of tokens they ended up with 
at the end of the game, whereas for the studies of Chapter 2 and 3, participants were paid 




operationalized by the amount contributed to the co-op at every round (an integer from 0 – 
10). 
  All questionnaire items were measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale, from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7), unless otherwise specified. 
The pre-experimental questionnaire consisted of 14 items which measured vertical and 
horizontal collectivism and individualism (Sivadas et al., 2008). Although all four of these 
constructs were found to have rather low reliability (H-C: e.g. “I feel good when I cooperate 
with others”; a=0.54, Greatest Lower Bound (GLB) = 0.63; V-C: e.g. “I would sacrifice an 
activity that I enjoy very much if my family did not approve of it”; a=0.46, GLB = 0.52; H-I: 
Cooperation/Amount contributed to the Public Good.  
Social Psychological Measures.
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e.g. “I enjoy being unique and different from others in many ways”; a=0.54, GLB = 0.57; V-
I: e.g. “I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others”; a=0.60, GLB = 
0.60); this could be due in part to the relatively small number of items for each construct (3-4 
items). Briggs and Cheeks (1986) suggest looking at the mean inter-item correlations instead 
of alpha and to retain those items that have a correlation of between 0.2 and 0.4. Doing this 





Figure 17. Arena in the Interpersonal Ties Condition 
Figure 18. Arena in the Social Categories Condition 
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The mid-experimental questionnaire15 which participants completed before the last 
two rounds of the game measure: perceived entitativity (a=0.76, GLB = 0.77); social 
identification (a=0.81, GLB = 0.87); belonging (a=0.81, GLB = 0.85); perception of group 
interdependence/common group goals (a=0.82, GLB = 0.89); perception of 
independent/individualist goals (a=0.81, GLB = 0.85). Closeness to own co-op and the other 
co-op were evaluated through an image selection task based on single item measures 
(Schubert & Otten, 2002, Chapter 3 of this thesis).  
Finally, the post-experimental questionnaire measured social identification with one’s 
own co-op, through a single-item measure (as validated by Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2012).  
In addition, trust (a=0.78, GLB = 0.78, one item dropped) and satisfaction (a=0.80, GLB = 
0.81) with the co-op were also measured (see Chapter 3 for item details); as well as perceived 
competition between co-ops – through a single item (“There was no competition between the 
co-ops”, reversed scored) and bias against the other co-op (e.g., “My co-op was better than the 
other”, 3 items, a=0.76, GLB = 0.76, one item dropped). The last two questions were 
developed for the purpose of this experiment.  
 
Hypotheses and Expectations16 
Hypothesis 1. We do not expect a difference between the Social Categories and 
Interpersonal Ties condition on the measure of social identification (i.e., statistical null 
hypothesis). We also do not expect differences in belongingness, perceived entitativity, 
perceived trustworthiness and satisfaction with the co-op between the conditions, according to 
the Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation (Postmes, Haslam, et al., 2005; Postmes, 
Spears, et al., 2005). 
Hypothesis 2. The perceived goals of group members will be more interdependent 
(group-based) in the Social Categories than the Interpersonal Ties condition. Conversely, the 
perceived goals of group members will be more independent (individualist) in the 
Interpersonal Ties condition, in which heterogeneity is more salient, compared to the Social 
Categories condition.   
                                               
 
15 The same items were used in the previous study (see Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis for examples and 
references). 
16 As not all of our hypotheses were strictly testable propositions, we label them as expectations that 
we had for the data prior to conducting the experiment.  
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Hypothesis 3. There will be greater perceived intergroup competition and ingroup bias 
in the Social Categories compared to the Interpersonal Ties condition, as the saliency of an 
outgroup for social categories tends to be associated with bias against the outgroup.  
 Hypothesis 4. There will be slightly higher levels of cooperation in the Social 
Categories compared to the Interpersonal Ties condition.  
 Expectation 5. In the Social Categories condition there will be higher and more 
stable patterns of cooperation in early rounds of the PGG and this will decrease slightly over 
time. On the other hand, in the Interpersonal Ties condition, similarly high levels of 
cooperation will be reached in later rounds and increase, rather than decrease, over time. 
Expectation 6. We measured four dimensions of culture in this study and we expect 
that different cultural dimensions may relate to the level of cooperation one shows. 
Specifically, vertical individualism (which values individual status) will foster the greatest 
defection while horizontal collectivism (which emphasizes interdependence and sociability) 
will foster the greatest cooperation. 
Expectation 7. We expect different classes of co-operatives will form fairly 
independently of the experimental condition (Social Categories and Interpersonal Ties), where 
classes of co-ops are characterized by their norms of behavior. 
Analytic approach and Results 
Social Psychological Effects  
In order to test differences in the mid and post experimentally measured constructs 
between the Interpersonal Ties and Social Categories conditions, we employ a multilevel, 
multivariate model in runMlwin in R (Version 2.36) (Leckie & Charlton, 2013; Rasbash et al., 
2009). Response (Level 1) is nested in participant (Level 2), nested in co-op (Level 3), nested 
in experimental group (Level 4). Due to the many dependent variables (DV’s) in the 
questionnaire (see, dependent measures above), we decided to collapse the ones that were 
highly correlated to simplify the analysis. Correlations (see  Table C1 in Supplementary 
Information C) suggested that social identification, entitativity, belongingness, satisfaction 
with one’s own co-op and closeness to one’s own co-op could make up one variable, which 
we will call ‘solidarity’17. The perception of group members having interdependent goals was 
also highly correlated with the variables in this list, however, since we had a specific 
                                               
 
17 In previous research, solidarity has comprised of social identitification, entitativity and 
belongingness (see for example, Koudenburg, Postmes, Gordijn & van Mourik Broekman, 2015).     
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hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) about this measure we kept it separate. In addition to solidarity, the 
other DV’s were: independent/individualist goals, interdependent/group goals, trust, closeness 
to the other co-op, ingroup bias and perceived competition. Table C2 in Supplementary 
Information C gives the descriptives for each social psychological measure by experimental 
condition.  
 The independent variables (IV’s) tested were: the experimental condition; the average 
amount given by the co-op in the second half of the PGG – giving enough time for norms to 
be established –, and the individual’s deviance from that amount. Lastly, since the cultural 
variables (V-C, V-I, H-C, H-I) were measured pre-experimentally, they were included as IV’s 
which could influence the perceptions about the group, additional to interaction in the game – 
although we had no strong prior expectations.  
 Through model comparison (see Table C3 in Supplementary Information 
C), the best fitting model included the following DV’s: average contribution of the co-op 
(“Mean co-op”); Horizontal Collectivism (H-C) and Horizontal Individualism (H-I). The 
experimental condition was not significant (which provides support for Hypothesis 1 but does 
not support Hypothesis 2 or 3). Individual deviance from the average co-op contribution was 
also not significant and therefore not included in the model – nor was Vertical Collectivism 
(V-C) or Vertical Individualism (V-I)18.  
The intra-class correlations are fully reported in Table C4 in Supplementary 
Information C. The proportion of variance at the game level was very low (near 0 for all 
DV’s) and at the co-op level, it was highest for solidarity (41%) and lowest for perceived 
competition between co-ops (3%). 
 The average amount one’s co-op 
contributed in the second half of the PGG had positive significant effects on one’s sense of 
solidarity, trust, perception of interdependent goals and ingroup bias (see Table 11); while it 
had significant negative effects on the perception of independent goals and perceived 
competition between co-ops. There was no effect for closeness to the other co-op. The overall 
pattern of results suggest that the more ones’ co-op contributed to the Public Good: 1) the 
more one felt connected to the co-op, 2) the less one perceived the co-op members to have 
independent/individualistic goals and 3) the more ingroup bias one experienced.  
  
                                               
 
18 We checked whether results differed substantively from a model with all the variables included and 
they did not. Therefore, we confirmed the best fitting model.  
Results.  
The effect of co-op contribution (Mean Co-op).   
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 An individuals’ measure of H-C had a significant positive 
effect on solidarity and the perception of interdependent goals, such that the higher one scored 
on H-C, the more solidarity one felt towards one’s co-op and the more one perceived that the 
goals of their co-op members were interdependent (i.e., for the collective). H-C had no 
notable effect on trust, independent goals, closeness to the other co-op or perceived 
competition between co-ops.   
 H-I had a significant positive effect on the perception of 
independent goals as well as significant negative effects (albeit, much weaker) on closeness to 
the other co-op and perceived competition between co-ops. The more individualistic one was, 
the more one saw one’s co-op members’ goals as being independent (i.e., self-interested). The 
absence of the solidarity effect for H-I suggests that collectivists are more likely to feel 
solidarity with their group compared to individualists, even in interactive settings. 
 
The Effect of Social Categories and Interpersonal Ties on Cooperative Behavior  
 While the overall level of cooperation was high in the previous two 
studies (Chapter 2 and 3), cooperation was much lower in the present study regardless of the 
experimental condition (Social Categories: MeanCooperation = 2.79(3.3), Interpersonal Ties: 
MeanCooperation = 2.43 (2.6)). In addition, in contrast to the previous two studies of this thesis, 
the proportion of variance explained by the co-op level (with the experimental condition 
included) was much lower (8%) than at the game level (32%).   
 To test the overall effect of condition (Social Categories versus 
Interpersonal Ties, coded 0 and 1 respectively) on cooperation over time, a multilevel linear 
regression model was applied using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) in the R 
environment (R Core Team, 2016). Round/time (Level 1) was nested in individuals (Level 2), 
nested in co-ops (Level 3), in experimental group (Level 4). A simple linear growth model 
was fitted. Random slopes for round were included at both the individual and co-op level. 
Model selection was based on model fit (see results for details). As with our previous studies 
in Chapter 2 and 3, the multilevel growth model provides an overarching view of the data and 
should be considered descriptive because the data violates the assumptions of the model (i.e., 
homoscedasticity). Therefore, we also model the data using a dynamic latent class model 
(below) for a more process-oriented view regarding the decision rules that guide participant 
cooperation or defection over time.  
  
Horizontal Collectivism.  
Horizontal Individualism.  
Descriptives.  
Method.  













Multilevel Multivariate Model for social psychological variables: Fixed Part 
 Coef. S.E Z P 95% CI  Coef. S.E Z P 95% CI 
Intercept (Solidarity) 2.18 0.67 3.27 0.001 0.88 3.48 Intercept (Closeness to other co-op) 2.62 0.96 2.73 0.006 0.74 4.49 
Mean co-op (Solidarity) 0.26 0.06 4.46 0.000 0.15 0.37 Mean co-op (Closeness to other co-op) 0.06 0.05 1.09 0.277 -0.05 0.16 
HC (Solidarity) 0.33 0.08 3.93 0.000 0.16 0.49 HC (Closeness to other co-op) 0.24 0.12 1.96 0.050 0.00 0.48 
HI (Solidarity) -0.13 0.08 -1.63 0.103 -0.28 0.03 HI (Closeness to other co-op) -0.25 0.12 -2.16 0.031 -0.48 -0.02 
Intercept (Trust) 3.44 1.02 3.37 0.001 1.44 5.45 Intercept (Ingroup bias) 2.58 0.95 2.70 0.007 0.71 4.44 
Mean co-op (Trust) 0.23 0.07 3.39 0.001 0.09 0.36 Mean co-op (Ingroup bias) 0.20 0.06 3.36 0.001 0.08 0.32 
HC (Trust) 0.13 0.13 0.96 0.335 -0.13 0.38 HC (Ingroup bias) 0.16 0.12 1.31 0.190 -0.08 0.39 
HI (Trust) -0.02 0.12 -0.19 0.848 -0.26 0.22 HI (Ingroup bias) 0.08 0.12 0.72 0.473 -0.14 0.31 
Intercept (Interdependent goals) 2.74 0.67 4.09 0.000 1.43 4.05 Intercept (Perceived Competition) 4.60 1.02 4.50 0.000 2.59 6.61 
Mean co-op (Interdependent goals) 0.25 0.05 4.89 0.000 0.15 0.34 Mean co-op (Perceived Competition) -0.14 0.06 -2.25 0.024 -0.27 -0.02 
HC (Interdependent goals) 0.20 0.09 2.40 0.017 0.04 0.37 HC (Perceived Competition) 0.27 0.13 2.05 0.040 0.01 0.53 
HI (Interdependent goals) -0.13 0.08 -1.61 0.106 -0.29 0.03 HI (Perceived Competition) -0.27 0.12 -2.17 0.030 -0.51 -0.03 
Intercept (Independent goals) 4.36 0.63 6.90 0.000 3.12 5.59        
Mean co-op (Independent goals) -0.19 0.04 -4.31 0.000 -0.28 -0.10        
HC (Independent goals) -0.08 0.08 -1.03 0.303 -0.24 0.08        
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 The intra-class correlations from the null model show that 32% of the 
unexplained variance lies at the game level; 8% at the co-op level; 12% at the individual level 
and 48% at the round level. The conditional growth model with random slopes provided the 
best fit to the data and is reported here19. For model comparisons see Table C5 in 
Supplementary Information C.  
There was a negative effect of round on cooperation (b = -0.12, SE = 0.02); as well as 
a negative interaction between round and condition (b = -0.06, SE = 0.03). Overall, 
cooperation decreased over time in both conditions and furthermore, cooperation broke down 
more rapidly in the Interpersonal Ties condition compared to the Social Categories condition, 
as visualized in Figure 19. Given the results of our previous research (see Chapter 2 and 3), 
we were not expecting such low levels of cooperation at the start of the game (although we 
had hoped to lower it somewhat), nor did we expect a drastic decline over time.  
Nevertheless, our findings partially support Hypothesis 4 – there was indeed higher 
cooperation in the Social Categories condition. Furthermore, following Expectation 5, the 
predicted decrease in cooperation in the Social Categories condition was supported (but not 
the predicted initial level of stability), while the expectation that cooperation would increase 
for the Interpersonal Ties condition found no support in this analysis. Figure 20 shows the 
variation between co-ops in each condition, and the general pattern of increasing defection 
seems strong, with only a few co-ops (for example in the Social Categories condition) 
showing slightly higher and more stable levels of cooperation.  
Using the above presented model as a base model, we could test whether cultural 
values (H-C, V-C, H-I or V-I) had any additional explanatory value on cooperation over time 
and we also tested whether it had an effect on the first round of interaction. Neither model 
showed any effect for any of the cultural factors. For the sake of space, we just report the 
model for initial contributions, because in this model culture would be less likely 
contaminated by group processes20 (see Table 12 below). Since cultural values had no effect 
on actual behavior, Expectation 6 is not supported.  
                                               
 
19 Random slopes are modelled at the co-op level and not the game level, despite most of the intercept 
variance lying at the game level. This is supported by model fitting: (BIC (reported model) = 14527.7, 
BIC (random slopes for game) = 14556.3). Looking at the raw data, there appears to be only one game 
where the co-ops acted similarly, therefore we expect the variance at the game level is high due to this 
one game.  
 
20 Note: we also tested whether the cultural variables, aggregated by co-op, had an effect on 
cooperation and they did not.  
Results.  

















































Condition: ● ●Social Categories Interpersonal Ties
Figure 20. Co-op cooperation over time 
Interpersonal Ties Social Categories
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Classifying cooperative behavior, types of individuals, and types of co-ops 
 In order to take into account the dynamic nature of an individual’s 
decisions regarding how much to cooperate with the co-op on a round-by-round basis, as well 
as to classify, based on similar characteristics, the co-ops that formed, we applied a multilevel 
latent class Markov model using Latent Gold (Version 5.1) (Vermunt & Magidson, 2016). 
The same analytic method and model building procedure for the latent class model was 
followed from our previous studies (Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis). The details have already 
been explained in previous chapters so will not be repeated here.  
In summary, this model allowed us to classify an individual’s decision rule which 
informs one’s level of cooperation or defection in a particular round (i.e., how much one 
contributed to the Public Good). Decision rules are dynamic, which means that they can 
change from round to round, where changes are modelled based on one’s decision rule in the 
previous round; as well as the type of individual one is classified as at the higher level of the 
model. The model therefore also classifies the types of individuals and the types of co-ops 
that form, according to similar shared properties. The individual and co-op classes are stable 
(unlike the decision rules) and do not change from round to round. The main benefit of using 
this type of analysis is that while the multilevel growth model provides a descriptive view of 
the data, the latent class model used here provides a more nuanced view of the round-by-
Method.  
Table 12 
The effect of cultural values on cooperation 
 Amount 
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round behavior, which fits the data better and overcomes the violation of the assumption of 
homoscedasticity which is required for the multilevel growth model.  
 The estimated model specified 5 decision rules, 3 individual classes and 3 
co-op classes. For the details of model selection, the reader is directed Table C6, and a 
subsequent description, in Supplementary Information C.  
 We labelled the five decision rules as: 
Maximum Cooperation, Marginal Cooperation, Ambivalent Defection, Near-Defection and 
Complete Defection, due to their features discussed below. The regression results for the 
decision rules can be found in Table 13, with their overall relative frequency and the mean 
amount contributed to the Public Good (PG), with which they are associated. The history of 
the game had a significant effect on which decision rule would be chosen: both for own 
lagged amount (c2 (5) = 28.13, p <0.01) and the mean lagged amount for the co-op (c2 (3) = 
41.42, p <0.01). Further, the decision rules at the beginning of the experiment differed 
significantly from one another (c2 (4) = 73.64, p <0.01), predicting different levels of 
cooperation from round one. In addition, the transition probability matrices of the five 
decision rules were significantly different (c2 (20) = 218.78, p <0.001). Descriptions of these 





Level 1: Decision rules for cooperation.  
Table 13 














0.07 0.29 0.14 0.21 0.29 
Mean 
Amount 
10 4.6 2.09 1 0 
Intercept 10 3.440 2 1 0 
Time 
Dummy1 








0 0.268 0 0 0 
Residual 
variance 
0.008 3.019 0.004 0.003 0.002 
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 The two most common decision rules guiding the level of cooperation were: 
Complete Defection and Marginal Cooperation – both with a 29% probability occurring 
throughout the game.  
The amount contributed when guided by Complete Defection (Mamount= 0) could not 
be predicted by the history of the previous round – neither by one’s own lagged amount (b = 
0) nor by the lagged amount of the co-op (b = 0). From the transition probabilities in Table 
14, if one chose Complete Defection in one round, there was a 63% chance that it would 
remain the decision rule in the next round; while there was only a 11% chance that one would 
subsequently be guided by Marginal Cooperation. By comparing the transition probabilities of 
all 5 decision rules, Complete Defection was one of the most stable decision rules, with only 
Maximum Cooperation being 3% more stable (see Table 14). Complete Defection had almost 
no residual variance (s2 = 0.002), which makes sense given that it embodied the floor effect 
for cooperation.  
Marginal Cooperation (Mamount=4.6), as prevalent as Complete Defection, was the 
decision rule associated with the second highest contribution level. Both own lagged amount 
(b = 0.149) and the lagged amount of the co-op (b = 0.268) had a significant effect on the 
amount contributed to the PG. This indicates that if one contributed a high amount in the 
previous round and one’s co-op contributed even higher, then one was likely to presently 
draw on Marginal Cooperation as their decision rule. Although not part of the regression 
results or transition probabilities, examination of the posterior probabilities provides further 
support for this interpretation: If, in the previous round, one had contributed in the higher 
Table 14  
Transition Probabilities of the Decision rules 
  
Present Decision rule 























0.66 0.21 0.03 0.03 0.08 
Marginal 
Cooperation 
0.05 0.49 0.15 0.15 0.16 
Ambivalent 
Defection 
0.01 0.33 0.24 0.26 0.16 
Near-Defection 0.01 0.15 0.19 0.41 0.25 
Complete 
Defection 
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range (6 - 10 tokens), or median range (around 3 - 5 tokens) then one was likely to use 
Marginal Cooperation in the following round with a 48% and 37% probability, respectively. 
In addition, one was also likely to choose this decision rule if one’s co-op contributed a higher 
amount in the previous round.  For example, if the co-op contributed an average of 3 – 5 
tokens then there was a 42% chance selecting Marginal Cooperation in the following round, 
and a 39% chance if the co-op gave around 5 -10 tokens.  
After selecting Marginal Cooperation, there was a 49% chance of remaining with this 
decision rule and only 5% chance of transitioning to Maximum Cooperation (see Table 14). In 
addition, there was about an equal chance (~15%) of transitioning into the remaining three 
decision rules. The residual variance for this rule was very high (s2 =3.019).  
The decision rule to contribute the maximum amount (10 tokens), labelled Maximum 
Cooperation, occurred only 7% of the time. The amount contributed when using this decision 
rule could not be predicted by one’s own lagged amount nor by the lagged amount of the co-
op (b = 0 for both). If in the previous round, an individual used the Maximum Cooperation 
decision rule, they had a 66% of doing the same in the following round, and a 21% chance of 
transitioning into Marginal Cooperation. There was a much lower chance of someone 
switching from Maximum Cooperation to the three lowest contributing decision rules: 
Complete Defection (8%); Near-Defection (3%) and Ambivalent Defection (3%). It therefore 
appears that Maximum Cooperation was a fairly resilient decision rule; especially considering 
that there was a high incidence of Complete Defection in the game. Since Maximum 
Cooperation was the ceiling effect for cooperation, the residual variance was almost nil (s2 
=0.008). 
Finally, the remaining two decision rules are quite similar to one another. Neither 
could be predicted by one’s own contribution in the previous round, nor by the contribution of 
the co-op (b = 0 for both decision rules and both predictors). Near-Defection (Mamount= 1) 
occurred 21% of the time and Ambivalent Defection (Mamount= 2.09), 14%. Both decision 
rules were close to Complete Defection in terms of their mean amounts and both had almost 
no residual variance (s2 = 0.004 and s2 = 0.003 for Ambivalent Defection and Near-
Defection respectively). However, comparison of the transition probabilities (Table 14) 
indicates that individuals choosing Near-Defection in one round, compared to those selecting 
Ambivalent Defection, had a 9% greater chance of transitioning to Complete Defection in the 
following round. Furthermore, people who selected Ambivalent Defection showed an 18% 
greater chance of transitioning into Marginal Cooperation, compared to those who selected 
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Near-Defection. Finally, if one chose Ambivalent Defection, rather than Near-Defection, one 
was slightly more likely (9%) to transition into Marginal Cooperation than to stay stable (i.e., 
to remain with Ambivalent Defection). These findings suggest that there was a greater 
likelihood for people selecting Ambivalent Defection to become more cooperative in later 
rounds of the game (thus the label), while people selecting Near-Defection were a lot more 
likely to defect completely and not remain as open to future cooperation.  
 
As Figure 21 shows, overall, Marginal Cooperation decreases over time while 
Complete Defection increases. In sharp contrast to Chapters 2 and 3, Maximum Cooperation 
is least likely to occur and does not increase over time. 
 There were three classes into which individuals were 
classified. Two of them were quite similar in overall relative frequency: Marginal Cooperators 
(45% of individuals, Mamount= 3.14) and Defectors (43%, Mamount= 1.09). The highest 
contributors, Resilient Cooperators (Mamount= 5.60), made up the remaining 12%. These 
classes differed from one other, both in terms of the decision rule that they primarily selected 
at the beginning of the game (c2 (8) = 32.02, p <0.001) and in terms of their transition 
probability matrices (i.e., the chance of transitioning from one to each of the other decision 
rules; c2 (40) = 437.98, p <0.01, see Table 15).  
  






















Maximum Cooperation Marginal Cooperation Ambivalent Defection Near−Defection Complete Defection
Figure 21. Decision Rules over time 

















Transition probabilities for Individual Classes   
Starting Decision rule  
Individual Class Maximum Cooperation Marginal Cooperation Ambivalent Defection Near-Defection Complete Defection  
Resilient 0.14 0.56 0.05 0.19 0.05  
Marginal 0.09 0.56 0.21 0.09 0.05  
Defectors 0.00 0.42 0.09 0.23 0.25   
Present Decision rule 






Maximum Cooperation 0.85 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Marginal Cooperation 0.33 0.52 0.11 0.00 0.03 
Ambivalent Defection 0.12 0.00 0.48 0.40 0.00 
Near-Defection 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.89 0.00 






Maximum Cooperation 0.30 0.36 0.08 0.11 0.15 
Marginal Cooperation 0.03 0.49 0.18 0.16 0.14 
Ambivalent Defection 0.00 0.45 0.25 0.22 0.08 
Near-Defection 0.02 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.08 







Maximum Cooperation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 
Marginal Cooperation 0.02 0.45 0.10 0.16 0.28 
Ambivalent Defection 0.01 0.11 0.13 0.34 0.41 
Near-Defection 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.35 0.47 
Complete Defection 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.73 
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Overall, Marginal Cooperators used the Marginal Cooperation decision rule 45% of 
the time, more so than Defectors (14%) and Resilient Cooperators (22%). Furthermore, 21% 
of the time they drew on Ambivalent Defection – which we know from the transition 
probabilities of the decision rules, was likely to increase the chances of future cooperation. At 
the beginning of the interaction (round one), 56% of Marginal Cooperators chose Marginal 
Cooperation and only 8%, Maximum Cooperation. In addition, Marginal Cooperators who 
selected Complete Defection in one round, although they had an 18% chance of remaining 
with it, had a 38% chance of switching to Marginal Cooperation. 
Defectors chose Complete Defection 55% of the time and chose Maximum 
Cooperation less than 1% of the time. In the first round of the game, Defectors had a 42% 
probability of being guided by Marginal Cooperation and a 25% chance of Complete 
Defection; suggesting that defection, rather than cooperation, increased over time. Strikingly, 
there was a zero probability that Defectors would begin with Maximum Cooperation. 
Defectors using Complete Defection in one round of the PGG, had a 73% probability of 
sticking with Complete Defection in the following round. Finally, none of the Defectors who 
chose Maximum Cooperation would continue to cooperate the following round, instead they 
had a 99% chance of switching to Complete Defection. 
Resilient Cooperators, the smallest class of individuals, mostly employed the decision 
rules of both Maximum Cooperation (41% of the time) and Marginal Cooperation (22%), and 
only selected Complete Defection 2% of the time. 14% of Resilient Cooperators begun by 
choosing Maximum Cooperation and 56%, Marginal Cooperation – fairly similar to Marginal 
Cooperators. Therefore, Marginal and Resilient Cooperators begun similarly but came to 
differ in their cooperation strategies throughout the course of interaction. Resilient 
Cooperators who used Complete Defection in one round, only had a 29% chance of 
continuing to do so and were actually 10% more likely to select Marginal Cooperation in the 
subsequent round. When Resilient Cooperators used Maximum Cooperation in the previous 
round, they had an 85% probability of sticking with it, a 15% chance of subsequently 
selecting Marginal Cooperation, and zero probability of turning to Complete Defection. 
 Finally, at the highest level, three classes of co-ops were 
estimated. The Breakdown Co-op (Mamount= 1.93) was the most common type of co-op to 
form (64%), followed by the Struggling Co-op (30%, Mamount= 3.35) and lastly, the Resilient 
Co-op (6%, Mamount= 5.56). The three co-op classes which formed differed in terms of the 
classes of individuals present (c2 (4) = 21.61, p <0.01).   
Level 3: Co-op classes.  
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In previous studies, in Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis, we found near perfect overlap 
between all individual and all co-op classes (in the 99% range) which we interpreted to 
indicate norm formation within co-ops. However, here we do not find such a strong pattern of 
norm formation in the present study.  The Breakdown Co-op, showed the lowest degree of 
norm formation consisting of 66% of Defectors, 30% of Marginal Cooperators and only 4% 
of Resilient Cooperators.  The Struggling Co-op was mostly made up of Marginal 
Cooperators (85%) but also had Resilient Cooperators (11%) and a few Defectors (3%). 
Finally, the Resilient Co-op shows the strongest norm formation with 99% of people being 
Resilient Cooperators. This pattern suggests that when there are even a few Defectors in the 
group, people seem to find it harder to align their behavior as they are reacting to this 
defection. Without Defectors, and when cooperation is fairly high, norm emergence occurs 
more easily. 
At the co-op level, we tested whether the experimental condition (Interpersonal Ties 
versus Social Categories) had a significant effect on the type of co-op that formed. As with 
previous studies in Chapter 2 and 3, we only found a marginal effect for the experimental 
condition predicting the class of co-op (c2 (2) = 4.75, p <0.09). Closer inspection revealed a 
further, albeit marginal difference as to whether the Breakdown or Resilient Co-op would 
form (c2 (1) = 3.33, p = 0.06), but no effect for the Struggling Co-op. This is not a strong 
result by any means but it does suggest that in the Social Categories condition 74% of co-ops 
were Breakdown Co-ops; 16% Struggling and 10% Resilient. In the Interpersonal Ties 
condition, 56% were Breakdown Co-ops and 44% Struggling. Interestingly, no Resilient Co-
op’s seemed to form in the Interpersonal Ties condition where interpersonal ties rather than 
social categories were made salient.   
From Figure 22 we can see that both the Breakdown and Struggling Co-ops show low 
levels of contributions over time and this decreases from the first rounds. The Resilient Co-op 
shows an initial increase in cooperation (having started similarly to the Struggling Co-op) and 
this levels off and stays around the midpoint of what is possible to contribute. The three co-op 
classes which formed (largely independently of the experimental condition) provides some 
support for Expectation 7, although the norm formation, in two of the three co-ops, was not as 
strong as we may have expected given our previous research (Chapter 2 and 3).  
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 Our latent class model included social psychological 
measures as inactive covariates – meaning that they do not change the regression coefficients 
of the model but can be used to further describe the different individual classes (Vermunt & 
Magidson, 2016). The full results are reported descriptively in Table 16 below.   
The general pattern indicates that Resilient Cooperators experience above average 
solidarity, Defectors experience below average solidarity and Marginal Cooperators 
experience average levels of solidarity. The exact same pattern exists for experiences of trust 
and a similar pattern is present for the perception of interdependent goals (although here, 
Marginal Cooperators score slightly more above average). Other notable patterns include that: 
Resilient Cooperators score below average on perceptions of independent goals, while 
Defectors score above average and Marginal Cooperators score average. Resilient 
Cooperators are also more biased against the other co-op (in the sense that they felt their co-
op was better) but also experience above average levels of closeness to the other co-op. Since 
Resilient Cooperators also perceived lower than average competition between co-ops, this 
sense of closeness to the other co-op indeed seems plausible, assuming ingroup favouritism 
and outgroup derogation are not mutually exclusive. Finally, Defectors perceive above 
average competition between the co-ops. 
  



















Figure 22. Co-op class contributions over time 



















In this Chapter, we aimed to extend our previous work from Chapter 2 and 3 of this 
thesis. We studied cooperation with the same Public Goods paradigm, but in the South 
African context and with the addition of monetary incentives. Our aim stated at the beginning 
of this paper – to lower initial cooperation levels and increase the variance in cooperation – 
proved effective, perhaps too much so. Nevertheless, we replicated the previously found 
strong norm emergence, in one of the three types of groups.  
  
Table 16 
Breakdown of probabilities for social psychological correlates by individual class 






Solidarity High  43% 37% 20% 
Mean (3.8) 52% 43% 5% 
Low 44% 50% 6% 
Trust High  40% 38% 22% 
Mean (4.5) 55% 39% 6% 
Low 46% 51% 3% 
Interdependent goals High  48% 34% 18% 
Mean (3.6) 45% 45% 5% 
Low 42% 53% 11% 
Independent goals High  41% 52% 7% 
Mean  (5.4) 47% 45% 8% 
Low 47% 36% 17% 
Bias against the other 
co-op 
High  43% 38% 19% 
Mean  (4.4) 45% 49% 6% 
Low 45% 48% 7% 
Perceived competition 
between co-ops 
High  37% 53% 10% 
Mean (4.17) 59% 32% 9% 
Low 48% 37% 15% 
Closeness to other co-op High  45% 39% 16% 
Mean (2.6) 46% 47% 7% 
Low 44% 46% 10% 
Note: Rows sum to 100%. Each cell percentage indicates the probability that the given type of 
player would score in a certain range on the given measure. To simplify the presentation of the 
results we collapsed the probability above and below the mean of the given measure (which is 
recorded in brackets). The low percentages in the column for Resilient Cooperators reflect their 
low numbers in the data.  
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Overall Levels of Cooperation 
Overall, cooperation was low and declined over time in both conditions. This result 
contrasts with our previous studies in Chapter 2 and 3. First, it is possible that while the 
experimental manipulation and condition enhanced the normative goal, incentivizing 
participants by their end token balance made the goal of obtaining higher gains more salient, 
thus defection was more prevalent (e.g., Lindenberg, 2015b). 
Second, the societal context may account for differences among cooperation across the 
three studies. However, we should note that one’s cultural values (both vertical and horizontal 
collectivism and individualism) had no effect on actual cooperation in this study, although H-
C and H-I had some effect on the perceptions of the group and one’s feelings toward the 
group. This suggests that between-person differences in cultural values cannot explain the low 
levels of cooperation, and that perhaps cooperation is more strongly an emergent property of 
group interaction.  
A third possible explanation for the low levels of cooperation could be a lack of trust 
at a societal level: Research suggests that if societal institutions, like government structures, 
are not trusted – arguably the case in South Africa – this may spillover into lab behavior in 
social dilemmas (Jordan et al., 2014; Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016). Relatedly, the present 
study was conducted in the wake of the Fees Must Fall protest movement in South African 
universities (2015-2016); where student activists were protesting ever-increasing university 
fees, as well as arguing for the decolonization of education. In the aftermath of such a 
movement, mistrust in the university as an institution could also have been a factor that 
perhaps explains a different relationship between participants and the university institution (as 
represented by the experimenter), compared to their European counterparts in Chapters 2 and 
3.  
However, we unfortunately did not measure participants’ trust in societal institutions 
pre-experimentally (nor cultural values in Chapters 2 and 3) and therefore, we cannot 
determine a possible macro-level societal explanation for the prevalence of defection in these 
data. 
 
Pattern of Cooperation in the Social Categories and Interpersonal Ties Groups  
From previous research (Chapter 2 and 3) we expected that overall, cooperation would 
be higher in the Social Categories condition, as social categories appear to be effective in 
creating contexts for cooperation to flourish. Literature in the field of intergroup relations and 
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social identification support such a supposition (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; De Cremer et al., 
2008; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Turner, 1991; Wit & Kerr, 2002). This expectation was 
only partially confirmed: While cooperation was very low in general and decreased over time 
in both conditions, it was still slightly higher overall, and broke down slower, in the Social 
Categories compared to the Interpersonal Ties condition. This may suggest that even if 
defection is rife in a particular environment, social categorization may still have a beneficial 
effect – even though it cannot, at least by itself, prevent the downward spiral of cooperation 
when other forces are at play.  
If one considers the overall pattern of cooperation given by the first analysis, one might 
believe that people “bottom out” in the same was as they “maxed out” in Chapters 2 and 3. 
However – through the analytic methods employed here – we see that one type of stable 
group aligns their decision rules regarding cooperation, while the other two groups show a lot 
of variation (i.e., they do not all bottom out), and lack the same norm emergence (even a norm 
of complete defection).  
 
Strategies for Cooperation and Defection 
We found that essentially three distinct types of decision rules emerged21: Maximum 
Cooperation (amount contributed: 10), Defection (0,1, or 2) and something in between – 
which is guided by the past contributions of self and co-op members. Compared to our 
previous two studies in Chapter 2 and 3, Maximum Cooperation rarely occurred.  
Furthermore, each type of individual (Resilient Cooperator, Marginal Cooperator and 
Defector) employed a different set, and proportion of, the decision rules to guide their 
cooperation in the PGG and these different types of individuals were associated with different 
social psychological measures. Resilient Cooperators, for example, were more likely to 
experience higher than average levels of solidarity and trust.   
Different proportions of these individual types were found at the co-op level such that we 
could classify three co-op classes in the present study: The Breakdown, Struggling and 
Resilient Co-op. In our previous research, we have shown how cooperation develops over 
time and group norms for cooperation are established such that behavior is consistent within a 
type of co-op and different among types of co-ops (see Chapter 2 and 3). For Resilient co-ops 
                                               
 
21 The model classified 5 types of decision rules, but for the sake of discussion we collapse some of the 
similar ones.  
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in this study, this general finding was replicated as there was 99% overlap between the 
individual and co-op class such that Resilient Co-ops were made up almost entirely of 
Resilient Cooperators. There was not this same strong norm formation in the Struggling Co-
op (consisting of 85% Marginal Cooperators, 11% Resilient Cooperators, 3% Defectors) and 
less so in the Breakdown Co-op (66% Defectors, 30% Marginal Cooperators, 4% of Resilient 
Cooperators). Therefore, it appears that cooperative actions (such as contributing highly or 
maximally to the PG) create an environment conducive to the convergence on a common 
pattern of behavior among all group members; while uncooperative environments – where 
there are even a few Defectors – result in a misalignment of behavior because people have 
different decision rules regarding what to do. For example, some individuals try to increase 
cooperation and show goodwill by cooperating no matter what, others indicate their own self-
interest – or lack of trust – by defecting, and others still react to that defection (i.e., play tit for 
tat; Axelrod, 1984). Cooperation is hard to build and maintain in environments such as these.  
While stable groups emerged in both previous studies as well as in one of the groups in 
the present study, there was a lot of variation in behavior within the other two types of groups 
– groups which showed a breakdown in cooperation over time. What is hopeful about these 
uncooperative groups though, is that despite the presence of defectors and despite cooperation 
going down over time, Resilient and Marginal Cooperators continued to cooperate at least to 
some extent, perhaps even preventing the complete breakdown of cooperation (see Figure 22). 
Clusters of these more cooperative types of individuals (also tit-for-tat cooperators; Axelrod, 
1984), through their persistent interaction with one another, could change uncooperative 
norms, thus preventing cooperative decline (also see Mao et al., 2017; Weber & Murnighan, 
2008).   
 
Social Psychological Correlates of Cooperation and Defection  
As we had expected, there were no differences between the Social Categories and 
Interpersonal Ties conditions on measures of solidarity and related social psychological 
constructs. We had expected this based on previous research (Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis) 
and the theoretical argument laid out by the Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation 
(Postmes, Haslam, et al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005). However, apart from 
experimental condition, we did find that the more one’s co-op members cooperated, the 
greater one experienced solidarity to the group, but also bias against the other group (in the 
sense that participants felt their co-op was better, and should have received an additional 
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bonus). Therefore, interaction within the group rather than the a priori social category has the 
greatest impact on one’s perception of group relations, and these perceptions are important 
because they would likely motivate future interaction in the form of cooperation or defection.  
 
The role of cultural preferences  
Over and above the co-ops’ average cooperation levels, one’s cultural values also affected 
the level of ‘groupiness’ one perceived. For example, higher horizontal collectivism was 
associated with greater solidarity (even more than the co-ops’ contributions), as well as the 
perception of interdependent goals within the co-op. On the other hand, horizontal 
individualists were more likely to perceive that their co-ops’ goals were independent (also 
more than the co-ops’ contributions). So, while cultural values did not appear to affect one’s 
behavior, in terms of contributions in the first round or indeed in later rounds, they did still 
influence the perceptions of one’s co-op and the goals of its’ members.  
 
Limitations and Future Directions  
In Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis, we found very high levels of cooperation compared 
to the present study. Because several changes were made to the experimental design between 
Chapter 3 and the present research, we cannot draw any definitive conclusions as to why, 
compared to the previous studies, the overall level of cooperation was lower and declined 
over time. In our view, there could be two plausible explanations: 1) differences in the 
societal context could have resulted in defection being more prevalent than cooperation, and 
2) a gains goal frame – activated by tokens having an instrumental, rather than purely 
symbolic value – outweighed a normative goal frame – activated by the framing of the 
experiment. Future research could explicitly tease apart these possible explanations by 
running identical studies in these two different societies. These studies could manipulate the 
social identification pathway and compare an instrumental to symbolic outcome condition; 
also including societal level pre-measures (culture, trust etc.).  
 
Conclusion  
Cooperation can emerge in groups where normative patterns for decision making are 
established that result in high levels of rather stable cooperation, as evidenced by one type of 
co-op in this study, and in line with the previous Chapters. However, even under similar 
circumstances, unstable groups also arise which cannot align their decision rules of 
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cooperation and cooperation further devolves in these groups over time. Nevertheless, these 
uncooperative groups still contain cooperating individuals – and perhaps in greater numbers, 
these individuals could potentially change the group norm and allow for the emergence of 
future cooperation. Finally, while dynamic factors within the group are evidently important 
for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation, it is perhaps ‘static’, macro-level factors – 
such as the goal frame, culture or societal context – that can kick start, or indeed hamper, the 
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Abstract 
Past research has shown that communication in social dilemmas is associated with better 
cooperative outcomes. However, not much is known about the content of the communication 
which arises naturally within groups and that facilitates or hinders the emergence of 
cooperation. In this Chapter, we study the content of the messages sent by participants during 
the Public Goods Games presented in Chapter 3 and 4. Using a mixed-methods approach, we 
find that messages coordinating cooperative action appear to facilitate cooperation, especially 
when it is used in combination with attempts to promote group solidarity. Agreement and 
interpersonal bonding can also be valuable in creating a cooperative environment. Further, 
sanctioning did not appear to be effective in building good, cooperative relationships, in fact it 
was harmful. Taken together, group-based communication, when it has a certain prosocial 
quality and is aimed at the level of “us”, aids in the creation of prosocial norms for 
cooperation and thus may allow groups to develop shared understandings, mutual 
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In Chapters 2 through 4 of this thesis we studied the emergence of cooperative 
behavior over time in three large dynamic Public Goods Games, conducted in the Netherlands 
and in South Africa. As noted in these chapters, participants could communicate with one 
another in between contribution rounds of the game, after they had received full feedback 
regarding the amount that their co-op members had just contributed. We found a rather large 
coherence within co-ops with respect to the cooperative behavior of their members. In other 
words, members of the same co-op aligned their decision rules on how much to contribute to 
the Public Good, and this was especially true of all co-ops in Chapter 2 and 3, and for one co-
op in Chapter 4. In the present Chapter we explore the content of those messages in order to 
see whether there are any patterns in communication which help to distinguish cooperative 
from non-cooperative co-ops.   
Overall, the ability to communicate has been shown to increase cooperation in social 
dilemmas (Balliet, 2010; X. Chen & Komorita, 1994; Dawes et al., 1977; Ledyard, 1995). It is 
hypothesized that communication can facilitate cooperation through: 1) enhancing the 
understanding of the PG situation; 2) providing a means of coordinating action; 3) leading to 
the creation of cooperative social norms; 4) allowing strategic agreements to be formed; 5) 
enhancing trust in others; and 6) establishing a social identity (N. L. Kerr & Kaufman-
Gilliland, 1994; Shankar & Pavitt, 2002). By providing the means to communicate, people 
have an opportunity to facilitate cooperation, potentially through one, or many, of the 
proposed mechanisms, thus leading to cooperative outcomes. However, the simple ability to 
communicate may not be enough: what is communicated is important. The focus of this 
Chapter is to explore the role of communication in the formation of cooperative versus non-
cooperative group norms.  
 
Developing shared expectations 
One potential explanation is that communication allows pledges to occur and there is 
indeed evidence that a pledge with a certain degree of bindingness – in other words, having to 
follow through on what you have pledged – can increase cooperation (for example, X. Chen 
& Komorita, 1994). Pledging may be important as it provides information about the intended 
contributions of others; while commitments limit the degree of false information or 
strategically misleading pledges that may occur. In addition, the effect of pledging enhances 
cooperation more if the pledge is group-based rather than an individual pledge (X. Chen, 
1996). In the former case, commitments are less changeable because there is a greater sense of 
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social pressure, and a fear of violating group norms. Indeed, of all the potential explanations 
for how communication facilitates cooperation, Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007) argue that it 
seems most plausible, given current experimental evidence, that the likely pathways are 
through developing mutual expectations for future behavior – often done through pledging 
and keeping commitments– and by enhancing the salience of pro-social norms. 
 
Social identification  
Group-based pledging also creates a condition in which there is greater 
interdependence and a sense of common fate among group members – which are also 
important aspects of social identification (Turner, 1991). Indeed, some scholars suggest that 
the emergence of social identity, through social categorization for example, may result in 
higher cooperation levels (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; De Cremer et al., 2008; De Cremer & 
Van Vugt, 1999; Simpson, 2006; Wit & Kerr, 2002). A study by Chen (1996), found partial 
support for the idea that group identity, arising through communication, plays some role in the 
emergence of cooperation. While group identity and mean contribution levels were found to 
be higher in a group-based, compared to an individual-based pledge condition, higher group 
identity in itself did not lead to higher contributions. So, while social identity through 
communication may play a role, it appears that it interacts with other factors – such as 
perceived criticality, that is, the view that one’s individual contributions will make a 
difference to the shared outcome in terms of the public goods payout – in order for it to have 
an effect on cooperation. Furthermore, Shankar and Pavitt (2002) argue that norms for 
cooperative behavior – established through communication – may play a stronger role than 
social identity in enhancing cooperation. Undoubtedly, however, social norms and social 
identities are closely related as norms exist with reference to a particular set of social 
relations, therefore both would be important.  
 
Establishing norms  
Communication in itself, can help to establish a normative environment in which 
cooperation can emerge (Bicchieri & Lev-On, 2007). Indeed, in the previous Chapters of this 
thesis, we have also seen this to be the case: Specific types of co-ops emerge through 
interaction and group members within the co-op share the same norms regarding which 
decision rules to use. In turn, this influences the trajectory of their groups’ cooperation or lack 
thereof. Furthermore, these types of co-ops form in both social identity pathways – deductive 
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and inductive groups.  What is less clear, both from our own research in this thesis as well 
from arguments by scholars such as Shankar and Pavitt (2002), is how these different norms 
may arise through communication. Clues to the different pathways to cooperative norms may 
be found by examining the content of the messages sent during interaction. As far as we are 
aware, however, there has not been very much exploration of message content in prior social 
dilemma research.  
 
Computer-mediated communication 
Literature examining the idea that communication can increase cooperation has also 
been concerned with the question of which medium is suitable for the maintenance of 
successful social relations. The early predominant assumption was that computer-mediated 
communication would be relatively impersonal (for discussions see Hiltz & Turoff, 1978; 
Kiesler, Siegel, & McGuire, 1984; Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976), while face-to-face 
communication was shown to be effective at increasing cooperation (for example see, Dawes 
et al., 1977). Accordingly, some more recent research has shown that face-to-face interaction 
may be somewhat more effective in facilitating cooperation (Bicchieri & Lev-On, 2007; 
Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1998). At the same time, there is a rich program of research which 
shows that these social effects depend on the social context of the collaboration (e.g., whether 
a shared identity exists from the outset of the interaction or not) and that within online 
collaborations there is a strong tendency for social norms and shared identity to develop hand 
in hand, over time (for example, Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1998, 1999, 2000; Postmes, Spears, 
Lee, & Novak, 2005).   
 
Sanctioning and social disapproval  
Finally, communication provides the means through which one can sanction others for 
non-cooperative behavior. Social order, created through the establishment and maintenance of 
social norms supporting cooperation, may require norm enforcement by means of sanctioning 
and punishment. Punishment lessens the appeal of free-riding due to the potential cost 
associated with being ‘caught’. A meta-analysis on the effect of punishment on cooperation 
shows that overall, punishment has a medium sized, positive effect on cooperation (Balliet, 
Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011). Furthermore, punishment is even more effective when it is 
costly to the punisher; when it is decentralized; and when interaction occurs over time (Balliet 
et al., 2011).  
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However, there is much debate in the literature about the exact definition of 
sanctioning and punishment (e.g., Guala, 2012). For example, from a game-theoretic 
perspective, endogenous punishment is usually operationalized as the direct fining of a non-
cooperative individual by another individual who, serving the role as punisher, also pays a 
price to sanction. In the real world, punishment can include a wide range of strategies such as 
ridicule, gossip, verbal confrontation and social ostracism – strategies which are not directly 
linked to an explicit or immediate financial cost for either the punisher or punished. 
In our research, we did not allow participants to punish one another instrumentally, 
thus we define sanctioning here as the expression of social disapproval for non-cooperation. 
Indeed, communicated social disproval can be seen as a form of symbolic punishment which 
might not be very costly to the punisher – although, of course there may be psychological 
costs or even social costs to doing the sanctioning, especially if it is viewed by others as 
illegitimate. Nevertheless, the costs to punish or express social disapproval are not formalized 
in the games of this thesis.  
How people respond to sanctioning, including the verbal expression of disapproval, 
will likely depend on how they interpret the sanction in the first place. From a sociological 
perspective, sanctioning can either have a positive or negative relational signal attached to it 
(Wittek, 2003). Sanctioning, when it expresses a positive relational signal, will cue to the 
receiver of the sanction, the giver’s openness to repairing the relationship so that this may 
remain or become mutually rewarding in the future. On the other hand, sanctioning which 
expresses a negative relational signal will likely escalate the sanctioning-retaliation cycle 
because the cue to maintain a solidarity relationship is lost. Therefore, the way in which the 
giver communicates one’s social disapproval for non-cooperative behavior and how the 
receiver interprets this message would likely affect the effectiveness of the sanction.  
 
Aim  
In this Chapter we explore, with a mixed methods approach, how different forms of 
communication over time are related to the emergence of cooperative norms. While this 
Chapter is exploratory and partly qualitative in nature, from the literature reviewed above 
some general ideas can be evaluated about how communication may facilitate cooperative 
norms. First, communication which enhances a shared social identification with the group 
may facilitate a sense of common fate, and willingness to place collective-interest over 
narrow self-interest, thus leading to higher levels of cooperation. Second, developing mutual 
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expectations and coordinating action, perhaps through individual pledging, may increase 
cooperation. Finally, if sanctioning occurs and is interpreted as having a positive relational 
signal, it could be effective for increasing cooperation. On the other hand, if sanctioning is 
associated with a negative relational signal it might not be effective and might even result in 
further defection.  
Method 
 Data  
Participants could send messages to one another between the active rounds of the 
game (i.e., between contributions to the PG). Before each communication round, participants 
received full feedback onscreen regarding everyone’s contributions to the PG. Then, before 
the next contribution round, participants could send messages to one another for a brief period 
– 40 seconds per communication round. Messages were very short with a character limit of 
100 but there was no limit on the number of messages that they could send within the 
communication period. Needless to say, across 3 studies of 780 participants, there were many 
messages – a total of 15,774 across all three studies. Our data analysis plan was as follows: 
First, conduct a qualitative study on a few explorative case studies and then use these insights 
to generalize beyond the case studies via: 1) graphical representations of the relationship 
between messages and cooperation; and 2) formal statistical analyses to test the relationship 
between cause and effect.  
 
Coding procedure  
A random sample of 100 messages were taken from the first study (Chapter 2) of this 
thesis. From this, an initial coding scheme was worked out and tested on random samples 
from Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis. This iterative process led to a coding scheme with 16 
codes (see Table 17 below). Coding of all three studies was conducted by two independent 
raters, one of whom is the author of this thesis. Coding was performed using CodeThing (see 
http://codething.net), an online software designed for the bulk coding of content. The coders 
independently coded 15,774 messages across all three studies. Many of the messages were 
double coded. For example, a message might be interpreted as both awareness of the outgroup 
and promoting group solidarity if it mentions the other co-op while stating the virtues of one’s 
own co-op. The interrater reliability between the two coders for single-coded messages was 
substantial (kappa = 0.621, p<0.001) and for double-coded items, moderate (kappa = 0.405, 
p<0.001) (Landis & Koch, 1977).  
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Selection of case studies  
The studies in Chapter 3 and 4 were most similar in experimental design, so in this 
Chapter we zoom in on specific co-ops in these two studies and leave out the co-ops from 
Chapter 2. First, we used the heatmap from Chapter 3 (see Figure 23) and created the same for 
the PGG co-ops of Chapter 4 (see Figure 24). From these figures, we selected co-ops of 
particular interest in order to examine the types of messages that they sent throughout their 
interactions. We use qualitative and descriptive (count) techniques to explore the content of 
the messages sent during the PGGs. 
Results 
Case Studies  
The results are divided into subsections, based on similar  
patterns of group cooperation. First, we look at co-ops in both Chapters – Study 2 and 
Study 3 of Chapter 3 and 4, respectively – which converged on Maximum Cooperation from 
the beginning. At the other extreme, we take a closer look at those co-ops which converged on 
Defection or failed to reach consensus on the amount to contribute. And finally, we sample 
some co-ops in the middle of these extremes, which began aligned in their behavior but then 
stopped, or followed the reverse pattern. 
 First, we look at Study 2 in Chapter 3 and selected three 
co-ops, called A, B, and C, that aligned their behavior within two tokens of one another on 
high levels of cooperation (see the top, red rows of Figure 23). The coded messages and the 
total number of them sent in a round are visualized in Figure 25, which shows for each code 
of interest, the frequency of messages sent per round by the co-op, coloured according to the 
range of the amount contributed to the PG. The colours indicate the range of the contributions, 





Maximum Cooperation.  
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Table 17  
Coding Scheme  
 











Interpersonal bonding* Expression and effort to build  or maintain a relationship with group 
members. Especially comments indicating caring for an individual 
player. Trying to find out who everyone is in the game, sharing 
personal information etc.  
287 305 
Sanctioning * Complaining about unexpected and undesired behaviour of other group 
members/ some sort of verbal punishment.  194 816 
Uncertainty Expressing a feeling of being confused or having a lack of insight into 
the game and what the group should or will do.  187 129 
Agreement * Confirmation or support of someone’s action/comment. 447 57 
Disagreement Expressing dissatisfaction with someone’s action/comment. Offering 
alternatives.  35 22 
Awareness of outgroup Expressing knowledge about the existence of another group within the 
game. Making comparisons to the other co-op.  149 58 
Promotion of group solidarity* Any expression of appreciation directed towards the group (co-op) as a 
unit; motivating comments etc. In addition, mere identification and 
unity; “Team”, “Comrades”.  
261 303 
Impeding group solidarity Any expression/action working against promoting group solidarity. 37 87 
Facilitating understanding of the 
game 
Any communication aiding members understanding of actions 
necessary for the Public Goods game. This applies to the rules of the 
PGG as well as understanding what happened/is happening in the 
specific game (i.e., commentary in the game). Included in this is 
mentioning the number of points people have, talking about what 
strategies might work or not. In general: making meaning of the game.   
516 215 
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Table 17 Continued    
Leadership statements* Statements resembling instructions to follow an action proposed by the 
member. Fairly directive. Use of exclamation points etc.  240 437 
Follower statements Statements that clearly outsource leadership to another member of the 
co-op. Asking what one “must” do. Comments indicating a willingness 
to follow what others say. 
78 61 
Coordination of cooperative 
action * 
Any communication that serves as basis for action. In other words, 
discussing how to act (i.e. how many tokens to give) in the coming 
rounds. Trying to get players points to balance out etc. 
1202 1034 
Relationship repair* Phrases or statements that reflect the attempt to apologize/reestablish a 
relationship that has been harmed or interrupted in some way (i.e. 
deviating from the amount of promised tokens). Providing explanations 
for why someone did something. 
44 17 
Individual hardship When individuals complain about some aspect of the game and how it 
affects them. For example, complaining about personal, low token 
balance.  
44 112 
Individual pledge When individuals pledge an amount that they will contribute in the 
next round (included here is mention of what they gave the previous 
round).  
127 49 
Miscellaneous Phrases that are nonsensical or cannot be coded without understanding 
the context of the whole conversation.  9 39 
Note: The asterisk indicates the codes we chose to discuss in this Chapter as the other codes were not numerous enough and no interesting 
patterns were discovered. The exception is relationship repair, in that although it was not numerous, it’s absence is noticeable particularly when 
sanctioning is high. 
 
  










Note: The coloured blocks indicate when co-ops aligned behavior within 2 tokens of one another, coloured according to the mean 
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Figure 24. Co-ops in Chapter 4: Convergence on mean amounts Figure 23. Co-ops in Chapter 3: Convergence on mean amounts 
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We selected the most highly cooperative groups that emerged early on. While Co-op B 
shown in Figure 25, sends many messages related to the coordination of cooperative action 
(e.g., “we didn’t all do 10, you guys want to this time?”, “I think we can all keep doing 10”), 
it is not a prominent pattern in the other two co-ops presented here (Co-op A and C). Rather, 
Co-op A spends more time promoting group solidarity (e.g., “Haha we are a really nice 
group”, “Good group <3”(heart sign)) while Co-op C uses interpersonal bonding (e.g. “Fun 
fact: did you know that a koala sleeps approx. 22 hours a day?” and the whole conversation 
weaved in that particular game is a humorous discussion about koala’s)22.  
Next, we compare these patterns of communication to three co-ops converging on high 
contributions in Study 3, where such co-ops were rare because many non-cooperative co-ops 
formed. We can see from the messages across rounds, that all three co-ops in Figure 26 sent 
many messages coordinating cooperative action (e.g., “donate 10 please”, “keep 10’s 
popping”) and co-op members seemed to do this quite directly, often with a leadership quality 
(e.g. “Green23 needs to invest 10 again”). For two of the three groups, the promotion of group 
solidarity is rather high (through the use of messages such as: “Good job members”, “we’re 
doing good). For Co-op E, however, promoting solidarity seems to be replaced somewhat 
with the apparently effective use of sanctioning (e.g. “Whoever sent 2, don’t be selfish”, 
“weak people in this group”).  
Generally speaking, across both studies it seems like attempts to coordinate 
cooperative action, along with interpersonal bonding and the promotion of group solidarity, 
are associated with high levels of cooperation. 
 Now we turn our attention the non-
cooperative co-ops from Chapter 3 and 4. None of the co-ops of Study 2 in Chapter 3 
converged on complete defection. Therefore, we selected three co-ops that failed to converge 
most of the time and when they did, converged on low levels of cooperation. One of the 
groups in Study 2 (Co-op I, Figure 27), which failed to create a norm of cooperation, used 
sanctioning (e.g., “who was the cattle that did not send any?”), which became quite aggressive 
(e.g., “hope you have bad dreams tonight”, “F*#! you”, “damn traitor”).  
 
  
                                               
 
22 Note: Most of the agreement in this game turned out to be about koala’s 
23 Green here refers to an individual player onscreen. 
Defection or the lack of convergence.  
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Figure 25. Study 2 Convergent groups: Maximum Cooperation 
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By contrast, Co-op G in Figure 27, attempted to coordinate their actions but through 
all contributing different and low amounts – it seemed to be their strategy to try balance out 
their tokens rather than all contributing equally every round. There seemed to be no ill will in 
their messages (e.g., “who invests what?”, “what shall we do?”, “I think 2 if you did 5 last 
round” etc.). Perhaps this could have arisen from confusion about how to maximize profits – 
although there was no indication of that in their messages – or simply a failure to successfully 
coordinate. Finally, Co-op H sent relatively few messages and were unable to coordinate, 
eventually giving up (e.g., Coordination of cooperative action: e.g., “let’s make a profit”, “all 
5”, Impeding group solidarity: “yeah, we suck as a co-op”, Sanctioning: “the mistrust rises as 
the amount of tokens decrease”). 
We compare the non-cooperative co-ops of Study 2 to three that aligned their behavior 
on defection in Study 3, Chapter 4 (the bottom, yellow rows of Figure 24). In both Co-op J 
and K in Figure 28 we notice that, overall, there seem to be fewer messages sent and 
sanctioning is more prominent compared to the highly cooperative groups in Study 2 and 3. 
Sanctioning is used very early on in interaction which suggests that from the outset, people 
were not contributing highly and as a result others sent messages to sanction this non-
cooperative behaviour. Examples of sanctioning include: “You are not investing and we see 
you”, “Come on guys, why are you not investing now”; and in some cases, it becomes quite 
aggressive: “Haaaa You guys are a#@holes” and “F*#! you guys, why am I the only one 
investing here”24. Furthermore, attempts to promote cooperative action (e.g., “PLEASE”; 
“Guys let’s donate to the co-op now”) seems to fall on deaf ears as there is no indication of 
sanctioning being followed by relationship repair and the behavioral pattern indicates that 
cooperation does not actually improve. Fewer attempts are made to promote group solidarity 
and coordinate cooperative action. Notably, these two codes were present in the highly 
cooperative groups.  
                                               
 
24 In all studies, participants were told that their messages were being recorded for analysis but I 
naively did not think to explicitly tell them not to be rude, unkind or swear at one another. I can only 
hope that no one was seriously affected by the nature of some of the messages. No ethical complaints 
were made that I am aware of.  












Figure 27. Study 2: Co-ops that failed to converge (overall low amounts 
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Above, we examined more closely those co-ops that were at the extreme end of Study 
2 and 3. In other words, we examined those co-ops that converged on high levels of 
cooperation and those that either failed to converge or converged on defection. We found 
these co-ops in vastly different proportions in either study. However, we are also interested in 
those co-ops from either study that fell somewhere between the two extremes presented 
above. Therefore, next we present co-ops that appeared in either Study 2 or Study 3, but not in 
both.  
First, from Study 2 in Chapter 3, we look at co-ops that: 1) started off well and then 
stopped converging; and 2) those that built up to convergence on maximum cooperation over 
time.  
 One striking pattern is that for 
both co-ops in Figure 29, convergence stops after round 7. This lack of behavioural 
convergence is mirrored by the sudden stop of messages which serve to promote group 
solidarity, despite their earlier prevalence (e.g., “We corns are sticking together well”, “I think 
our strategy is awesome”, “Great”, “nice”). In Co-op L, the momentum is lost when one 
person starts defecting and sanctioning follows (e.g., “Dirty play by one of us”, “Why weren’t 
(sic) one investing?”). As with the groups that converged on defection or failed to converge 
completely, in both Study 2 and Study 3, sanctioning here was apparently ineffective. For Co-
op M, a similar pattern emerges except that instead of outright defecting, one player tries to 
coordinate cooperative action in another manner by suggesting that they each rotate defection 
to try maximize individual profits (e.g., “invest less and then change your investments seeing 
the others, that’s what I did” and another player responds “Should we do the 10, 10, 1 
thing?”).  
 In the opposite pattern to the 
one described above, there were also co-ops that reached convergence on maximum 
cooperation after a few rounds. Co-op N in Figure 30 reached convergence on maximum 
cooperation after four rounds of play while Co-op O did the same after two rounds. Both co-
ops spent a fair amount of messages coordinating cooperative action in the beginning stages 
(e.g., “Next time 10? We have to pull on the same string”, “okay, it’s a really fast game, let’s 
do 10?”, “should we invest the maximum?”, “max for all?”) and showed agreement at various 
stages (e.g., “yeah 10”, “sure”, “yes”). While Co-op N spent some time promoting group 
solidarity (e.g., “ONE TEAM HAHAHA”, “keep it up”, “Go team Cattle”), Co-op O 
Study 2: Maximum cooperation to no convergence.
Study 2: No convergence to maximum cooperation.
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appeared to spend that time on interpersonal bonding, which may have similar effect (e.g., 
“everyone is very enthusiastic”, “:D”, “Do you do this for SONA25?”).  
Next, in Study 3 there are some examples of co-ops that never converged and those 




 Both co-ops in Figure 31 show some 
attempt to coordinate cooperative action (e.g., “invest all tokens brothers”, “How many?”), 
phrased in a rather directive way in some cases (e.g., “GUYS LETS INVEST THE SAME 
                                               
 
25 Reference to course credit (i.e., asking about their motivation for participating in the study).  
 
Study 3: Co-ops which never converged.   
Figure 29. Study 2 Maximum Cooperation to defection 
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NUMBER”, “LETS INVEST MORE AGAIN”). However, there is also a lot of sanctioning 
(e.g., “heey (sic) you guys, why you invest less?...you fool…you stupid”, “pig26 please come 
on what is wrong with you”, “ay chicken licken you are robbing”, “DUCK INVEST 10 AND 
STOP ROBBING US”), which resembles the sanctioning found in co-ops that converged on 
defection. The fact that sanctioning is not regularly followed by relationship repair is perhaps 
a reason that cooperation never emerges. Furthermore, in comparison to more successful 
groups, there is less interpersonal bonding and promotion of group solidarity.  
  In all the 
example co-ops in Figure 32 there are many messages with the apparent intention of 
coordinating cooperative action (e.g., “let’s do 8”, “let’s all invest 10 guys, no cheating 
please”) and more so, with a directive or leadership quality (e.g., “WE SHOULD ALL 
INVEST GUYS”, “8 NOW GUYS”). Similar to other dysfunctional co-ops though, there is 
also a lot of sanctioning (e.g., “be loyal guys”, Duck farmer, stop being unfair”, “GOAT AND 
PIG ARE PLAYING US THEY (sic) INVESTING LITTLE MONEY”). This pattern of 
message content is very similar to co-ops that align on defection or never manage to reach 
agreement on cooperative action. Notably, for Co-op R in Figure 32 there is some promotion 
of group solidarity (e.g., “maize people, we on it for real”, “shine maize farmers for life”). 
However, closer inspection of the message exchange indicate that there is one person – out of 
five – who appear to use the promotion of group solidarity to cover up for their defection. 
While everyone else is trying to sanction this person for not contributing, the defector seems 
to ignore these messages and just pretend to be a good team member by saying things that are 
in ‘team spirit’. 
                                               
 
26 References to animals are pointing to the “type” of farmer they were (i.e., their avatars).  
Study 3: Co-ops that started off well and then stopped converging.
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Overall impressions from the case studies 
In order to generalize beyond these case studies it is useful to first discern the general 
patterns observed. First, in co-ops that move towards maximum cooperation there are more 
messages that promote group solidarity and there is less sanctioning. This pattern is 
particularly visible if you compare Figure 25 and Figure 26 on one hand, to Figure 27 and 
Figure 28 on the other hand. Of course sanctioning is not necessary in highly cooperative 
groups where everyone is already contributing. But sanctioning appears to have been rare also 
at the start of collaborations, when cooperation was not so high yet. Only in a few cases, there 
was any sanctioning in cooperative groups that appears to have been effective (e.g., Co-ops C 
and E). By contrast, in co-ops that could not converge on high contributions or that converged 
on defection, there are many more instances of sanctioning. Examples of this can be found in 
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Figure 31. Study 3: Co-ops that never converged 
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Co-op’s I, J, K, P, Q, R, S and T. Notably, this sanctioning is sometimes harsh and not 
followed by relationship repair. Overall, we can see that there is much more sanctioning in 
groups that are struggling to cooperate, also early on in interaction. Here, sanctioning is 
apparently unable to stop the decline in cooperation, or it may even have promoted decline. 
Thus, the sanctioning used by participants in these studies appears to be poor at promoting 
cooperation. 
Overall, most co-ops (both cooperative and non-cooperative) sent messages 
attempting to coordinate cooperative action. However, only in cooperative groups in which 
coordination appeared in conjunction with the promotion of group solidarity, does said 
coordination appear to be effective. Additionally, it seems that interpersonal bonding may 
also work to help boost cooperation levels in a similar fashion to the promotion of group 
solidarity. For instance, there are a few highly cooperative groups which do not send 
messages promoting group solidarity but do have high levels of interpersonal bonding – one 
exemplary of this is Co-op C, but also see Co-op O. Finally, one could also expect that there 
would be more agreement in cooperative compared to non-cooperative groups and indeed, we 
see evidence of high agreement in cooperative co-ops – Co-ops B, C, N and O – but not in 
uncooperative co-ops such as Co-ops P, Q, J and K. In sum, coordinating cooperative action 
in conjunction with messages promoting group solidarity, interpersonal bonding and 
agreement may facilitate the emergence of cooperative norms.  
 
Generalizing beyond the case studies   
We also attempted to quantify some of the above impressions, by running additional 
analyses. In order to test whether the frequency of different types of messages influence the 
mean amount given by the co-op in the subsequent round, we conducted a simple logistic 
regression27. The dependent variable is a binary variable that indicates whether the average 
amount contributed to the co-op increases from the previous round. The independent variables 
tested are the actions in the previous round: 1) the average amount given by the co-op, 2) the 
square roots of the number of messages in different coding categories (i.e., coordinating 
cooperative action, interpersonal bonding, agreement, promoting group solidarity, leadership 
statements and sanctioning) and 3) the interaction between these.  
                                               
 
27 Given that much of this analysis was exploratory, we chose not to present complex multilevel 
analyses. We did attempt a few models that did not converge. The multilevel models that did converge 
gave very similar results to those presented here.   
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Separate logistic regressions were conducted for Studies 2 and 3. A backward 
selection procedure was used to select the final models. In this model, interactions were tested 
and eliminated when they explained insufficient variance. Model comparison tables can be 
found in Supplementary Information D (see Table D1 and Table D2). Note that code 
frequencies were not highly inter-correlated– the highest was r = 0.35 and r = 0.54 in Study 2 
and 3 respectively28.  
 The mean amount contributed by co-ops in these data is 8.2 tokens – 
indicating overall high levels of cooperation. The final model is presented in Table 18 where 
the interaction effects in the final model remained significant after backward selection. The 
results show one main effect: The more messages coded as Coordination of cooperative action 
that were sent in the previous round, the more likely that the co-op would increase 
contributions in the current round. The remaining main effects can be interpreted in light of 
their interactions. There were four two-way interaction effects, visualized in Figure 33.  
The patterns of the interactions for the amount given in the previous round by: 
agreement, interpersonal bonding and promoting group solidarity, are quite similar. These 
patterns show that an increase in contributions due to the number of messages sent is lower 
for larger previous amounts. In other words, sending more messages that express agreement, 
interpersonal bonding or promote group solidarity, will be effective in increasing cooperation 
when it is rather low. Noticeably, the interaction between amount given in the previous round 
and the number of Sanctioning messages is opposite: The probability of increasing 
contributions due to number of sanctioning messages sent is higher for larger previous 
amounts, although still not very high. In other words, sending more sanctioning messages 
when the previous contributions are low, does not seem to increase contributions. In fact, 







                                               
 
28 The highest correlation for Study 3 was coordinating cooperative action with leadership statements. 
Since this correlation was not very strong and also not present in Study 2, we did not combine these 
codes in the analysis.  
Study 2.  















Table 18  
Study 2 Logistic regression: Effect of the frequency of messages of a 
given kind on the increase in the amount given the following round. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Up 
Amount given in the previous round -0.459 (0.065)*** 
Coordination of cooperative action 0.736 (0.163)*** 
Promoting group solidarity 2.430 (1.273)* 
Agreement 1.791 (0.773)** 
Interpersonal bonding 2.262 (1.021)** 
Sanctioning -2.137 (0.725)*** 
Amount*Promoting group solidarity -0.323 (0.144)** 
Amount*Agreement -0.219 (0.091)** 
Amount*Interpersonal bonding -0.322 (0.120)*** 
Amount*Sanctioning 0.266 (0.091)*** 
Constant 2.468 (0.540)*** 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 19 
Study 3 Logistic regression: Effect of the frequency of messages of a given 
kind on the increase in the amount given the following round. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Up 
Amount given in the previous round -0.479 (0.112)*** 
Frequency Coordination of cooperative action -0.081(0.200) 
Amount*Coordination of cooperative action 0.155 (0.069)** 
Constant 0.266 (0.274) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Interaction for Sanctioning
Figure 33. Study 2 Interaction Effects 
Note: To create this plot, the frequencies were squared to transform back to the original data. The y-axis represents 
the probability from 0 – 1, transformed from the log odds of the logistic regression model. 0 number of messages sent, 
provides the baseline of the effect. 
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 In contrast to Study 2, the mean amount contributed by co-ops in these data 
is 1.5 tokens – indicating overall very low levels of cooperation. The same process for model 
selection, described above, was followed for Study 3. The results of the final model can be 
found in Table 19. The main effects can be interpreted in light of the interaction between 
them. Figure 34 shows the interaction between the amount given in the previous round by the 
number of messages coded as Coordination of cooperative action, sent in the previous round. 
The interaction shows there is a higher probability of contributions increasing depending on 
the number of messages sent, for any number of tokens given in the previous round, besides 























Study 3.  
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Interaction for Coordinating Cooperative Action
Note: To create this plot, the frequencies were squared to transform 
back to the original data. The y-axis represents the probability from 0 
– 1, transformed from the log odds of the logistic regression model. 0 
number of messages sent, provides the baseline of the effect. 
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Discussion 
 Previous scholars have argued that for cooperation to emerge, communication among 
individuals is important. Indeed, communication has been found to increase cooperation in 
social dilemmas (Balliet, 2010). However, less is known about how communication facilitates 
the emergence of particular types of cooperative group norms. In this Chapter, we provide 
qualitative and quantitative evidence which suggest that groups that successfully align their 
behavior on high levels of cooperation tend to exhibit particular communication patterns.  
 
Coordinating cooperative action 
Qualitative results as well as quantitative results show that one form of 
communication that appears to enhance cooperation are attempts to coordinate cooperative 
action. Co-op members do this by making active suggestions to each other about how the 
group should behave, often by suggesting to each other how many tokens should be 
contributed to the Public Good in the next round of play. This finding is consistent with prior 
research: Communication can be used to coordinate action, negotiate strategic agreements, 
establish mutual expectations for future behavior and facilitate the emergence of cooperative 
social norms (e.g., Kerr & Kaufman-gilliland, 1994; Shankar & Pavitt, 2002). 
Relatedly, research has suggested that communication can coordinate cooperation 
through individual pledging: exclamations such as "I will give 10 to the co-op!" might help 
establishing norms for cooperation – especially if it is binding to some extent (for example, X. 
Chen & Komorita, 1994). However, in our studies, we did not see many instances of 
individual pledging in either studies (the reader is referred to the total frequency of pledging 
in  Table 17). Rather, group members focused on the collective amounts to contribute (i.e., 
they were busy coordinating at the level of "us") which suggests that there was greater focus 
on generating shared expectations as a group, in a collaborative manner. This finding implies 
that during the public goods game, communication was used as a means for establishing 
collective intentions, rather than reciprocal expectations among individuals – this is quite 
consistent with ideas about collective intentions being shaped at the level of “us” rather than 
at the level of “me and you” (e.g., Searle, 2002). Conversely, it may be inconsistent with the 
idea that coordination happens at the dyadic, interpersonal level of the “I will do x and you 
will do y” type. Indeed, Dawes, Van der Kragt and Orbell (1990) argued that discussion in 
social dilemmas makes the collective, rather than the individual, central; and that this 
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phenomenon in turn supports the idea that communication can help cooperation through the 
emergence of social identification (but see Bicchieri & Lev-On, 2007).  
 
Promoting group solidarity  
Although the coordination of cooperation appears to be necessary, it does not appear 
to be sufficient. The data show that there were many messages coded as coordination of 
cooperative action in groups that were not successful in creating cooperative norms (see Co-
ops G, H, I, J and K). Therefore, we would argue that coordinating communications should be 
paired with messages that promote a sense of “we-ness” and solidarity. Indeed, we found that 
the promotion of group solidarity appears to be associated with developing cooperative 
norms, supported both by the qualitative analysis and the logistic regression results for Study 
2 in which cooperation was much higher and increased over time, in contrast to Study 3. This 
finding is in line with existing literature which suggests that communication can lead 
cooperation through social identification (X. Chen, 1996; Shankar & Pavitt, 2002), also in 
computer-mediated contexts (Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1998, 1999, 2000). It also dovetails 
with evidence that having a high social identification with the group can increase cooperation 
(Brewer & Kramer, 1986; De Cremer et al., 2008; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Simpson, 
2006; Wit & Kerr, 2002). But crucially, it shows that such solidarity should not be conceived 
of as given but that it is actively construed and maintained through communication (Postmes, 
Haslam, et al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005).  
The regression results for Study 2 indicate that other strategies also serve a similar role 
as promoting group solidarity in order to make coordination more effective. These are 
interpersonal bonding and agreement. Qualitatively, interpersonal bonding – not the 
promotion of group solidarity – was found in high levels in at least two highly cooperative co-
ops (e.g., Co-op C; Co-op O). In addition, in Study 2, interpersonal bonding increased 
cooperation in the next round when the average level of cooperation was low in the previous 
round.  
Literature suggests that in some groups interpersonal bonding could be a way of 
forming a social identity with the group through bottom-up processes (Postmes, Spears, Lee, 
& Novak, 2005). However, this pattern was not replicated in Study 3 – probably due to lack 
of cooperation in general (i.e., there was not enough data of people cooperating, thus there 
was no opportunity for the effect of interpersonal bonding to emerge). Furthermore, some 
existing data suggests that interpersonal bonding may not be as effective as promoting groups 
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solidarity. Interpersonal bonding messages were also scattered throughout the communication 
of some of the non-cooperative co-ops in Study 2 (see qualitative analysis, Co-op I) and Study 
3 (Co-op P, R, S and T).  
So, while interpersonal bonding may increase cooperation, possibly through bottom-
up social identity formation and the development of a sense of common fate, this is not 
always the case. In fact, there is research to suggest that social approval can exist in non-
cooperative groups where interpersonal relations become more important than the cooperation 
levels at a group level (Flache, 1996; Flache & Macy, 1996). These studies show that bilateral 
cooperation is learned quicker than complex, multilateral cooperation. The authors theorize 
that because of this, the desire to obtain social approval from interpersonal relations may 
result in individuals not being able to sanction others to enforce cooperation at a group level. 
Having said that, in our data sanctioning was very prevalent in Study 3 where cooperation 
was low, even in cases where there was some interpersonal bonding.  
 
Sanctioning  
According to the game-theory literature, punishment can be an effective strategy in the 
establishment of cooperative norms (Balliet et al., 2011; Horne, 2001; Voss, 2001). Therefore, 
one may reason that sanctioning should reduce defection and increase cooperation. However, 
the evidence provided here shows that there may be a downside to sanctioning under some 
circumstances. First, from the qualitative analysis of Studies 2 and 3 we see that sanctioning 
was not followed by messages of relationship repair and further, sanctioning did not seem to 
have any behavioral effects (except in one or two instances for highly cooperative groups 
where defection and sanctioning was very uncommon). Second, the quantitative analysis 
provided additional support to the assertion that sanctioning does not always work to increase 
cooperation: There was no effect of sanctioning in Study 3, while it had a negative effect on 
cooperation in Study 2. 
 One may argue that sanctioning failed to create or enforce cooperative norms 
because it is ‘cheap talk’ (Farrell, 1987) – meaning that it was non-binding and costless to the 
person who is doing the sanctioning. From our analysis, however, it appears that other types 
of talk do indeed matter and can positively influence cooperation. We see this for the 
coordination of cooperative action, interpersonal bonding, promoting group solidarity and 
agreement. As such, there is no reason to suspect that verbal sanctions could not also be 
influential. The present findings may then be better explained by relational signaling theory: 
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Sanctioning in groups that have not had the chance to develop solidarity ties could be 
perceived as expressing a negative relational signal (Wittek, 2003). Indeed, from the 
qualitative analysis we see that sanctioning was often harsh and did not leave much room for 
relationship building (e.g., “F*#! you guys, why am I the only one investing here”). In turn, 
sanctioning messages such as these can actually escalate the sanctioning-defection cycle 
rather than enhancing the saliency of the solidarity relationship. On the other hand, positive 
relational signaling may also help to explain why, in some already cooperative groups, the 
few instances of sanctioning appear to be effective, presumably because solidarity ties already 
exist and the sanctioning is not so harsh. 
 
Conclusion  
Previous research has shown that communication in social dilemmas is associated 
with better cooperative outcomes. Simply allowing communication to occur naturally, 
however, is not enough. The content of the communication is important. The results of this 
Chapter suggest that the coordination of cooperative action appears to be effective, when it is 
used in combination with attempts to promote group solidarity – for example, through the use 
of encouragement and team spirit. Agreement and interpersonal bonding are also valuable in 
creating a cooperative environment. These ways of communicating within groups appear to 
work in combination to create prosocial norms for cooperation and develop a shared 
understanding and mutual expectations for how group members will act. Finally, sanctioning 
is clearly not always a straightforward way to build good, cooperative relationships – 
especially when it is not tactful and does not signal the desire for establishing mutually 
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Emergence is when “the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, 
but truths concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles 
governing the low-level domain.”  
David Chalmers (2006, pp. 244) 
The overall aim of this dissertation was to study the emergence of cooperative norms 
over time in small, interactive groups. Applying the above quote to the social world: 
Emergence is when the group phenomenon arises from the individual domain, but truths 
concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the (perceived) principles governing the 
individual domain. We applied a dynamic perspective to social dilemma games in order to 
understand how cooperation emerges in small groups that interact, communicate, and thus 
may form bonds over time. 
What guides an individual’s decision to cooperate or not? In traditional economic 
approaches, individuals were thought to make a very “rational” calculation (whether through 
conscious or unconscious processes): Weigh the costs and benefits of cooperating, then act 
(for discussion on rationality in economics, see Simon, 1986). Many early theories from an 
economic perspective have assumed and argued that humans are essentially “homo-
economicus” – that is, individuals are primarily concerned with their own self-interest in 
terms of maximizing their own profit (e.g., Edwards, 1962; Hardin, 1968). Under this 
assumption, it is rational not to cooperate because it is possible to gain more if one does not 
share resources – especially in once-off interaction, or when longer-term interaction is about 
to end. However, a key problem with such assumptions is that there is abundant evidence of 
“irrationally” high levels of cooperation in social dilemma games (and in society at large) (for 
example, see Ledyard, 1995).  
Accordingly, in line with perspectives such as interdependence theory (Kelley et al., 
2003; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2008; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) and 
goal-framing theory (Lindenberg, 2015b, 2015a), the rational calculations of individuals 
seeking to maximize their rewards are not independent: they take interdependence with others 
into account and thus moment-to-moment decisions to cooperate are made against the 
background of longer-term relational considerations. In other words, one’s goal may not be to 
gain resources here and now, but to establish and maintain relationships – which in the long 
run should ultimately be beneficial for instrumental reasons too. Therefore, the definition of 
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rationality in the context of human relations has slowly changed from a logical, mathematical 
definition assuming atomized individuals to an integration of rationality plus sociality – social 
rationality (for example, see Diekmann & Lindenberg, 2015). 
Whilst the consideration of an individual’s decision to cooperate as being in relation 
to others has moved cooperation research forward, limitations remain that cannot be 
addressed until we consider more closely how individual level interactions with others results 
in emergent group processes. For example, in modern interdependence theory, the extent to 
which one values relations over self-interested, instrumental outcomes, is still seen as a more 
or less fixed preference (e.g., Kelley et al., 2003; Messick & McClintock, 1968). In other 
words, whether one is “prosocial” or “proself” (i.e., one’s social value orientation or SVO) 
will largely predict to which extent one will cooperate and under a variety of conditions. 
“Proself” people will likely act in accordance with traditional economic understandings of 
human behavior and may defect rather than cooperate in an attempt to accrue more resources; 
while “prosocial” people will value establishing and good relationships and thus will 
cooperate as a way of signalling the willingness to sustain a mutually beneficial relationship.  
While there has been additional research into how one’s SVO may interact with the 
context (for a review of some moderators see Balliet et al., 2009), a more complex 
understanding about how these personal response styles play out in dynamic settings, where 
individuals interact for a prolonged period of time, has not yet been explored in detail. 
Similarly, while goal-framing theory provides an explanation for how the social context may 
influence, and perhaps change, an individual’s goals in a given situation  (e.g., by 
situationally making different norms for behavior salient, see also Turner, 1991), it does not 
detail when or how the active co-creation of these norms with others might play out in 
interaction29. As such, both theories could be interpreted as somewhat deterministic: pre-
existing characteristics of individuals determine how they cooperate in groups; the social 
norms bound up with the situation cues an individual’s behavior; or the social environment 
(e.g., groups, organizations, society or even culture) exerts a major influence in shaping the 
actions of individuals.  
                                               
 
29 Note that goal-framing theory does argue that people can self-regulate to change their sensitivity to 
environmental cues; and avoid, or seek out, certain cues (see for example, Lindenberg & Steg, 2014). 
Nevertheless, while this elaboration suggests some agency in individual cognition, it does not address 
the role of  interacting individuals on emergent processes and norms. 
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In sum: While the contribution of ‘socially rational’ theories to the understanding of 
human cooperation has indeed been fruitful, nevertheless most of this research has been 
focused on individual preferences that exert a constant influence on the extent to which 
someone will choose to cooperate under a wide variety of circumstances, or on how the 
environment may change one’s individual goal or activate particular social norms. In this 
thesis, we were principally interested in extending this to the dynamic factors that occur in 
small, interactive groups which cause some groups to cooperate and flourish and others not 
to. How do people create social norms of cooperation with their groups, in real time; and how 
is group behavior an emergent property of interacting members?  
 
The Methodology and its Innovations 
Studying emergent group phenomena is a complex undertaking—after all these are 
inherently unpredictable, and emergence is fundamentally antagonistic to strict experimental 
control. So to understand how cooperation emerges through interaction within a group over 
time, we adapted two existing methodologies (in data collection and in data analysis) and 
applied them in a novel way.  
 In terms of data collection, we ran 
three studies in order to address the emergence of cooperation over time using a dynamic 
Public Goods Game (PGG), set up in the computer-mediated experimental platform, the 
Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL; see viappl.org; and as used in a simple exchange 
game, see Durrheim, Quayle, Tredoux, Titlestad, & Tooke, 2016). VIAPPL allowed us to 
simulate societies in which people could exchange goods over multiple rounds of a social 
dilemma game – that is, a game where there is an inherent tension between individual and 
collective interest (Olson, 1965) . In such cases, the socially optimal outcome is universal 
cooperation, whereas the best individual outcome is defection while all others continue to 
cooperate. Our methodology allowed participants to interact, communicate and receive 
feedback regarding one another’s behavior between rounds of contributing to the public good. 
Thus, they did not just exchange goods but, as in the real-world, they could interact with each 
other about anything they liked, albeit via text-based chat only. Moreover we developed a 
context within which the formation of groups would meaningfully relate to the social 
exchange in the game: we designed stimuli to create the world of ‘farming co-operatives on a 
deserted island’ and tried to ensure that within this context, participants' interactions served a 
purpose in the formation of their co-operatives.   
Dynamic Public Goods Games in VIAPPL.  
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Because we were inherently interested in social interaction and the emergence of 
cooperation, we used the Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation (Postmes, Haslam, et 
al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005) as a framework that informed our thoughts about the 
factors that might promote and encourage the emergence of cooperation, as well as the 
processes that might account for this cooperation such as social identification formation. 
Accordingly, our studies did not just allow for interaction but we also developed experimental 
manipulations that we thought might influence emergence. 
 In the first study (Chapter 2), we compared a Categorized condition to a Non-
Categorized condition, assuming that social categories would enhance cooperation overall but 
that interactive, non-categorized groups could reach similar levels of cooperation over time. 
We found partial support for this hypothesis but the effects of the manipulation were not 
strong and we did not find the predicted time pattern. Since the differences between the 
experimental conditions were not as robust as they could have been (i.e., because participants 
in the categorized condition could self-form groups, interact and communicate, these groups 
may have been more similar to inductive groups than we had hoped), in Chapter 3 we 
strengthened the experimental manipulation. Specifically, we prevented individuals in the 
categorized condition from self-forming groups and, as a result, had to limit interaction for the 
inductive, Interpersonal Ties groups, and instead made their inductive nature salient by 
emphasizing their members’ heterogeneity and highlighting the importance of interpersonal 
relations rather than social categories. This time, we found that the pattern of cooperation over 
time was more consistent with our expectations: inductive groups began with slightly lower 
levels of cooperation and, over time, reached similarly high levels as social categories; while 
social categories still showed slightly higher levels of cooperation overall. It should be noted, 
however, that the differences between the experimental conditions were not huge.  
Our feeling was that the first two studies were consistent with one another but because 
the overall levels of cooperation were very high, possible ceiling effects could limit a full 
understanding of how deductive and inductive group processes influence cooperation. Thus, 
in Chapter 4, we again changed the design somewhat. More in line with economic traditions 
of experimental design, we paid participants according to their end of game outcome, which is 
not often done in psychological studies. This change was made to lower the initial values of 
cooperation and see how cooperation would emerge when it began a bit lower. Indeed, the 
starting levels were lower but perhaps too much so and cooperation largely failed to emerge. 
In sum, all three studies allowed for social interaction but we also manipulated the degree of 
Stimulus material in the PGG and reasons for changing it across experiments.  
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categorization in different ways. As we discuss further in the summary of the findings, the 
manipulations mostly had the predicted effect but these effects were weak and as research 
progressed, we concluded they are not the most interesting feature of the findings. 
Nevertheless, these ideas guided our design of the experiment arena in VIAPPL and appear to 
have provided the backdrop to allow for emergent group processes.  
 Our second methodological 
contribution was in the area of data analysis. As mentioned, emergence is an inherently 
unpredictable process and is therefore fundamentally antagonistic to attempts of strict control, 
and/or predefining pathways along which it might proceed (if it occurs at all). We applied a 
multilevel latent class Markov model  (Van de Pol & Langeheine, 1990; Vermunt et al., 2008) 
which is inherently suitable for studying inductive, dynamic processes because it does not 
rely on the identification of predefined patterns of behavior or structure. Rather, it allows for 
the distinction and classification of whatever characteristic patterns of behavior may emerge 
over the course of interaction. This model not only accounted for the interdependencies 
inherent in the experimental set-up; it allowed us to learn from these interdependencies. 
Without this approach to the analysis, we would not have found the finding we are 
most excited by: Particular types of decision rules, used to determine how much to cooperate 
in any given moment, are an emergent property of the group. In other words, over a short 
period of interaction, individuals align their decision making behavior within their group. 
Thus the “type” of person one is in an interactive group situation, depends on the nature of 
interaction within the group and is not purely a fixed and stable preference. This particular 
finding would not have been possible by using traditional types of analysis. While our 
traditional analysis, by a linear multilevel model, did indicate (through the random slopes at 
the group level) that there was great variation among groups even in the same experimental 
condition; the latent class analysis provided a process-oriented way of quantifying and 
describing these patterns and could show that people may develop similar behavioral 
tendencies through interaction over a short period of time.  
 
Summary of key findings across Chapters 
Two of our PGG studies were conducted in the Netherlands (see Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3) where we incentivized participants with course credit or a standard amount, in the 
case of the few paid participants, with compensation independent of their behavior in the 
experiment. The final study was conducted in South Africa (see Chapter 4), where we 
Data analysis to study emergent processes.  
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incentivized participants with a payment according to their end token balance. Based on the 
Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation (Postmes, Haslam, et al., 2005; Postmes, 
Spears, et al., 2005), all three studies were designed in order to examine the trajectories of 
cooperation through: a) deductive processes (the Categorization/Social Categories condition 
in Chapter 2 through 4) and b) inductive processes (namely, the Non-Categorization condition 
in Chapter 2 and Interpersonal Ties in Chapters 3 and 4).  
The groups formed in the experiments were called co-ops, reflecting that cooperation 
was the decisive feature of the behavior of the group members. First, and following from the 
multilevel latent class Markov analysis, in all three studies we discovered the formation of 
“co-op types” which overlapped nearly 100% with “individual types”, strongly suggesting the 
emergence of unique cooperative norms within groups, in a short period of interaction (to our 
best knowledge, within the first 4 rounds). In Committed Co-ops (Chapter 2, 3) and Resilient 
Co-ops (Chapter 4), the norm was to contribute very highly, even maximally, to the public 
good in almost every round. In Responsive Co-ops (Chapter 2, 3), while also sometimes 
contributing maximally, the norm was to also base cooperation on what the rest of the co-op 
members did in the previous round – essentially rewarding cooperative action by the group 
(by personally giving more the next round), and indirectly sanctioning uncooperative action 
(by giving less). Finally, in Reactive Co-ops (Chapter 2) the norm was to give less than 
Committed and Responsive Co-ops and especially react negatively to low contributions from 
the co-op, by contributing even less themselves the next round. Note that in Chapter 4, we 
also found two other “co-op types” (the Struggling and Breakdown Co-ops) which did not 
form similarly strong normative patterns, discussed in further detail later.  
Second, within-group convergence on high, even maximum, levels of cooperation was 
found to be associated with particular kinds of social interaction. For example, taken from the 
content analysis of the messages sent between rounds (Chapter 5), we found that coordination 
of cooperative action at the level of “us”, not at the level of “you and me”, increased the 
likelihood of the emergence of cooperation within a group, especially when used in 
conjunction with communication that enhanced the promotion of group solidarity, 
interpersonal bonding on non-task related subjects, and agreement. Furthermore, in these 
studies sanctioning was not an effective tool in ensuring the emergence of cooperation – in 
fact, in many groups it appeared detrimental. Sanctioning’s negative effect was possibly due 
to the harshness of the messages sent which, in absence of a pre-established relationship, 
failed to signal the importance of the group relationship continuing on good terms (e.g., 
Wittek, 2003). Taken together, for cooperation to flourish within groups of three or more 
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members, there should be an active shaping of social norms for cooperation through 
communicating in a way which enhances the relationship with the collective and ensures its 
sustainability.  
Finally, in Chapters 2 and 3, we found that for both social identification pathways 
there were high levels of cooperation overall. However, by changing the experimental context 
in Chapter 4, as well as employing a different incentive scheme by using material rather than 
symbolic rewards, we found that cooperation was rare and defection (rather than maximum 
cooperation) was commonplace. Although there were a few cooperative groups in the form of 
Resilient Co-op’s in Chapter 4, the vast majority of the co-ops in the last study were classified 
as the Struggling or Breakdown type which did not show the same strong norm emergence: 
they consisted of individuals of different “types” using different patterns of decision rules. 
What is notable here though, is that despite these co-ops consisting of many defectors, and 
despite cooperation going down over time, there were still some Resilient and Marginal 
Cooperators in these types of co-ops who kept trying to build a relationship with the group at 
the expense of their short-sighted self-interest. Axelrod (1984) discussed the possibility that 
clusters of particular types of cooperators (specifically, tit-for-tat cooperators) can enter into a 
situation permeated with defection and could, through their interaction with one another, 
change the norm to increase overall cooperation. This idea as well as the findings of Chapter 
4 provide hope to situations where cooperation feels unattainable: if more Resilient or 
Marginal Cooperators enter the scene, could the social norm of these failing co-ops change? 
 
Practical Implications 
From the research presented in this thesis, we can see that there are a few factors that 
appear conducive to facilitating the emergence of cooperative groups. In cooperative groups, 
group members align their decision rules and behavior, creating strong cooperative norms.   
First, pre-existing (and somewhat static) environmental factors may act as a starting 
point determining, at least in part, how cooperation unfolds through interaction over time. For 
example, cooperative groups are more likely to emerge in environments that facilitate 
normative goal frames rather than competitive goal frames. Although not directly tested 
experimentally, we see that in Chapters 2 and 3, in which there were no monetary incentives 
tied to the outcome of the game and thus rewards were symbolic, high levels of cooperation 
flourished. However, in Chapter 4, where there was a monetary incentive, cooperation was 
much less likely to emerge. Indeed, in this last study, it seems that the framing of the 
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experiment (as a “Community/Farm” game) was possibly overshadowed by a competitive 
goal frame (Lindenberg, 2015a).  
Further, pre-existing cultural values may also play some role in initiating cooperation. 
However, we did not explicitly test the role of between-country cultural values on 
cooperation, therefore we do not know the exact role that culture plays in the differences in 
cooperation levels in Chapter 2, 3 in comparison to Chapter 4. While there has already been 
previous research to suggest that differences between cultures are meaningful in determining 
cooperation levels in social dilemmas (see for example, Joseph Henrich et al., 2001), we 
found little evidence for the role of within-country culture on cooperative behavior in Chapter 
430.  Nevertheless, is quite possible that somewhat static environmental cues (such as the 
experimental framing or societal context) activate high levels of cooperation in the first round 
of play. We see that cooperation starts much higher in Chapters 2 and 3, compared to Chapter 
4. Early defection appears hard to ameliorate, especially with the very high degree of harsh 
sanctioning evident in the PGG of Chapter 4 (see the content analysis of messages in Chapter 
5). Considering the atmosphere for interaction is apparently set right from the beginning, it 
appears that interventions that would facilitate cooperation, such as highlighting similarity 
and providing a normative goal frame, should be introduced as soon as possible.  
Second, while the beginning of group interaction appears to play a role – perhaps 
influenced by an external static factor – importantly, the studies in this thesis show us that the 
emergence of cooperation over time is crucial.  As an illustration of this, in Chapters 2 and 3 
we see that not all members of Committed Co-ops start by cooperating maximally from the 
first interaction, but this maximum level of cooperation develops as time goes on. 
Additionally, in the Committed, Responsive (Chapter 2, 3), and Resilient Co-ops (Chapter 4), 
there was almost complete overlap in the group members’ decision-making behavior 
regarding how much to contribute to the public good, meaning that these social norms must 
develop through interaction over time.  
The formation of cooperative norms may require communication to aid in the alignment 
of decision-making and cooperative behavior. In Chapter 5 we see that there are different 
communication strategies which seem to benefit the emergence of cooperation. Notably, 
groups that show greater convergence on high levels of cooperation, send many more 
messages coordinating cooperative action at the level of “us”. Results show that this effect is 
                                               
 
30 Although horizontal collectivism had some positive effect on social identification, measured at the 
end of the interaction period. 
 Chapter 6: General Discussion 164 
causal, in the sense that the lower the average cooperation level is in the previous round and 
the more coordination of cooperative action messages sent directly afterwards, the probability 
of cooperation increasing in the next round is higher. Another communicative feature of 
cooperative groups appears to be messages that encourage bonding – namely, promoting 
group solidarity as well as interpersonal bonding on non-task related subject, although to a 
lesser extent. Taken together, group interventions based on facilitating particular 
communicative patterns, such as the ones described in this thesis, may encourage the 
emergence of cooperation.  
While the emergence of cooperative group norms through endogenous processes are far 
more important than the social identity pathway that was primed by the experimental 
condition, we do still see that slightly more Committed Co-ops (in Chapter 2 and 3) and more 
Resilient Co-ops (in Chapter 4) form in the social categories pathway where deductive 
identities are primed, compared to the inductive, interpersonal ties pathway. Further, in 
Chapter 3, we see that for groups formed in the inductive path (i.e., Interpersonal Ties 
condition), it takes longer for cooperation to reach the same high levels as the deductive 
pathway (i.e., Social Categories condition). As such, it appears that cooperation with the 
group may arise more frequently and quicker when the emphasis is on homogeneous group 
characteristics.  
However, our results also show (in Chapter 3 and 4) that in groups that cooperate more 
(regardless of the pathway to social identification), social identification (or solidarity, in the 
case of Chapter 4) is higher at the end of the group interaction, once group norms are firmly 
established and when shared identities appear to have formed. Further, there are no 
differences between pathways in the end levels of social identification. Therefore, since 1) 
cooperation is associated with higher social identification, and 2) there appears to be slightly 
more cooperation in social categories, this at least suggests a self-reinforcing mechanism of 
social identification on cooperation. In other words, establishing social identification in 
groups through cooperation, and/or enhancing the saliency of social categories, may serve in a 
feedback mechanism that encourages future cooperation. While this potential feedback 
mechanism (social identification à cooperation à identification etc.) was not directly 
studied in this thesis, future research could test this hypothesis.  
In sum: under ideal conditions (for example, where there are normative goal frames and 
existing social identities), it appears that group members can fairly quickly and easily align 
their decision rules of cooperative behavior to create highly stable, normative and cooperative 
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groups (as in the Committed and Responsive Co-ops in Chapter 2,3 and Resilient Co-ops in 
Chapter 4). However, when the conditions are not ideal, unstable groups emerge which cannot 
develop such cooperative norms (in particular, see the Breakdown and Struggling Co-ops in 
Chapter 4), although these groups can still contain a small proportion of cooperators, 
providing hope for future cooperative emergence.   
 
Theoretical Implications 
Finally, we should consider the results of this thesis for theory, especially as it relates to 
cooperation. First, the Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation (IMIF; Postmes, 
Haslam, et al., 2005) has already extended ideas of social identity theory by arguing that in 
addition to deduction from social categories, groups and their concomitant social identities 
can be induced through interaction and communication over time. As such, the social identity 
perspective allows for the dynamic emergence of identities. Having said that, there did appear 
to be slightly higher levels of cooperation when social categories were made salient and 
overall, high levels of cooperation seemed to be associated with higher levels of social 
identification at the end of interaction. Furthermore, in Chapter 2 there appeared to be more 
variation with respect to cooperation among inductively formed co-ops and in Chapter 3, 
inductively formed groups took longer to reach the same levels of cooperation as deductive 
groups. These findings suggests two things: 1) the process of induction may be more time-
consuming which means that cooperation may take longer to emerge and may not emerge 
consistently across all inductively formed groups; and 2) there is a possible self-reinforcing 
mechanism whereby social identification  (for example, through categorization) can increase 
cooperation leading to higher levels of identification over time. But for this to happen, 
communication and interaction over time plays an important role.  
Indeed, our research found that endogenous group processes can far better explain the 
emergence of cooperation compared to the primed social identity pathway. This finding itself 
confirms the idea that induction is important in the process of emergence: what happened 
within the co-ops/groups themselves (behaviorally and through particular communication 
patterns) can much better account for the development of cooperation than the static 
manipulations of identity at the beginning of the experiment. In other words, induction seems 
to be a process that occurs in most cooperative groups. 
In this thesis, we have argued that the emergence of group phenomena is enabled by group 
members' ability to interact with each other over time. To further extend this idea, it might be 
of interest to explore the role of dyadic ties on the emergence of group level outcomes. 
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Statistical advances in social network analysis provide scope to study social phenomena that 
arise in emerging networks of cooperation and competition, providing a way to integrate 
social identity theory with a social network approach. In other words, the idea that networks 
evolve through interpersonal (dyadic level) interaction within a large intergroup (social level) 
setting – wherein there is the emergence of group norms – could be explored with statistical 
methods other than the multilevel latent class Markov model presented here. Such an 
approach would be interesting because it removes the constraint of having to study these 
group dynamics in small groups: indeed the dynamics of cooperation in very large networks 
are an important next step for researchers to take. 
  On the other hand, in addition to studying dyads, interdependence theory (Kelley et al., 
2003; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2008; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) could 
also explore more complex group dynamics – using methods such as those presented here – in 
order to study the kinds of emergent processes that the theory is interested in (such as 
cooperation in groups). This is because emergent group phenomena may not follow directly 
from interpersonal, dyadic ties. In our research, we found that individual preferences for how 
to behave cannot be seen as static and independent of emergent group processes. While there 
has been some research on how one’s social value orientation, for example, can interact with 
other factors to alter one’s individual goal behavior in a social dilemma (e.g., Balliet et al., 
2009), it is of interest to further consider the situations in which collective preferences come 
into being through interaction and communication over time at the collective, group level of 
“us”. As such, there is scope for both the social identity perspective and interdependence 
theory to explore what kinds of interaction (collective or dyadic or a combination) may 
account for emergence, and under what conditions.  
Finally, and more broadly in terms of future research on social dilemmas, it would be 
important to further study the dynamic emergence of cooperation within groups. While social 
dilemma research has explored many static individual-level and group-level factors that could 
influence cooperation, there has been less focus on emergent social norms for cooperation that 
develop in interaction over time. Our methodologies employed in this thesis (data analysis 
and collection) could aid researchers interested in studying emergent group phenomena. 
Quantitatively, future development of the specification of the multilevel latent class Markov 
model should more closely consider the first three or four rounds of interaction (which in the 
current set-up appeared to be crucial for most co-ops) in order to better understand the 
processes by which social norms emerge. Qualitatively, Chapter 5 of this thesis highlights the 
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added value of detailed analysis of group communication: these proved a tremendous help in 
understanding the process of emergence and we believe that future work in this direction 
could be very fruitful and insightful. 
 
Limitations  
While the studies in this thesis have taught us many things, there are of course 
limitations. First, it seems very likely that multiple static and dynamic factors interact with 
one another, leading to cooperative or non-cooperative outcomes in groups. In this 
dissertation, we did not explore all possible static and dynamic factors which may come into 
play and, between studies, we also varied some factors simultaneously, making it impossible 
to unconfound some of the explanations for the between-study differences we found. For 
example, related to the differences between Chapter 2 and 3 on one hand and Chapter 4 on the 
other, we acknowledge that we did not fully anticipate the consequences of taking the final 
study to South Africa and changing the incentives at the same time. In retrospect we should 
have included pre-measures in all three studies about culture and generalized trust, and 
perhaps other measures of societal differences too. In that way we could have more easily 
been able to causally establish the reasons for such a drastic change between the first two, 
compared to the final study. Further, we chose to run all our experiments with a normative 
goal frame in which the experiment was presented to participants as a community-type game 
where “farming and farming co-operatives” are central. The initial framing of the experiment 
– that is, requesting participants to imagine that they arrived on a deserted island and would 
be farming – could be problematic in the South African context. Although ‘deserted’ implies 
no existing group of people on the fictional island, this experimental framing could be a 
reminder of colonization in South Africa – which led to many serious subsequent problems, 
including Apartheid.  
As such, this metaphor may have primed general mistrust and ultimately led to 
defection, especially given that the experiment was conducted after the much publicized 
“Fees Must Fall” student protest movement in which activists were arguing for the reduction 
of university fees as well as the decolonization of education. Specifically, future research 
could test how different goal frames (such as the one used in this thesis) may operate given 
the context and history of a particular society. More generally, research could disentangle the 
other possible explanations for the change in cooperation in the final study – for example, by 
comparing how monetary incentives operate differently across different societies or by 
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exploring what other factors may interact with incentivization (for example, generalized 
levels of societal trust or mistrust).  
Second, in practice it proved difficult to experimentally manipulate deductive and 
inductive routes to social identification. The use of social categories in order to simulate a 
deductive route to social identification and the use of non-categorization and interpersonal ties 
to stimulate an inductive route, could not be cleanly teased apart in the experiments. This was 
because we also had to maintain experimental equivalence between the two conditions. As a 
result, social categories communicated and interacted over time while inductive groups could 
see a possible outgroup onscreen and thus perhaps draw intergroup comparisons. 
Additionally, in the second two experiments, inductive groups could not self-form. While, 
theoretically, we would not expect there to be large differences in overall cooperation 
between these two pathways (although we would expect the trajectory to be different) – it is 
also possible that the differences were not so great due to the similarities in the experimental 
manipulations. Future research could find additional ways to test these pathways in a more 
distinct manner. In addition, more meaningful group identities could be stimulated. One 
example of this would be to use demographic factors to activate social categories more 
strongly. 
Third, in all three studies, at least two co-ops appeared onscreen at the same time. 
While the co-ops could not exchange with one another, participants were able to see – through 
the feedback image of token contributions to each co-op after every round – how the other co-
op was doing. However, in the data analysis, no particular attention was given to the 
possibility of competition between the co-ops. Part of the reason for this was that there was 
not high variance at the experimental game level (only at the co-op level) and therefore we 
reasoned that co-op’s perhaps did not strongly influence one another. However, future 
research could explore any possible effects that witnessing another group interact has on the 
ingroups’ behavior.  
We end this discussion by providing a table (Table 20) summarizing key ideas 




In this thesis, we set out to understand how cooperative norms emerge over time in 
small, interactive groups, as well as the impact that different pathways to social identification 
 169 Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 
(i.e., the deductive and inductive path) have on cooperation. First, we found evidence for the 
fact that through both social identification pathways, similarly high or low levels of 
cooperation can be reached – albeit through different trajectories. But more significantly, we 
found that groups tend to form norms of cooperation based on similar decision making rules, 
which subsequently has an impact on the overall level of cooperation which the group may 
achieve. In other words, decision-making behavior regarding cooperation was an emergent 
property of the group and groups aligned on different patterns of decision-making. Therefore, 
an individual’s choice of cooperative behavior is not a fixed and stable trait – for example, 
due to a cooperative personality – but may be almost entirely dependent on the people with 
whom one interacts, how the interaction unfolds, and the setting in which this interaction 
takes place. Finally, we found that changing the societal context and the monetary outcome of 
the final experiment, led to a vast decline in cooperation compared to our first two studies. 
Taken together, the results of the behavioral data for cooperation across studies (i.e., the 
amount contributed to the Public Good), as well as the content of the messages sent, suggests 
that static factors – such as macro-level variables that can explain differences between 
societies, as well as gains goal frames activated by monetary incentives etc. – may predict 
initial contributions to the Public Good. However, dynamic factors – which can only come 
into play through interaction and communication over time – subsequently direct how 
cooperation further evolves. Crucially, the nature of social interaction – specifically, whether 
groups coordinate activity at the level of “us”, while also promoting group solidarity – 
appears to foster social norms that maximize cooperation
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Table 20.  
Summary of key findings across chapters 
 






Chapter 5  
(Messages) 
Implications 
Category membership promotes higher cooperation overall, 
compared to inductive groups 
Evidence Evidence Partial evidence (not 
strong) 
 Categorisation as a static factor has some effect 
in promoting cooperation but it is not 
guaranteed.  
Non-categorised and interpersonal ties groups reach the same 
levels of cooperation as categorized groups over time, while 
categorized groups are higher from the beginning. 
Partial Evidence (but 
both started at the 
same level) 
Evidence No evidence. Both 
started similarly low 
and declined over 
time 
 Given these and the above findings, 
endogenous group processes are more 
important in determining the progress of 
cooperation in groups than statically 
manipulated pathways to social identification.  
While the levels of social identification, entitativity and 
belonging will be the same at the end of interaction for 
categorized and non-categorized groups, there will be other 
measurable differences to distinguish them (e.g., in 
perception of personal value, independence, competition 
between co-ops, closeness to own co-op etc).  
Evidence for the first 
part but not the 
second (unreliable 
measure of personal 
value) 
Evidence for the 
first part but not 
the second 
Evidence for the 
first part but not the 
second 
 The social psychological measures were 
naturally confounded with group interaction 
during the experiment. Endogenous group 
processes were more important than the 
pathway and we found that groups that 
cooperated more (regardless of pathway) had 
higher measures of social identification etc.  
Latent class Markov models are suitable for modelling 
(dynamic) inductive processes 
Evidence Evidence Evidence  Without this model we would not have seen the 
overlap between individual and co-op, where 
people aligned their decision rules. However, a 
future challenge is to model the first rounds to 
determine the process of this norm emergence. 
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Table 20 continued      









When groups cooperate, this is due to norm formation in the 
initial rounds of the collaboration, during which behaviour of 
individuals becomes almost perfectly aligned with the group 
norm. 
Evidence Evidence Evidence  As above 
When groups fail to cooperate, no norm formation takes 
place and alignment does not happen 
  Evidence  Study 1 and 2 showed overall high levels of 
cooperation so this pattern was not found. In 
Study 3, despite overall low levels of 
cooperation, in the Breakdown and Struggling 
Co-ops some people (Marginal and Resilient 
Cooperators) kept trying to build relationships 
despite having many defectors in their group: 
they gave up their short-sighted interest for the 
future of the group.  
Emergent cooperation co-occurs with a particular style of 
communication which encourages mutual solidarity 
   Evidence Cooperative groups were able to coordinate at 
the level of “us” and promote group solidarity. 
These messages emerged naturally but future 
work could test these effects more 
systematically.  
Sanctioning has a negative effect on emergent cooperation 
and is associated with a failure of intra-group alignment of 
cooperative behaviors 
   Evidence Negative signalling embedded in sanctioning 
appears detrimental. Again, this could be more 
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Coöperatie is vandaag de dag, maar eigenlijk altijd, fundamenteel voor het sociale 
leven. Het succes van de menselijke evolutie is mede te danken aan de effectieve 
samenwerking binnen en tussen groepen (bijv. Boyd & Richerson, 2009). Het vermogen om 
samen te werken en kennis en goederen uit te wisselen, stelt mensen in staat om hun 
vaardigheden te diversifiëren en als collectief productiever te worden. In een geglobaliseerde 
wereld waarin er veel belemmeringen zijn voor coöperatie, is het belangrijker dan ooit om te 
begrijpen hoe we coöperatieve sociale normen kunnen ontwikkelen die coöperatie binnen 
gemeenschappen stimuleren. 
Recentelijk wordt er steeds meer belang gehecht aan het verkrijgen van inzicht in de 
evolutie en het onderhoud van een coöperatieve samenleving. Dit komt onder meer door de 
groei in sociale ongelijkheid, de polarisatie van ideologieën en extremisme, en de politieke 
manipulatie door middel van algoritmen van sociale media, die allemaal een uitdaging en 
soms zelfs een bedreiging vormen voor het aantasten van bestaande coöperatieve sociale 
structuren (bijvoorbeeld Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Putnam, 2001; Woolley & Howard, 
2018). Hoe kan, in het licht van al deze maatschappelijke veranderingen en de spanning 
tussen coöperatieve en concurrerende tendensen in de samenleving, coöperatie worden 
gehandhaafd en onderhouden? Veel recent onderzoek richt zich op de omstandigheden en 
variabelen die bestaan in coöperatieve samenlevingen (zoals 
persoonlijkheidsvoorkeuren, sociale en algemene normen, saillante doelen in de omgeving 
enz.). Er is echter minder onderzoek gedaan naar hoe coöperatieve samenlevingen ontstaan 
- met andere woorden, hoe de persoonlijke kenmerken, normen en doelstellingen ontstaan en 
ontwikkelen is niet bekend. In dit proefschrift, onderzochten we het ontstaan, de ontwikkeling 
en het onderhoud van coöperatie binnen nieuwgevormde groepen. Onze aanpak van het 
bestuderen van coöperatie maakte het mogelijk om ons begrip van hoe deze coöperatieve 
gemeenschappen evolueren te vergroten, maar ook om inzicht te krijgen in hoe coöperatieve 
gemeenschappen kunnen voortbestaan gedurende een langere periode. 
Ons belangrijkste theoretische kader is gebaseerd op het interactieve model van 
sociale identiteitformatie (Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation: IMIF; Postmes, 
Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005), dat een uitbreiding is van de 
sociale identiteitstheorie (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Er is al veel bewijs dat suggereert dat 
identificatie met een groep of sociale categorie coöperatie binnen de groep faciliteert (Brewer 
& Kramer, 1986; De Cremer, Van Knippenberg, Van Dijk, & Van Leeuwen, 2008; De 
Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Simpson, 2006; Wit & Kerr, 2002). Iemands sociale identiteit op 
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basis van groepslidmaatschap kan worden geactiveerd wanneer groepslidmaatschap 
saillant wordt binnen een bepaalde sociale context en kan - volgens IMIF - ofwel worden 
gededuceerd uit brede, abstracte sociale categorieën (zoals ras, 
nationaliteit, geslacht, enz.) of van beneden naar boven geïnduceerd (via interpersoonlijke 
interactie en communicatie). Zowel kleine, interactieve groepen als brede abstracte 
categorieën kunnen dezelfde eigenschappen ontwikkelen. Echter, deze ontwikkeling loopt via 
verschillende paden. In interactieve groepen zijn dynamische processen van cruciaal belang 
voor de groep: sociale normen van de groep ontstaan dynamisch als gevolg van interactie 
gedurende de loop der tijd (inductie), in plaats van dat ze worden 'ingeschakeld' door het 
saillant worden van een sociale categorie (deductie). Dit inductieve proces kan verklaren hoe 
individuen een gevoel van gelijkheid en gemeenschappelijke sociale identiteit ervaren, wat op 
zijn beurt het ontstaan van sociale normen voor coöperatie binnen die groep mogelijk maakt. 
In dit proefschrift hebben we dynamische ‘Public Goods Games’ (PGG's) gebruikt om 
de opkomst of het gebrek aan coöperatieve normen in kleine interactieve groepen te 
bestuderen. PGG's stellen mensen in staat om bij te dragen aan een gedeelde goederen ‘pot’ 
die winst genereert die evenredig is aan de investeringen, maar die het rendement voor 
iedereen gelijk verdeelt, ongeacht individuele investeringen (Olson, 1965). Als gevolg van 
deze opzet, presteren groepen het beste wanneer iedereen meewerkt, maar maximaliseren 
individuen hun winst – in ieder geval op de korte termijn én zolang anderen coöpereren - door 
niet te coöpereren (het zogenaamde ‘free riding’ effect) (Samuelson, 1954). Voorbeelden van 
zogenaamde publiek goederen in onze samenleving zijn: openbare televisie en 
radio; materiële infrastructuur (zoals wegen); intellectuele eigendom ontwikkeld in 
groepen, enz. (Katz, Lazer, Arrow & Contractor, 2004; Shankar & Pavitt, 2002). PGG's zijn 
nuttig omdat ze conceptueel weergeven hoe publieke goederen in de echte wereld werken, 
maar ons in staat stellen coöperatie in een gecontroleerde omgeving te bestuderen. In dit 
proefschrift waren we vooral geïnteresseerd in de vraag of coöperatieve sociale interacties 
binnen PGG's verschillen afhankelijk van of de groepsstructuur deductief of inductief was. 
We hebben een dynamisch PGG geprogrammeerd in de Virtual Interaction 
Application (VIAPPL, zie viappl.org). VIAPPL is een experimenteel platform dat is 
ontworpen om sociale interactie en de evolutie van groepsprocessen en -normen te 
bestuderen (zie Durrheim, Quayle, Tredoux, Titlestad en Tooke, 2016). VIAPPL is 
gebruikt om kleine gemeenschappen te simuleren zodat de opkomst van in interactieve 
groepen - zogenaamde 'co-ops' - kon worden bestudeerd. Interactie tussen deelnemers vond 
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plaats gedurende een bepaalde tijdspanne (d.w.z. deelnemers konden bijdragen leveren aan 
de gedeelde goederen pot gedurende meerdere rondes) en acties van de deelnemers konden 
worden geobserveerd door alle groepsleden. Daarnaast was communicatie tussen de leden van 
de groep mogelijk, waardoor de deelnemers hun intenties konden communiceren, vragen 
konden stellen, of er expliciet naar konden streven elkaar te beïnvloeden door groepsnormen 
te uiten of door anderen verbaal te berispen. Na elke communicatie ronde, konden de 
deelnemers vervolgens bijdragen aan de gedeelde goederen pot. Deze belangrijke 
ingrediënten binnen de experimentele opzet, stelden de groepen in staat om deel te nemen aan 
ruilhandel terwijl ze tegelijkertijd ook sociale relaties kon ontwikkelen met andere 
groepsleden. Deze opzet hielp ons inzicht te krijgen in hoe coöperatieve normen in 
groepen gedurende de tijd ontstaan. 
 
Samenvatting van de bevindingen in de hoofdstukken 
Twee van onze studies werden uitgevoerd in Nederland (zie Hoofdstuk 2 en 
Hoofdstuk 3) waar we deelnemers hebben beloond met een studiepunten of 
een geldbedrag, maar waar de hoogte van de beloningen onafhankelijk was van de uitkomst 
van het experiment (de individuele prestatie op het PGG). Het laatste onderzoek werd 
uitgevoerd in Zuid-Afrika (zie Hoofdstuk 4), waar we de deelnemers aan het einde van het 
experiment hebben beloond door een betaling op basis van hun individuele prestatie op het 
PGG. Gebaseerd op het Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation (Postmes, Haslam, et 
al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005), werden alle drie studies ontworpen om de 
ontwikkeling van coöperatie te onderzoeken door middel van: a) deductieve processen (de 
categorisatie/sociale categorieën conditie in Hoofdstuk 2 tot 4) en b) inductieve processen 
(namelijk de niet-categorisatie conditie in Hoofdstuk 2 en interpersoonlijke netwerken 
conditie in Hoofdstukken 3 en 4). 
Voor de analyse van de gegevens pasten we een ‘multilevel latent class Markov-
model’ toe (Van de Pol & Langeheine, 1990; Vermunt, Tran, & Magidson, 2008) die de 
onderlinge afhankelijkheden die inherent zijn aan de experimentele opzet in rekening nam en 
die ons hielp bij het classificeren van besluitvormingsregels van ronde tot ronde, evenals het 
classificeren van individuele spelers en co-ops (groepen). Zonder deze statistische benadering 
zouden we onze meest fascinerende bevinding niet hebben gevonden: bepaalde soorten 
besluitvormingsregels, die worden gebruikt om te bepalen hoeveel op welk moment wordt 
ingezet in de pot, zijn een eigenschap van de groep die ontstaat als gevolg van hun 
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interactie. Met andere woorden, in een korte periode van interactie (dat wil zeggen, binnen de 
eerste drie tot vier rondes), stemmen mensen hun besluitvormingsgedrag af met hun 
groep. Dus het "type" persoon dat iemand is in een interactieve groepssituatie hangt af van de 
aard van de interactie binnen de groep en is niet puur van een vaste en stabiele eigenschap 
van het individu. Deze specifieke bevinding zou niet mogelijk zijn geweest door het gebruik 
van traditionele statistische analyses. 
In het bijzonder ontdekten we allereerst, door middel van de multilevel latent class 
Markov analyse, dat in alle drie studies zich “co-op types”  vormden, die bijna 
100% overlapten met "individuele types". Dit suggereert in sterke mate dat 
unieke coöperatieve normen ontstaan binnen groepen in slechts een korte periode van 
interactie. Hoewel er een aantal verschillen waren tussen de studies met betrekking tot het 
aantal co-op types die ontstonden en het aantal groepen per co-op type, waren er tussen de 
twee studies ook veel overeenkomsten in de bevindingen. In ‘Committed Co-ops31’ 
(Hoofdstuk 2, 3) en ‘Resilient Co-ops’ (Hoofdstuk 4) ontwikkelde zich een norm om in bijna 
elke ronde maximaal bij te dragen aan de gedeelde pot. Hoewel in ‘Responsive Co-ops’ 
Hoofdstuk 2, 3) soms ook maximaal werd bijgedragen, ontstond daarin een norm om de 
coöperatie te baseren op wat de rest van de co-opleden deden in de vorige ronde - wat in 
wezen coöperatief gedrag beloonde (door individueel meer te geven in de volgende ronde), en 
indirect niet-coöperatief gedrag bestrafte (door minder te geven). Tenslotte, in ‘Reactive Co-
ops’ (Hoofdstuk 2) was de norm om minder dan de Committed en Responsive Co-ops te 
geven en vooral negatief te reageren op lage bijdragen van de groep door zelf de volgende 
ronde nog minder bij te dragen. Dit is een vergelijkbare reactie als bij de Responsive Co-ops, 
echter, met een neerwaartse trend in plaats van een opwaartse trend. Met andere woorden, dit 
soort groepen was minder vergevingsgezind. In Hoofdstuk 4 vonden we ook twee andere "co-
op types" (de ‘Struggling’ en ‘Breakdown’ Co-ops), die geen vergelijkbare sterke normatieve 
patronen vormden. In deze groepen overlapten de individuele typen die door het model 
werden geclassificeerd niet 100% met de typen coöperaties. Zo waren de Struggling 
Coöperaties samengesteld uit 85% ‘Marginal cooperators’, 11% ‘Resilient cooperators’ 
en 3% ‘Defectors’, terwijl ‘Breakdown’ Co-op s bestond uit 66% ‘Defectors’, 30% ‘Marginal 
cooperators’ en 4% ‘Resilient cooperators’. 
                                               
 
31 Om verwarring te voorkomen hebben we ervoor gekozen deze termen niet te vertalen.  
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Ten tweede bleek convergentie binnen groepen (d.w.z. het ontstaan van 
overeenkomsten in de hoogte van de inzet tussen groepsleden binnen een co-op) bij hoge, 
zelfs maximale coöperatie te zijn geassocieerd met bepaalde vormen van sociale 
interactie. Uit de analyse van de inhoud van de berichten die tussen de ronden werden 
verzonden (Hoofdstuk 5), vonden we bijvoorbeeld dat de coördinatie van coöperatieve actie 
door het woordgebruik van "ons", en niet van "jij en ik", de kans vergrootte op het ontstaan 
van coöperatie binnen een groep. Dit gebeurde vooral wanneer het “ons”-woordgebruik werd 
gecombineerd met communicatie die de groepssolidariteit bevorderde, communicatie over 
niet-taakgerelateerde onderwerpen die interpersoonlijke relaties bevorderde, en communicatie 
die overeenstemming bevorderde. Bovendien was berispen in deze studies geen effectief 
instrument om de totstandkoming van coöperatie te bewerkstelligen - het bleek in veel 
groepen zelfs schadelijk te zijn. Het negatieve effect van berispen was mogelijk te wijten aan 
de hardheid van de verzonden berichten die, bij afwezigheid van een vooraf bestaande relatie 
binnen de groep, niet het belang van een goede voortzetting van de 
groepsrelatie communiceerde (zie bijv. Wittek, 2003). Alles bij elkaar genomen, moet er, om 
coöperatie te laten floreren binnen groepen van drie of meer leden, actief vorm worden 
gegeven aan de sociale normen voor coöperatie. Dit kan worden gerealiseerd door 
te communiceren op een manier die de relatie met het collectief verbetert en de duurzaamheid 
ervan waarborgt: Dit kan met name worden gedaan door middel van de coördinatie van de 
coöperatie op collectief niveau, het bevorderen van de groepssolidariteit, en het vermijden van 
berispingen wanneer de relatie nog niet is geconsolideerd. 
Ten slotte ontdekten we in Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 dat er voor beide sociale 
identificatieroutes in het algemeen sprake was van een hoge mate van coöperatie. Echter, 
door het veranderen van de experimentele context in Hoofdstuk 4 en het gebruikmaken van 
financiële in plaats van symbolische beloningen, vonden we dat coöperatie zeldzaam was en 
afwijking van de coöperatie (in plaats van maximale samenwerking) gebruikelijk 
was. Hoewel er enkele coöperatieverbanden in de vorm van Resilient Co-
ops waren in Hoofdstuk 4, werd het grootste deel van de co-ops in de laatste 
studie geclassificeerd als Struggling of Breakdown. Deze Struggling en Breakdown types 
vertoonden niet dezelfde sterke norm-ontwikkeling en bestonden uit verschillende "types" 
individuen die afzonderlijke patronen van besluitvormingsregels hanteerden. 
Aan het einde van deze reeks studies blijven we zitten met een belangrijke vraag: 
Waarom hebben we afwijkende effecten gevonden tussen de eerste twee studies en de laatste 
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studie van dit proefschrift? In Hoofdstuk 4 hebben we enkele mogelijke verklaringen voor 
deze verschillen besproken. Samengevat: de verschillen in de uitkomst van coöperatie 
kunnen mogelijk worden verklaard door de financiële beloning die aan het spel was 
verbonden. In het laatste onderzoek activeerde het winstdoel (Lindenberg, 2015) een 
competitieve geest vanaf het begin van de interactie, wat resulteerde in de hogere 
aanwezigheid van gedrag ten behoeve van het eigenbelang op korte termijn. Een alternatieve 
verklaring is dat de maatschappelijke context verschillend was in de studies. Dat wil zeggen, 
het zou kunnen dat deelnemers in Zuid-Afrika in het algemeen vreemden in het lab minder 
vertrouwen of andere culturele waarden hebben, in vergelijking met deelnemers in 
Nederland. Echter, in alle drie studies wordt duidelijk dat opkomende coöperatie ofwel een 
duurzaam succes ofwel een systematisch falen kan zijn. Ondanks het feit dat deze studies ons 
begrip over succesvolle coöperatie vergroten, suggereert de diversiteit van de bevindingen dat 
er nog veel meer te leren valt. Hoewel we in dit stadium niet alle variantie kunnen 
verklaren, biedt de benadering die we hebben gebruikt (zowel het experimentele paradigma 
als de statistische methodologie) een waardevol hulpmiddel voor toekomstig onderzoek. 
 
Conclusie 
Het doel van dit proefschrift was om te begrijpen hoe coöperatieve normen ontstaan 
in kleine, interactieve groepen in de loop der tijd; en wat de impact van de verschillende 
paden naar sociale identificatie (het deductieve en het inductieve pad) is op coöperatie. Ten 
eerste hebben we bewijs gevonden voor het feit dat via beide paden naar sociale identificatie 
vergelijkbare hoge of lage niveaus van coöperatie kunnen worden bereikt - zij het via 
verschillende wegen. Maar wat nog belangrijker is, we ontdekten dat groepen de neiging 
hebben om normen voor coöperatie te vormen op basis van vergelijkbare 
besluitvormingsregels. Die besluitvormingsregels hebben vervolgens een impact op het 
algemene niveau van coöperatie dat de groep kan bereiken. Met andere woorden, het 
besluitvormingsgedrag ten aanzien van de coöperatie was een product van groepsprocessen en 
groepen bereikten overeenstemming in verschillende patronen van besluitvorming. Daarom is 
het coöperatieve gedrag dat een individu vertoont, geen vaste, stabiele 
eigenschap (bijvoorbeeld vanwege een coöperatieve persoonlijkheid), maar bijna volledig 
afhankelijk van de mensen met wie men samenwerkt, hoe de interactie verloopt, en de 
omgeving waarin dit plaatsvindt. Ten slotte ontdekten we dat de verandering van de sociale 
context en de toevoeging van een financiële beloning in de derde studie, leidde tot 
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een aanzienlijke vermindering van de coöperatie in vergelijking met onze eerste twee 
studies. Bij elkaar genomen, suggereert het coöperatiegedrag in alle studies (dat wil zeggen, 
het bedrag dat werd ingezet tijdens de PGG), evenals de inhoud van de verzonden berichten, 
dat initiële bijdrages in PGG’s kunnen worden voorspeld door statische factoren - zoals 
variabelen op macroniveau die verschillen kunnen verklaren tussen samenlevingen, alsook 
de winstoogmerk geactiveerd door financiële prikkels, enz. Echter, dynamische factoren - die 
pas na verloop van tijd door interactie en communicatie zijn intrede doen - bepalen hoe 
de coöperatie coöperatie verder evolueert. Cruciaal voor het verklaren van deze variabiliteit 
blijkt de aard van sociale interactie – in het bijzonder of groepen gedrag coördineren op het 
niveau van 'ons', terwijl ze tegelijkertijd ook groepssolidariteit bevorderen. Sociale interactie 
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